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Studies of development assistance in Afghanistan have found the impact of such 
assistance for reducing violence and countering insurgents to be weaker than in Iraq, 
not connected to improvements in Afghan perceptions of the quality of their 
governance, and inconsequential in the long term.  While these previous results seem 
disappointing, existing frameworks offer only a limited perspective on why 
development assistance has not been more impactful in Afghanistan.  My research 
analyzes development assistance in contexts that are more closely related to the 
reality of how insurgents fight within the geographic environment in Afghanistan 
compared to the existing literature, while also focusing on the longer-term effects of 
assistance rather than the short-term impacts previously examined.  My framework 
identifies the concepts of risk and commitment as critical factors for countering 
insurgents.  Risk refers to the risk tolerance for counterinsurgents, specifically the 
  
degree to which counterinsurgents emplace development assistance in areas that favor 
insurgent control.  Commitment refers to the persistence of efforts aimed at 
development assistance, capturing the period of time over which counterinsurgents 
make investments in a local area.  My empirical work coupled with qualitative 
interviews indicate that counterinsurgents must be willing to take risk and 
demonstrate commitment for development assistance to contribute to stabilizing a 
local area.  An implication is that the weakness of development assistance for 
countering insurgents in Afghanistan reflects the typical situation in which 
development assistance has high commitment but low risk.  Even when development 
assistance has taken risk, sporadic commitment might be constraining the effects.  A 
hopeful implication of my research is that when development assistance involves 
sufficient risk and commitment, it has the potential to reduce violence in an adjoining 
area.  In particular, I find that more risky rural development has a consistent 
association with less urban violence, while less risky urban development has a 
consistent association with more urban violence.  However, the requirements of risk 
and commitment are steep in practice.  It is possible for development assistance to 
reduce violence and improve stability, but the institutional headwinds are great and 
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This dissertation addresses two basic puzzles around how to estimate and 
understand the effects of development assistance on insurgent strength in 
Afghanistan.  Both puzzles relate to policy problems concerning why the United 
States and coalition forces struggled to stabilize Afghanistan despite having freshly 
re-learned counterinsurgency in Iraq, and why counterinsurgent effects have not been 
enduring in either Iraq or Afghanistan.  Both puzzles are possible to address now 
because the geographic precision and the temporal length of the data on development 
assistance, popular perceptions, and violence in Afghanistan have grown steadily 
since coalition force operations began in October 2001.  There is now enough 
empirical evidence of improvements in stabilization in some local areas over time, as 
well as evidence of the absence of stabilization over time in other areas, to distinguish 
between efforts that did and did not effectively reduce violence and contribute to 
success in countering insurgents. 
The first puzzle is how to integrate the way in which insurgent organizations 
such as the Taliban in Afghanistan conduct attacks into the empirical analysis of the 
effects of development assistance.  The second puzzle is that short-term insurgent 
responses to development assistance may be inconsistent with the effects of 
development on insurgents in a local area over longer periods of time.  For example, a 
development effort might beget an initial increase in violence and only lead to a better 
outcome over a longer period.   





and 2) commitment.  While risk and commitment are familiar in security studies, 
game theory, and economics, I turned to them in this study because of my 
observations during two deployments to Afghanistan as a military intelligence officer.  
The need to integrate analysis with the way insurgents operate motivates the 
use of the term risk, which refers to the risk tolerance for counterinsurgents and 
captures the degree of insurgent control in an area.  Counterinsurgents take more risk 
when they operate in areas with more insurgent control.  The concept of risk in the 
counterinsurgent context can be seen as an analogy to traditional financial 
investments, where higher risk implies higher potential returns.  Counterinsurgents 
operating in areas further away from cities or off the main highway in Afghanistan, 
for example, can be seen as taking greater risk because the terrain and/or the 
population in more remote areas tend to favor insurgents.   
The concept of commitment refers to the persistence of counterinsurgents, 
capturing the period of time over which counterinsurgents undertake investments in a 
local area.  Commitment is consequential because development assistance that 
involves a single or even occasional project in an area would be expected to have a 
different (and lesser) impact than a situation in which development assistance in a 
local area is sustained.  In principle, development assistance could lead to increased 
conflict in the short term as insurgents contest the development or attack security 
forces associated with assistance projects, but over time, the assistance might lead to 
stabilization and a reduction in violence as the economic effects of the development 
assistance mature. These possibilities are the questions addressed in the empirical 





My empirical work and accompanying qualitative interviews together indicate 
that risk and commitment intertwine to such a degree that the potential for 
development assistance to contribute to stabilizing a local area exists only when both 
are present.  Counterinsurgents must not just operate in the relatively risky 
environment of rural Afghanistan and off the main highway, but they must also do so 
for an extended time period–enough to demonstrate commitment.  In addition, 
development in a relatively more risky area—such as in the rural areas around an 
urban area—might affect violence downstream in an adjoining area. That is, a 
development strategy focused on relatively risky rural areas may help stabilize the 
more populous urban areas.  However, the requirements of risk and commitment are 
steep in practice.  The opportunity for stabilizing effects from development assistance 
exist, but the institutional and practical headwinds are fierce, and the costs—
measured across multiple dimensions—are substantial.   
Risk 
Almost all research on development assistance in combat areas over the past 
ten years uses a geographical unit of analysis at the level of the second order 
administrative division.  In Afghanistan, that level is the district level.  While the 
district level unit of analysis seems appropriate from a governance perspective, it is 
not congruent with the way insurgents fight.  A district level unit of analysis neglects 
the reality that most insurgents who conduct attacks in a given area do not reside in 
that same local area.   
Consider an insurgent’s perspective:  why would an insurgent detonate an 





an attack would reduce the value of his own residence, agitate his neighbors (perhaps 
even leading them to provide information to counterinsurgents), and attract security 
forces to come search his residence for IED components.  Such behavior does not 
seem likely from rational insurgents.   
Most tactical intelligence analysts think of insurgent disposition in terms of 
bed-down locations, staging areas, and engagement areas—where insurgents sleep; 
where they gather to organize; and where they carry out attacks.  These can be 
simplified into support zones and disruption zones.  The areas where insurgents bed 
down are support zones.  The areas where insurgents attack are disruption zones.  
Staging areas are near the intersection of the two zones.   
Using risk as a variable allows alignment between quantitative analysis and 
this conception of insurgent disposition.  The level of risk for counterinsurgents 
typically varies with the degree of control for insurgents, where insurgent control can 
come from favorable terrain and/or a favorable population.  Areas of the greatest risk 
for counterinsurgents—the places where insurgents have the most control—are most 
likely to be near bed-down locations or support zones.  Those areas of the least risk—
where insurgent control is more contested—are most likely to contain engagement 
areas or disruption zones.  The empirical results suggest that projects in areas of 
moderate risk—areas near the staging areas around the intersection of support zones 
and disruption zones—may be more valuable for countering insurgents than projects 
in areas of low risk.  
Commitment 





Afghanistan were but a small part of the story of the past 17 years.  Over that period, 
both strategic shifts in the U.S. approach to the Afghan conflict and changes related to 
deployment cycles have made development investments at the local level very uneven 
and often disjointed.  While violence remained pervasive on the aggregate in 
Afghanistan, it seemed unfair to declare that this meant that development assistance 
had failed.  Instead, discerning the effects of development in any given local area 
require understanding the previous efforts made toward investment in that area.   
To have confidence in understanding whether development assistance did or 
did not have an effect, it seemed necessary to know whether a development project 
was, for instance, the first project or the twentieth project in a district.  A violent 
insurgent response to the twentieth project tells a different story than a violent 
response to the first.  Prior analyses had not included this information, focusing 
primarily on the dollars involved but not on projects’ temporal characteristics.  
Including a measure of commitment brings in information about whether the impacts 
of development assistance have compounded over time at the local level.  
Why the Omission of Risk and Commitment is Consequential 
When analyses do not distinguish between varying levels of risk, the majority 
of projects carried out in areas with relatively less risk can dominate the effects that 
appear in empirical estimates of the relationship between development assistance and 
violence.  While there is some risk anywhere in Afghanistan, Chapter 1 illuminates 
the many headwinds that constrain most projects to be emplaced in less risky areas.  
At the same time, when analyses do not capture the degree of local commitment, they 





and stabilization mechanisms that require time to take root.   
Opportunity cost and goods competition mechanisms are often prematurely 
dismissed in such analyses, but they might be relevant in models that account for risk 
and commitment.1  An opportunity cost effect in an Afghan context would exist if 
potential insurgents turn away from insurgent recruitment because their time would 
be more valuably spent farming or transporting goods to market.  This type of effect 
is only possible once development investments have lasted for periods that exceed 
insurgent recruitment cycles and have reached the populations targeted by insurgents 
for recruitment.  A goods competition effect could occur if existing insurgents or 
insurgent supporters began to defect because loyalty to insurgents precluded them or 
their families from access to counterinsurgent development programs.  This type of 
effect is only possible once counterinsurgents have a stable presence in areas close 
enough to areas of insurgent control to make competition genuine.  Instead, an 
information-sharing mechanism by which counterinsurgents undertake development 
projects in order to elicit useful information from locals dominates empirical findings 
in analyses that are short term or do not consider risk.2  
However, the relationship between development assistance and 
counterinsurgent success based on information-sharing faces fundamental constraints 
                                               
1 The opportunity cost mechanism suggests that development assistance can increase the opportunity 
cost of participating in the insurgency and thereby reduce insurgent recruitment because potential 
insurgents must relinquish better opportunities outside of the insurgency.  The opportunity cost 
mechanism originates from Becker (1968) but has greatest empirical support in this context in 
Blattman and Annan (2015).  The goods competition mechanism suggests that development assistance 
can reduce the relative advantage insurgents maintain with local public goods provision, subsequently 
increasing the likelihood that insurgents face a defection problem.  Goods competition comes from 
Berman and Laitin (2008). 
2 The information-sharing mechanism suggests that development assistance can lead the population to 
provide more information that is useful to counterinsurgents.  The information-sharing model was 





when risk and commitment are not considered.  This condition exists because 
placement and access are key criteria for the quality of information from a human 
intelligence source.3   Individuals with placement and access to insurgents are more 
likely to reside in areas of greater insurgent control.  As a result, the likelihood of 
receiving information from an informant with quality placement and access has a 
direct relationship with the level of risk counterinsurgents undertake.  Hence, the 
information that might be derived from a project in a relatively risky area has the 
potential to be more valuable than the information from a project in a less risky spot.  
In addition, developing credible information corroboration in a relatively risky area 
takes time; counterinsurgents must be committed to the area.  Thus, if institutional 
processes lead to the establishment of more projects in areas of less risk or if there is 
sporadic commitment to risky areas (as is shown in Chapter 1), then the only 
detectable effect will be from information-sharing, and the effect of development 
assistance in reducing violence is likely to be small—as has been found in previous 
research. 
Why Development Assistance with Risk and Commitment Could Be 
Consequential 
 
This dissertation, in contrast, examines development assistance with an 
empirical methodology—both quantitative and qualitative—that measures both risk 
and commitment.  Counterinsurgency and stabilization mechanisms that involve 
information-sharing, opportunity cost, or goods competition could each reduce 
                                               
3 The Army Human Intelligence manual (FM 2-22.3, 2006) states, “Sources are chosen according to 
their reliability, level of cooperation, and placement and access.  Selection is particularly important in 
stability and reconstruction operations where the HUMINT collectors have access to a large potential 





violence when risk and commitment interact.  From a risk perspective, projects must 
be close enough to areas of insurgent control for efforts to elicit information-sharing 
from local citizens with placement and access to insurgents, for opportunity cost to 
dissuade potential insurgent recruits, or for counterinsurgent goods and services to 
offer viable competition in areas of insurgent advantage.  Risk alone is insufficient, 
however, because commitment over time is necessary to develop information 
corroboration, to manifest a positive effect on the local economy, or to reach a level 
of competitiveness with insurgents.  Thus, the need for sufficient risk and 
commitment is a common spatial and temporal requirement for development to 
improve security.  This two-fold requirement for both risk and commitment connects 
the information-sharing, opportunity cost, and goods competition mechanisms.  These 
mechanisms are all present in extant theoretical frameworks.  The innovation here is 
applying the concepts to empirical work with the spatial and temporal parameters that 
allow policy conclusions to be drawn. 
Designing a Study around Risk and Commitment 
Examining the effectiveness of development assistance for countering 
insurgents along the dimensions of risk and commitment was necessary for personal 
contentment that the conglomeration of development investments in Afghanistan 
since 2002 had been analyzed properly and that the right lessons had been gathered 
on whether these efforts made a difference.  As described above, many of the 
counterinsurgency and stabilization mechanisms discussed elsewhere in the 
development and counterinsurgency literature are unifiable along the lines of risk and 





multiple mechanisms might be present as ways in which assistance works to reduce 
violence.  To date, however, there is no empirical work to discern whether risk and 
commitment matter for development assistance’s effects; this became my principal 
focus. 
Not surprisingly, I did not find a single data source or level of analysis where I 
could illuminate readily-quantified measures of risk and commitment and estimate 
their independent and interactive effects on insurgents.  Data are both noisy and 
incomplete in an environment such as Afghanistan.  Some data on quantitative 
measures of development assistance or insurgent attacks have great geographic 
precision but do not have accurate reporting over a sufficient timespan (let alone all 
17 years of the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan).  Precise violence data in particular 
(such as Department of Defense Significant Activities, or SIGACTS, data) depends 
on the number of troops patrolling; the econometrician would say the data are biased.  
Other quantitative data on development projects or on the number of attacks exist 
over a longer period with more consistent measures but without the same geographic 
precision.   
In addition, relying on quantitative data alone misses the insights that can be 
gathered from those who made decisions about development in Afghanistan and 
observed its effects first-hand.  Capturing these insights is a fleeting opportunity 
while memories remain vivid.  Even so, there are limits to the analysis here.  For 
example, the best measures of insurgent strength—those that reveal private insurgent 
information—exist only to a very limited degree at an unclassified level.   





triangulate whether risk and commitment matter, and why.  I begin with a two-
chapter, provincial-level case study on project emplacement and its effects to build 
and refine my theory of risk and commitment’s importance.  I conclude with a 
national-level application of the theory to a rural-urban construct, examining the 
interactions between risk and commitment across the rural versus urban geographical 
divide that is pervasive in Afghanistan.  No single chapter is irrefutable, and I openly 
state the uncertainties and limitations in each.  Confidence in the importance of risk 
and commitment emerges from the multiple data sources and multiple levels of 
analysis that point toward the common conclusion that risk and commitment matter. 
Dissertation Outline 
Chapter 1 begins with an institutional perspective on project emplacement to 
explain why development projects rarely involve both risk and commitment.  
Counterinsurgents face a challenge of projection.  Qualitative interviews and 
quantitative data capture the headwinds faced by counterinsurgents in consistently 
conducting development projects away from cities or away from the main highway 
(the ring road, which is an area over which counterinsurgents consistently seek to 
maintain control).  Consequently, the majority of projects are in the less risky 
insurgent disruption zones—locations in which weaker effects of development 
assistance are expected—rather than near the more risky staging areas or support 
zones.   
Chapter 2 operationalizes risk and commitment within the case study from 
Chapter 1 and estimates their independent and interactive effects.  The empirical 





identified in Chapter 1.  Development with commitment but without risk allows 
violence to escalate.  Meanwhile, development with risk and low levels of 
commitment at least initially, curbs violence.  A limitation of the empirical work is 
that there are a limited number of projects in relatively risky districts, with the result 
that uncertainty remains about the combined effects of risk and higher levels of 
commitment in the longer term.  From the micro-level case study, there may be 
qualitative differences between projects in more and less risky areas at lower levels of 
commitment—such as the possible presence of co-option in riskier areas—but the 
quantitative differences are less clear.4  The implication is that taking risk matters; 
commitment alone is not enough.  While there is suggestive evidence that violence is 
reduced when development assistance involves both risk and commitment, these 
latter empirical results are not as strong. 
Chapter 3 looks at risk and commitment in a broader context with different 
development and violence data—an out of sample test.  The empirical results show 
that more risky rural development has a consistent association with less urban 
violence, while less risky urban development has a consistent association with more 
urban violence.  Again, the implication is that risk must be taken for development 
assistance to translate into less violence.  While urban development can increase 
welfare for more people and is more cost efficient (because there are more people in 
the urban areas and each dollar goes further, or should), operating in the cities alone 
does not appear to reduce violence.  Rural development on the face appears less 
                                               
4 The co-option mechanism suggests that insurgents allow development assistance to take place 
because it benefits them directly, reducing attacks in proximity to development projects.  For instance, 
insurgents may become part of the labor force for development projects or gain legitimacy by allowing 





consequential because those areas are less dense in population and there are greater 
logistical costs.  But the empirical work indicates that development assistance in more 
risky rural areas reduces violence in the adjoining urban areas—a finding that alters 
calculations of development’s benefits and costs during counterinsurgency and 
stabilization.  While I do not include a cost-benefit analysis of whether investing in 
development assistance with sufficient risk and commitment is worthwhile, the 
empirical results imply that the hurdle for success in countering insurgents is steep. 
Implications 
Each chapter contributes to illuminating the relevance of risk and commitment 
as critical dimensions for development assistance to counter insurgencies, but each 
one also has a unique implication.  The first chapter’s perspective on institutions is 
relevant for institutional reforms spurred by the 2018 inter-agency Stabilization 
Assistance Review.  The second chapter’s examination of different counterinsurgency 
and stabilization mechanisms addresses ambiguity in the literature on the effect of 
development assistance during counterinsurgency and stabilization.  The third 
chapter’s rural-urban framework has implications for thinking about the role of 
development in counterinsurgency and stabilization and for planning the disposition 
of security forces and development.  With this range of implications, this study is 
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Chapter 1: Provincial Reconstruction Team Decision-Making 
and Project Emplacement 
 
Since the United States began investing in governance and 
development in Afghanistan in 2002, resource constraints have always 
meant that decisions about where to invest have involved tradeoffs.  An 
investment in one village or government seat comes at the cost of a 
potential investment in another.  Yet, where to prioritize development 
assistance is not doctrinally prescribed.  I use qualitative interviews 
with civilian and military leaders on Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
in adjacent provinces that cross a regional command boundary 
(Ghazni and Zabul) to develop a generalizable understanding of this 
prioritization process and to identify conditions that influence project 
emplacement.  I organize my analysis to distinguish between 
conditions that constrain or support projection away from population 
centers or the main highway—development assistance with greater 
projection is away from the cities and in rural areas at a distance from 
the highway.  I find that maximizing benefits for Afghans, supporting 
Afghan provincial leaders, and unifying U.S. agency priorities 
constrained projection while valuing geographic equity for Afghans, 
leveraging Afghan local leadership, tolerating financial inefficiency, 
and separating U.S. agency objectives supported projection.  These 
ground-level conditions illuminate unanticipated consequences of 
logical principles that are relevant for strategic-level reforms seeking 




Development and reconstruction in Afghanistan since 2002 has involved some 
amalgamation of the doctrines of counterinsurgency and stabilization.  If the entire 
country could follow the “shape-clear-hold-build-transition” model in the most 
current U.S. ground force counterinsurgency doctrine (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 
2014), then stability tasks would be most prevalent in the later build and transition 
stages.  When resource constraints prevent such a sequence in every locale, however, 





accomplish multiple counterinsurgency and stability objectives.  A starting point for 
examining counterinsurgency and stability outcomes in Afghanistan is to ask, why 
were investments in governance and development made in one local area over 
another?  This understanding of project emplacement can then inform analyses of 
project effects.  However, a puzzle exists because existing analyses do not consider 
development project emplacement at a more granular level than that of a district, and 
neither counterinsurgency doctrine nor literature on bureaucratic and individual 
decision-making allow precise expectations or predictions for where projects should 
be emplaced.  Civilian and military leaders in Afghanistan had to figure it out.  This 
chapter seeks to make systematic what they learned. 
Counterinsurgency and stability doctrine are left open in terms of how much 
to invest in governance and development in different types of locations, leaving those 
on the ground with much leeway and many tradeoffs because each project must occur 
at a fixed location and can only impact a limited number of people.  Among the many 
echelons in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) spent the most time grappling with this challenge of 
deciding where to invest counterinsurgency and stabilization resources.  PRTs were 
inter-agency teams consisting of civilian and military personnel responsible for 
planning and implementing governance and development in each Afghan Province.  
U.S.-led PRTs consisted of Department of State, Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID), and U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) personnel.   





decisions in a conflict environment could influence PRT outputs.  Operating at the 
bottom of a bureaucracy, PRTs engaged in an inter-agency process that sought to 
translate general counterinsurgency and stability doctrine to actual locations of 
governance and development investment while allocating limited resources and 
limited time.  At the same time, individual personalities and capacities also mattered 
as civilian and military officials faced the complexities of gathering information and 
identifying the needs of Afghan communities—whether those perceived by the 
population or actual needs.   
This analysis coheres with the themes of Komer (1972) and Greentree (2013), 
who emphasized the consequences of institutions for counterinsurgency and stability 
outcomes at the national and theater levels in Vietnam and Afghanistan.  Studying 
PRTs allows a consistent focus on an inter-agency institution at the ground level of 
the multi-level, inter-agency institutional structure rather than the middle or the top, 
on which Greentree and Komer focused their attention.  If ground-level PRT 
decisions determine project emplacement and project emplacement in turn impacts 
counterinsurgency and stability outcomes—as I examine in Chapter 2—a nuanced 
understanding of PRT behavior aids in understanding those outcomes.     
I use a case study of PRTs in Ghazni and Zabul Provinces from 2008 through 
2012 for a view into counterinsurgency and stability efforts across two regional 
commands and across the pre- and post-surge eras of U.S. operations in Afghanistan.  
As adjacent provinces with PRTs led by the United States, the two locations for these 
longitudinal case studies capture both civilian and military efforts and offer insights 





space.  This study speaks directly to many of the themes in the 2018 Stabilization 
Assistance Review (SAR) completed by the Department of State, USAID, and DOD 
(June 2018).  While the SAR appropriately identifies past deficiencies in “strategic 
clarity, organizational discipline, and unity of effort” during stabilization (1), policy 
changes to address these deficiencies will not be costless.  This study illuminates 
some of the potential unintended consequences of what seem like logical principles 
regarding development assistance when decisions about project emplacement are 
made.   
The lessons from the SAR that have direct ties to the findings in this case 
study are those related to the host nation’s role in driving projects (7) and achieving 
“unity of purpose” across U.S. agencies (9).  Both are appropriate lessons, but this 
study highlights nuance when it comes to project emplacement decisions where host-
nation primacy and inter-agency unity could diverge from their intent.  Limited 
interests of host nation leaders or a lumbering inter-agency process could constrain 
projection and weaken stabilizing effects.  By projection, I mean the emplacement of 
projects away from the center, whether outside of a provincial or district seat, or in a 
location at a distance from a central geographic feature like the main highway.  Thus, 
this study presents ground-level challenges that are relevant for the implementers of 






I find that PRTs faced consistent logistical resource constraints.  Logical and 
doctrinal efforts to efficiently maximize the number of Afghans who benefit from 
governance and development, the desire to support—or at least acknowledge— 
Afghan provincial leader preferences, and the need to work in a way that could unify 
multiple U.S. agency objectives often constrained development assistance from 
taking place away from provincial capitals or away from the main highway (Table 1).  
That is, projects were more often emplaced closer to the center.  Because limiting 
projection optimized popular benefits, governor interests, and U.S. agency priorities, 
sustained development projection was rare.  When projection did occur, it arose from 
a combination of emphasis on equitable geographic dispersion of goods and services, 
local leaders with large social endowments, tolerance of financial inefficiency, and 




Conditions That Constrain Projection
1.  Maximizing Benefits for Afghans Serve the most people by developing densely populated areas High
2.  Supporting Afghan Provincial Leaders Support the governor whose interests center around the capital High
3.  Unifying U.S. Agency Priorities Achieve "Whole of Government" approach and mass effects Low
Conditions That Support Projection
1.  Valuing Geographic Equity for Afghans Distribute benefits of development throughout the province High
2.  Leveraging Afghan Local Leadership Capitalize on those with interest in and influence over projects High
3.  Tolerating Financial Inefficiency Permit contractors to coalition-build to complete projects Medium
4.  Separating U.S. Agency Objectives Accomplish agency objectives independently Low
Table 1.  Summary of Conditions that Impact Project Emplacement
Note:  High confidence indicates that officials in both provinces consistently mentioned the conditon's importance.  Medium 
confidence indicates that officials in one province consistently mentioned the condition's importance.  Low confidence indicates 





Background on PRTs in Afghanistan 
 
 
 The use of PRTs in Afghanistan began in 2003 and ended by the end of 2013.  
While all PRTs did not start at the same time, there were PRTs in 26 of 34 Afghan 
provinces.  Taking a snapshot in 2008, twelve provinces had PRTs led by the United 
States, and 14 provinces had PRTs led by other countries in the coalition.   PRTs in 
Iraq had more substantial civilian leadership, while PRTs in Afghanistan were—
numerically—dominated by military personnel.  U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan were 
composed of approximately 100 military personnel and up to about 10 civilians.  
Among the military personnel were civil affairs, engineer, medical, and security force 
personnel.  The military positions were filled by a combination of active duty, 
reserve, and national guard members from either the Army, Navy, or Air Force.  In 
the case of the two provinces in this case study, the Navy or Air Force provided 
active duty key leaders including the PRT commander, the Army Reserves provided 
civil affairs teams, and the National Guard provided security forces. Among the 
civilian personnel were one or several State Department officials, one or several 
USAID officials, a U.S. Department of Agriculture official, and several U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers civilians.  The senior State Department official on the PRT served 
Table 2.  Summary of PRTs in Ghazni and Zabul, 2008-2012
Ghazni Zabul
Regional Command RC-East RC-South
Provincial Battlespace Ownership Poland Romania (2008-June 2010)
U.S. (July 2010-2012)
PRT Leadership Navy Air Force
Civil Affairs Army Reserve Army Reserve
Security Forces Army National Guard Army National Guard







as the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) for each of the two provinces studied 
here. 
 PRT responsibilities were broad, spanning governance, security, and 
reconstruction and development spheres.  One PRT commander in this study shared 
his mission statement:   
Conduct civil-military operations in [X] Province to extend the reach 
and legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan by: 
 
Promoting good governance and justice 
 
Supporting and enabling effective Afghanistan security apparatus 
 
Facilitating reconstruction, development and economic growth by 
developing projects on the leading edge of the Afghan National 
Development Strategy.  [Province was removed.  Emphasis in the 
original source.] 
 
This mission statement slightly reflects the earlier era of PRTs in Afghanistan before 
Afghan security forces were more heavily supported by Security Force Assistance 
Teams.  Hence while broad expectations for PRTs to contribute to governance, 
security, and reconstruction and development were common, the preponderance of 
PRT time was spent on governance and reconstruction and development. 
 While PRTs were central to counterinsurgency and stability strategy, they also 
faced resource constraints, making their prioritization decisions substantial.  One PRT 
commander noted, “You look at ISAF’s lines of effort, they had five at the time, and 
PRTs were engaged in four of the five, but they were the most under-resourced and 
the smallest units out in the field” (Interviewee 6, August 27, 2018).  Thus, the study 






Prior to the 2010 surge in Afghanistan, PRTs were generally seen as aiding 
stability.  Malkasian and Meyerle (2009) found from case studies of PRTs in four 
Afghan provinces in 2007 and 2008 that PRTs supported short-term stability (2-3), 
and they argued that PRTs should be a part of the U.S. surge (x).  Yet, the potential 
for success of PRTs that Malkasian and Meyerle found does not reflect all PRT 
performance.  Maley (2007) described that “as time has gone by, one point has 
become increasingly clear – there is no single ‘PRT experience’.  Instead, a range of 
factors come into play which shape what PRTs can achieve, and in what ways.”  
While a range of PRT outcomes are likely as Maley captures, this study aims to 
identify commonalities despite the variation.  I look for commonalities that extend 
across regional commands and across time.  Studying PRTs allows a rare lens into 
dynamics and challenges that are common for implementing development assistance 
by either civilian or military personnel.  The lessons brought forth will have 
application for future institutions implementing development assistance in conflict 
areas.      
What the Literature Offers for Predicting PRT Outputs 
The bureaucratic and individual decision-making literatures offer some clues 
about how PRTs as inter-agency institutions away from Washington arrive at project 
emplacement decisions.  The PRTs in this case study have four attributes that the 
literature suggests may exert conflicting pressures:  weak rules, distance from 
Washington and Kabul, uncertain cooperation, and environmental complexity.  The 
way in which these attributes interact is expected to be consequential for whether 





study aims to identify which among these conflicting pressures are most relevant for 
PRTs, and to consider whether additional factors outside the existing literature on 
bureaucratic and individual decision-making may govern PRT behavior.   
First, weak rules about project emplacement could either constrain or enable 
development projection.  A common refrain in bureaucratic literature is that 
bureaucracy leads to the avoidance of risk and adherence to rules, both of which are 
directly related to promotion in the bureaucracy (Warwick 1975, 110).  While rules—
that is doctrine—for counterinsurgency and stabilization exist, they emphasize what 
to focus on rather than where to prioritize.  In addition, because of the novelty of 
PRTs, they exhibit minimal institutionalization by which norms could take the place 
of rules.  In the absence of clear rules or norms, officials could wait for direction, 
avoid risk, and limit projection, or they could take advantage of the flexibility and 
independence to reach out into the countryside.   
Second, the distance from Washington and Kabul could create conflicting 
motives for both civilian and military officials.  Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter (1974) 
describe that on one hand officials in the field are responsive to their parent 
organization to the extent that “the military commander or ambassador is only 
nominally in full control of those beneath them” (261-2).  Because officials in the 
field have dominance over local information, however, they often come to view their 
superiors as uninformed and disruptive (263).  Whether officials become more or less 
deferential, and more or less risk averse, as a result of distance from Kabul and 
Washington will be consequential for where PRTs choose to emplace projects.   





matters for projection from the center are also uncertain.  Generally, there are low 
expectations for cooperation in inter-agency organizations because of information 
transaction costs and the trust required for cooperation.  This expectation connects 
back to North (1990; 12, 29-30).  Yet, PRTs place civilian and military officials in 
close proximity for an extended period—most often around six to nine months—
which could overcome barriers to cooperation.  Still, whether PRTs trend toward 
cooperation and what this could mean for projection is not certain in advance.  One 
might expect PRTs to exhibit the trading of political favors between officials and 
operate as described in the Allison (1999) model of governmental politics (255).  If 
Allison’s governmental politics model applies, PRT members may well push hard on 
some projects, relent on others, or trade favors as a form of strategic behavior.  These 
types of interactions are not visible in the existing PRT research, and the 
consequences in terms of project emplacement from how a PRT approaches 
cooperation are uncertain.   
Fourth, individual capacities and experiences could have a great effect on 
project emplacement because of the uncertainty of the combat environment.  Wilson 
(1989) notes that in any government agency, individual factors of prior experiences, 
professional norms, personality, and ideology are consequential (34).  Halperin, 
Clapp, and Kanter (1974) further emphasize the role of the individual in complex 
foreign environments like the conflict in Afghanistan:  
There is a great uncertainty about what is going on in the world and 
what the effects of alternative courses of action would be.  The way an 
individual copes with this uncertainty is affected by his background—
the personal experiences, intellectual baggage, and psychological 
needs he brings with him—as well as by his position in the 






This assertion has a great deal in common with the contentions of Steinbruner (1974), 
who describes the cybernetic mental simplifications individuals make to operate in 
complex environments (64-6).  He contends that otherwise frustrating bureaucratic 
outcomes might actually be reflections of cybernetic processes (13).  PRTs dealt with 
uncertainty in identifying the actual needs of Afghan communities as well as the true 
composition, disposition, and strength of insurgents.  How individuals resolve 
uncertainty and how they process information could be consequential for where 
projects were emplaced. 
 Out of this amalgam of bureaucratic and individual influences, PRTs arrived 
at locations for projects on the ground.  Explanations for how PRTs might arrive at 
such decisions exist within a range.  At one extreme, civilian and military PRT 
members could implement development assistance as close as possible to the center 
because the rules do not require taking risk, because higher headquarters have not 
specified what they should do, because all agencies can agree on the least common 
denominator outcome of working in the center, or because more time can be spent 
understanding the areas in closest proximity.  At the other extreme, civilian and 
military PRT members could implement development assistance broadly because the 
rules do not constrain them, because they can shape the information higher 
headquarters receive, because there is less conflict between agencies when moving 
further from the center, or because the environment away from the center has fewer 
actors.        
This analysis examines the different ways in which the lack of rules, distance 





resolving complexity interacted.  Out of the interactions, I identify collections of 
factors that constrain or enable projection, some of which connect with the factors in 
the existing research literature and others that are novel.  The results enable improved 
clarity about project emplacement decisions than allowed by the existing literatures 
on bureaucratic and individual decision-making.  
Case Study Selection 
The PRTs in Ghazni and Zabul were selected as case studies because they 
were U.S.-led PRTs in adjacent provinces at the boundary of two different 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Regional Commands (RCs).  As a 
result of commonalities between the provinces and the regional command boundary, 
it is reasonable to argue that commonalities between PRT experiences in the two 
provinces is generalizable to all U.S. PRT experiences.  As bordering provinces along 
Highway 1, similar geography, topography, key infrastructure, economic structures, 
and social demographics allows some separation between the characteristics of PRTs 
and characteristics of the environment.  
The time period from 2008 through 2012 was selected to allow insight into the 
pre-surge, surge, and post-surge eras in Afghanistan.  While PRTs were created in 
2003, most U.S. foreign policy attention was in Iraq from 2003 through the end of 
2007.  Afghanistan was starting to garner attention at the point when this case study 
begins in 2008.  The troop surge in Afghanistan began in 2010 after President 
Obama’s announcement in December 2009.  Nineteen months later, President Obama 
announced the beginning of the drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan.  Thus, 





increases associated with the surge and resource reductions associated with the 
drawdown.  Common trends across these time periods should be seen as robust and 



















Figure 1a.  Ghazni and Zabul Provinces within Afghanistan 







I began developing an understanding of PRT operations in Ghazni and Zabul 
by reviewing documents and social media posts.  As a starting point for documents, I 
used the Factiva database with a keyword search for “Provincial Reconstruction 
Team Ghazni” and “Provincial Reconstruction Team Zabul.”  The Factiva search 
produced news articles and press releases totaling 276 pages for PRT Ghazni and 243 
pages for PRT Zabul.  On social media, I read the full histories on the PRT Ghazni 
and PRT Zabul Facebook pages.  The Facebook pages often had links to other articles 
or press releases, such as those through Defense Visual Information Distribution 
Service (DVIDS) or, in the case of PRT Ghazni, a blog page.  From the several 
qualitative data sources, I developed timelines of events and persons for both PRTs.   
 I initially sent messages to civilian and military leaders on PRTs Ghazni and 
Zabul who were identifiable through LinkedIn.  Following some initial interviews, I 
was able to connect with other individuals through the connections of respondents, a 
snowball sampling technique.  In full, I contacted a total of 24 civilian and military 
officials who served in on PRTs in Ghazni and Zabul during the time frame of the 
case study, and I completed interviews with 13 of them.  Those contacted for 
Table 3.  Summary of Interview Data
Ghazni Zabul
Contacted Requesting Interview 13 11
Responded to Request 8 6
Completed Interview 7 6




Completed Interviews by Time Period
Before Surge (2008-2009) 1.25 4





interviews and those who completed interviews were balanced between provinces, 
civilian and military officials, and the time period of study, as shown in Table 3.   
I completed the interviews through a combination of personal meetings, phone 
calls, and videoconferences.  For accuracy and to protect the participants, I recorded 
the audio from the interviews, removed any personally identifiable information while 
transcribing the content, and then destroyed the recordings.  Throughout the analysis, 
individuals are identified only by the organization and province in which they served.  
For analysis of the interview transcripts, I created an excel table that separated key 
themes in the interview responses by agency and time.  I also used NVivo for 
keyword searching of the transcripts.  
Overview of PRT Experiences in Ghazni and Zabul 
The PRTs in Ghazni and Zabul exhibited some broad similarities.  PRT 
Ghazni was established in March 2004, and PRT Zabul was established in May 2004.  
In addition, civilian and military leaders I interviewed from both PRTs described 
having significant autonomy.  A large part of the autonomy was due to provincial 
battlespace ownership by other countries in the coalition, not the United States.  
Throughout the time period of this study, the Polish Task Force White Eagle was 
responsible for the battlespace in Ghazni.  One commander in Ghazni said, “We had 
more than our fair share of autonomy because the Polish commander had been 
granted a lot of autonomy from Bagram, from the 101st, from RC-East” (Interviewee 
2, October 1, 2018).  From the start of this study through July 2010, a Romanian Task 





Everybody was pretty much hands off.  They were just like, what do 
you need.  Their priorities were not really, it wasn’t so much that they 
weren’t dictating what I needed to do, it was more like go in, learn as 
much as you can.  And remember this was all pretty new.  Nobody 
knew what anyone was doing.  But, you had free reign to just make 
common sense decisions. (Interviewee 5, August 22, 2018.) 
 
Starting in July 2010, U.S. forces took leadership of Combined Team Zabul, 
although Romanian forces remained in Zabul and still contributed to the combined 
team staff.  However, the PRT remained generally autonomous until December 2011.  
3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, which assumed command 
on December 27, 2011, placed greater restrictions and controls on PRT operations 
(Interviewee 7, October 4, 2018).  Still, the autonomy that PRTs in Ghazni and Zabul 
maintained for most of the period of the case study makes the PRT the right echelon 
level at which to consider project emplacement decisions.   
 The PRTs in Ghazni and Zabul also both seem to end in similar positions.  
PRT Zabul experienced a major attack in August 2011.  On August 28, 2011, a 450 to 
500-pound vehicle-borne improvised explosive device was detonated next to the wall 
of the PRT compound, followed by several suicide bombers (Interviewee 7, October 
4, 2018; Interviewee 12, October 13, 2018).  Later, in April 2013, another vehicle-
borne improvised explosive device attack, this time on a Zabul PRT convoy, resulted 
in five killed in action (Associated Press, April 7, 2013).  The attack was on one of 
the final planned movements of PRT Zabul, and the PRT ended its operations in May 
2013 (Interviewee 12, October 13, 2018).   
Just a few months later, in August 2013, PRT Ghazni faced a complex attack 
that resulted in seven killed in action and fifty wounded in action (BBC, August 30, 





Figure 2a.  Graph of SIGACTS in Ghazni and Zabul Provinces from 2003 - 2013 
was the last PRT to conclude its operations (DVIDS, November 27, 2013).  These 
events create the perception of a strengthening insurgency at the time of each PRT’s 









Still, the paths of the PRTs in Ghazni and Zabul to these points were quite 
distinct.  Media reporting suggests that Ghazni became volatile far earlier.  Prior to 
November 2003, Ghazni was considered one of the few safe primarily Pashtun 
provinces, and international aid workers were able to operate independently in the 
province (Christian Science Monitor, November 19, 2003).  The establishment of the 
PRT in Ghazni in March 2004 was described as a response to rising violence in 
Ghazni (Agence France Presse, March 4, 2004).  PRT Ghazni was described as a case 
study of positive PRT influence in Malkasian and Meyerle (2009), but they also noted 
that violence did not decrease as a consequence of PRT Ghazni’s efforts (23-4).  This 
Ghazni case study from 2008 through 2012 identifies conditions that are consistent 
with what Malkasian and Meyerle found in their study of 2006 to 2008.   
During the period of this case study, the interviews suggested several different 
types of environments within Ghazni.  First, several districts were completely 
Taliban-controlled.  Second, the four primarily Hazara districts had almost no Taliban 
influence or violence.  Finally, the majority of districts were contested.  In the 
contested districts, PRT convoys were targets of attacks, but those attacks were not 
described as particularly strong.  One commander in Ghazni described,  
I guess there was one point when they were thinking about assaulting 
the base.  We were getting all of this intel, and we basically started 
doing all of these base defense drills.  They ended up not doing it.  
They basically ended up doing it what, two or three years later. 
 
Basically, I think they had been planning that attack for years.  For 
whatever reason, they decided not to execute it our year.  Basically, 
massive VBIED, break the wall, send in the suicide squad, see what 
you can do.  So we were preparing for a major attack that didn’t 
happen. 
 





thing.  They weren’t trying to annihilate units.  So, they would put an 
IED in the road.  Once a week you would have a Rosomak, one of the 
Polish APCs [Armored Personnel Carriers], get blown up.  And they 
would blow up the MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
vehicles]—by then, we were all driving MRAPs.  But, you never really 
saw the Stalingrad continuous meatgrinder.  It was very much.  Here’s 
an insurgency.  We will attrit you, and do just enough attacks to keep 
the pressure on.  We did get, I guess it was kind of that continuous low 
level, I think it averaged every-other-day we were getting indirect fire 
at the FOB.  (Interviewee 1, August 10, 2018.) 
 
Thus, most PRT movement could be delayed but not inhibited by the threat.  Yet, 
Taliban influence in the province also could never be stemmed.  Figure 2a and 2b 
show Significant Activities (SIGACTS) recorded by coalition forces in Ghazni and 
Zabul, which make evident the insurgency’s violent capability during the period of 
the case study.  (Data courtesy of Shaver and Wright.) 
 Meanwhile, the violence that PRT Zabul experienced at the end of its 
operations did not follow a consistent level of violence in Zabul.  Early in the time 
window of the case study, PRT members described that the Taliban was mostly 
interested in facilitation of men, weapons, and equipment through Zabul but not 
conducting attacks in Zabul.  As late as May 2011, The New York Times suggested 
that Zabul was “a glimpse of what a stable future might look like as Afghans take 
over their own security and administration by 2014” (May 24, 2011).  Yet, the attack 
in August 2011 and other attacks around Qalat the following year demonstrate the 
Taliban’s capability and perhaps suggest a shift in Taliban interest as they started to 
conduct attacks in Zabul.  A PRT commander said that the governor in Zabul 






I had a long talk with the governor about that.  It was funny because he 
also was not in town when that attack happened.  He told me that he 
thought it was that we were actually starting to make a substantial 
impact:  that the few years that the PRT had been there, that they were 
becoming part of the community, the USDA guy was out doing his 
farm, we were out building bridges and schools and getting stuff done 
at the hospital, and we were maybe starting to turn the population as a 
whole, helping the government do that, and helping the government of 
Afghanistan do what they needed to do to support their own people.  
He kind of told me that he kind of thinks it was because it was 
becoming more and more positive that they decided to hit our FOB.  
That was from his mouth, not mine; I had only been there a few 
months when the thing had happened.  (Interviewee 7, October 4, 
2018.) 
 
Although insurgent interest in attacking the PRT may have changed, insurgent 
capability is evident in Zabul throughout the case study based on the SIGACTS in 





Green = Completed (1,143) 
Purple = Incomplete (1,366) 
Ghazni = 1,748 
Zabul = 761 






While conducting interviews, I also did quantitative descriptive work to allow 
visualization of development projects in Ghazni and Zabul.  The data come from a 
NATO dataset of development projects in Afghanistan from 2001 through 2012.  
(Data courtesy of Shaver and Wright.)  Some of the projects in the dataset have 
latitude and longitude coordinates.  I verified existing coordinates and filled in 
missing coordinates using the “finder tool” within the Afghanistan Spatial Data 
Center (ASDC) to identify the coordinates whose village but not latitude and 
longitude are in the initial dataset.5  Figure 3 and Table 4 capture 2,509 planned 
projects from 2002 through 2011 in Ghazni and Zabul whose latitude and longitude 
coordinates I could determine.  From the spatial plot, there appears to be a difference 
in the dispersion of projects away from the highway in the two provinces.   
                                               
5 The ASDC is a geospatial tool developed by iMMAP with contributions from USAID, the Afghan 
Ministries, and the University of Maryland. 
Table 4. Planned Projects with Lat-Long by Province
STATUS_CODE Ghazni Zabul Total
Active / Obligated 257 84 341
Committed 2 7 9
Completed 822 321 1,143
Nominated 23 56 79
Suspended 0 2 2
Terminated (Cancelled) 77 50 127
Unknown 567 241 808









To further this analysis, I created an overlay of five-kilometer by five-
kilometer grids using the Gridded Reference Graphic (GRG) Python tool in ArcGIS.  
A snapshot of a section of that GRG in southern Zabul is shown in Figure 4.  After 
creating the GRG, I used the intersect tool in ARCGIS to intersect the project dataset 
and GRG layers, which adds a variable indicating the grid in which each project falls.  
I also intersected an Afghanistan roads shapefile with the GRG to create a dataset that 
Figure 5.  Planned Project Distance from the Highway over Time 





captures each GRG grid cell with a primary road (Highway 1) or secondary roads.  In 
Stata, I integrated the projects with grids dataset and the roads with grids dataset to 
create a variable that counts the distance from the highway for each project.   
Subsequently, I graphed the distance in terms of grid cells that projects fall 
from the highway.  To connect the quantitative analysis to the case study, I examine 
2008 and afterwards.  While the dataset includes projects from 2001 through 2012, 
for unknown reasons, there are only five projects in the dataset for Ghazni and Zabul 
in 2011 and none for 2012.  Thus, only 2008 through 2010 from the quantitative 
analysis allow meaningful insight into the case study.  The resulting graph, Figure 5, 
captures the difference in distance from Highway 1 for projects between Ghazni and 
Zabul.  Zabul has a higher percentage of projects on the highway or one cell (within 
5-10 kilometers) from the highway throughout the time period.  In addition, while the 
percentage of projects on the highway and one cell from the highway is almost 
constant throughout the 2008 to 2010 time period in Zabul, the percentage of projects 
on the highway or one cell from the highway decreases each year from 2008 to 2010 
in Ghazni.  This difference contributes to the focus of the qualitative analysis:  what 







I also examined descriptive statistics related to the types of projects pursued in 
each province and over time during the case study (Figure 6).  Three observations are 
evident from the descriptive data.  First, infrastructure projects were more common in 
Ghazni than Zabul.  Second, Zabul had a swell of public health initiatives in 2008.  
Third, both provinces have a downward trend in the number of education and 
community development projects from 2008 through 2010.  I focus my analysis on 
the project emplacement decisions over the project type decisions because of the 
breadth of existing work on different types of programs and projects.  Others in the 
past have considered which projects were undertaken but not where.  I include a brief 
discussion at the end about the relevance of the type of project as another part of the 
effort to maximize resources. 





How Decisions Were Made 
Decisions about priorities for governance and development in Ghazni and 
Zabul were sometimes routinized and other times left to more informal conversations.  
PRT Ghazni tended to have more regular meetings for the purpose of prioritization, 
with their frequency ranging between bi-weekly and monthly.  More frequent than the 
prioritization or planning meetings were weekly synchronization meetings or status 
updates at which PRT members would go through updates on each project.  One 
Ghazni commander described, “We definitely had weekly meetings, but a lot those 
were more status updates.  About once a month we would have to go through and 
rack and stack all of the projects” (Interviewee 1, August 10, 2018).  Even with these 
regular meetings, PRT members in Ghazni often mentioned more informal 
discussions about priorities, including discussions of priorities over dinner.  In 
particular, interactions with the Polish PRT in Ghazni were often done over dinner.   
Meanwhile, in Zabul there is a little more variation, which seemed to come 
mostly from variation in the personalities of the commanders.  In general, Zabul 
PRTs seemed to have more frequent smaller synchronization meetings, either daily or 
three to four times per week.  This does not mean that Zabul PRTs were less engaged 
in planning, but larger bi-weekly or monthly type meetings were less common.  One 
Zabul commander described,  
A lot of times what we had to do were late night discussions with me 
and the State Department guys and some of the folks on my team, we 
would just be like alright, this is how we are going to do this.  
Honestly, that’s how sometimes decisions were made.  (Interviewee 7, 






During the prioritization process, there is minimal evidence of disagreement 
on priorities between agencies in either province.  None of the individuals 
interviewed mentioned outright conflict between agencies.  Constant negotiations 
(Interviewee 10, July 24, 2018) and competing priorities (Interviewee 2, October 1, 
2018) were mentioned but not true conflict.  The lack of conflict could be either due 
to a spirit of cooperation, or a perspective that deployments were short enough that 
there was no incentive to raise substantial conflict.  One PRT commander said, 
We just worked real well together.  There was no animosity.  I had 
never worked in this environment before. But, there was no bravado.  
It was, let’s just work together and get this done.  It was amazing, like 
I said, probably my best job ever, because everyone seemed to work so 
good together.  (Interviewee 4, October 19, 2018.)  
 
Meanwhile, one State Department official said,  
 
There wasn’t a lot of out and out conflict about it.  Again it comes 
down to, I am deployed for nine months, I’m going to keep my mouth 
shut, and I’ll just do my thing, it’s nine months, whatever.  
(Interviewee 11, October 9, 2018.) 
 
The lack of conflict is somewhat surprising relative to the bureaucracy literature, 
which predicts more organizational loyalty and less willingness to cooperate. 
What was common in both Ghazni and Zabul were the importance of 
meetings and interactions related to logistics—in particular, who was included on 
convoy manifests.  While priorities were rarely disagreed upon, which agency had the 
opportunity to pursue its priorities depended mostly on logistics.  One State 
Department official described,  
At that time with the commander, it was everyone tell us what you 
want to do.  Ok, USAID needs to go to this village. At the same time, 
CAT A why don’t you go there, and why don’t you go there to meet 





kind of logistical.  And how are we going to use the resources in the 
most efficient way. (Interviewee 10, July 24, 2018.) 
 
Those who were most frequently concerned about being left off convoy movements 
were civilian officials.  One civilian perspective was that  
I think there were pretty frequent disagreements, but a lot was fighting 
for resources and trying to get out, to look at your project or talk to 
your counterparts.  You know, they say, to a hammer, everything is a 
nail, or whatever.  So, to Ag people, it was all about economic 
development, and to the education people, it was all about school 
development.  I don’t know if there was someone who was really 
taking a step back trying to mesh each piece of it together.  It was 
everyone trying to grasp resources to try to get out and meet with their 
counterparts.  (Interviewee 13, August 6, 2018.) 
 
Understanding these processes of prioritization and subsequent competition for 
resources frames the discussion that follows about the challenge of maximizing 
resources.  
The Challenge of Maximizing Resources 
Logistical resources were a constraint for PRTs in Ghazni and Zabul 
throughout the case study.  This was true both before and after the surge.  Before the 
surge a funding constraint was more relevant—although it was only noted in Ghazni.  
But a theme in both eras related to logistical constraints.  A Ghazni PRT commander 
before the surge described,  
The Taliban are just like, the U.S. don’t have their hearts here and it’s 
remote, and we’re going to kick it up a notch.  We were spread thin 
there.  You can’t be everywhere.  We would get calls, these guys are in 
a mosque, there’s all these Taliban.  We would report it up the chain, 
and they would be like we don’t have any assets to get there.  EOD 
wouldn’t be able to get there either.  The Taliban certainly knew that.  
(Interviewee 4, October 19, 2018.)  
 





reaching the entire province.  One commander said, “I’ve got 100 guys and an area 
the size of Connecticut to provide reconstruction and development and stability 
operations to.  No way you can do that, right” (Interviewee 6, August 27, 2018).  
Another Zabul commander said, “There were geographic limitations.  There were 
areas that you were not going to go.” (Interviewee 5, August 22, 2018).   
While the surge in Ghazni emphasized reaching outlying districts, logistical 
challenges remained.  A State Department official in Ghazni during the surge 
described,   
We had such constraints on our movement and such limited resources 
that we were not able to get out and see projects and see programs as 
much as we should have, or certainly as we would have liked to.  
(Interviewee 9, August 28, 2018.) 
 
He continued and addressed whether the constraints were due to the threat or due to 
resources: 
I could have done a lot more if I had more freedom of movement.  We 
had security constraints, but had there been double or triple the number 
of vehicles and bodies and security escort mechanisms, we could have 
done a lot more.  We were picking and choosing who got to have a key 
meeting on a given day.   
 
On a given day, we would have these mission planning exercises 
where it was like, alright, no one has been to Deh Yak in three weeks, 
we’re going, what do we want to accomplish there.  Then, everyone 
was throwing up their hands.  The Polish water guy wanted to go out 
there because his predecessor left a note about a program that they 
could have done.  AID said they wanted to go out because they never 
did anything to go outside the wire and that was the closest they could 
get.  I had my goals and agendas for who to meet with. (Interviewee 9, 
August 28, 2018.) 
 
In response to logistical constraints, two innovations were prominent:  the 
establishment of PRT sub-units or District Support Teams (DSTs) and PRT collection 





2011 when Ghazni PRT received two additional State Department officials.  In a 
press release, the new State Department team lead described the way in which the 
DST addressed the logistical constraints faced by the PRT: 
“We are starting a district support team,” said Dominick Aponte, State 
Department team lead. “It is a smaller version of a PRT, but we are 
able to work more closely with the district governor. Where the main 
PRT can only get out [to the district center] once or twice a month, 
because I’m so close, I’ll be able to get [to the district center] once or 
twice a week.” (DVIDS, December 5, 2011.) 
 
Later, the PRT commander also split his PRT between Ghazni City and another 
location on the border of Uruzgan where they could more efficiently reach western 
districts in the province (Interviewee 3, October 10, 2018).  When asked whether 
more teams at the district level would have had different effects, the Ghazni PRT 
commander said,  
Yes, we split into two to try to address that specific thing, but we still 
ran into the security issues.  While we could be in two places, we still 
had the security issues that existed, and we specifically tried to do that 
in order to maximize effects.  I would say for the level that we put into 
it, we got like a 30 percent return.  It wasn’t a one-for-one as we split 
the PRT in two. (Interviewee 3, October 10, 2018.)  
 
That commander also took advantage of relationships to expand the number of 
personnel he had available.  He described,  
I happened to finagle to get more forces assigned to me more as an 
interpersonal type of thing, and that lined up with the Army units that 
were coming, so I got more than my fair share if you will. (Interviewee 
3, October 10, 2018). 
          
Meanwhile, Zabul PRT decided to split their forces into four outstations and 






I had four locations.  I basically had one platoon of Army guys from 
the Massachusetts National Guard.  So that was the plan.  I split up the 
squads.  So I had ten civil affairs folks from the Army reserves, and I 
divvied them up as well.  I essentially guided what the three outlying 
teams did, and we coordinated their efforts centrally, but I let them do 
their own thing.  (Interviewee 7, October 4, 2018.) 
 
That commander also noted,  
 
One of the biggest challenges [of getting out] was logistics.  [The 
previous commander] had hoarded a bunch of MRAPS, some of the 
original ones that were left by the Marines.  Somehow [the previous 
commander] had acquired quite a few extra vehicles.  When I rolled in, 
we had in total maybe 50 MRAPS, different sizes, different models.  
So, I was able to pick-up and move and go to places, check things out, 
and get things moving.  (Interviewee 7, October 4, 2018.) 
 
Even with the additional resources, there were still logistical challenges: 
 
There are places that you go, and there are places that you don’t go.  
The only thing about the outlying areas was that it took longer to get 
there.  That was what made it difficult for us.  In order to support our 
own guys sometimes, we would have to launch missions out of Qalat 
and it would just take forever.   
 
It was just simply easier in Qalat because everything was there, and we 
could get to everything in a half hour or less.  That was one of the 
strengths of having those outlying places.  In most cases, they could be 
to everything they needed to be at in 30 minutes or less.  They didn’t 
have the same level of resources that we did, but I always tried to—
and this is true of all of the PRT commanders—to give them as much 
leash as possible in order to affect change and get things done.  
(Interviewee 7, October 4, 2018.) 
 
 Resource limitations with funding and contracting processes were relevant for 
PRTs at different points in the case study and for different reasons, but the most 
common refrain was logistics.  One State Department official summarized well the 
challenges and tradeoffs of projection and concluded that the time and resource 
requirements for stabilization would always be significant as a result:   
It’s such a complicated question.  I am thinking what are the lessons 





provincial thing, we tried doing some DSTs, but all of this stuff takes 
more time than I think we gave it.  But, it’s also personality-driven and 
skills-driven.  There’s little bit of art to going out and engaging in local 
communities.  You can’t just send any old person out there.  Most of 
the Americans that went out there, what 99% of them, did not speak 
the local language, so you were always going through an interpreter.   
 
I don’t want to take away that going out and engaging in the local area 
was a waste of time.  Stabilization is just always going to be time and 
resource intensive.  There is no good, efficient way to do good 
stabilization.  What we were always looking for was what was the 
least amount we could do for the biggest bang, and I’m not sure we 
ever got to the point where we were doing all the things we needed in 
order to actually stabilize. (Interviewee 11, October 9, 2018.)  
 
Because logistical resources were always short, resource maximization became 
central to PRT decisions about where they could support projects.  Some conditions 
aggravated the projection challenge and others enabled efficiency.      
Conditions that Constrain Projection 
Three conditions related to resource maximization made it hard to project 
away from the provincial capitals and the highway:  maximizing benefits for 
Afghans, supporting Afghan provincial leaders, and unifying U.S. agency priorities 
(Table 1).  The placement of value upon these conditions is both logical and doctrinal.  
Thus, describing these conditions illuminates where logical, doctrinal principles can 
create tensions that may need to be addressed in evolutions of counterinsurgency and 
stabilization theory.  
Maximizing Benefits for Afghans 
Concentration on governance and development efforts in the center—near the 
capital or along the highway—is logical for having the greatest popular impact.  





gains in development.  While this logic has pertinence in both Ghazni and Zabul, it 
was more frequently referenced by respondents in Zabul.  One Zabul PRT 
commander said, 
Well, like I said in the south we couldn’t [do projects].  In the north we 
couldn’t [do projects].  The time distance part of it, it would take days 
to get up there.  And, the risk versus reward wasn’t there.  So, low 
populace areas, they aren’t going to be in communication with the 
governor.  In the south, same thing in the north, they run their own 
thing up there, I am sure it was a Taliban haven.   
 
So we just tried to work from the middle of the province, like Highway 
1, and just start stretching north and south to a point.  It wasn’t worth 
getting out there and putting our guys at risk for the few people.  
Unless the government is extending its reach out there, I don’t see why 
our forces, in this kind of environment, need to be stretching out there, 
unless it’s a kinetic type of thing.  I don’t see a whole lot of benefit in 
that. (Interviewee 5, August 22, 2018.) 
 
If achieving the greatest popular impact is the predominant perspective, there is less 
incentive to project away from population centers.  Existing doctrine tends to weigh 
popular effect over geographic reach, leading to some pressure to focus in the center.   
Supporting Afghan Provincial Leaders 
Another potential headwind to projection is the need to interact with the 
leaders at the provincial level.  Most often these interactions were with provincial 
governors, but they were also sometimes with provincial councils.  While governors 
were imperfect—and the PRTs leaders interviewed readily acknowledged that—PRTs 
had a general interest in supporting the governor’s priorities.  The provincial 
government’s legitimacy logically flows from fulfillment of the governor’s stated 
priorities.  One PRT commander said,  
You don’t want them [the local population] to follow the Taliban; you 





is doing, what is he supposed to be doing, governance.  So everything I 
did was to support that governor to the best of my ability whether it be 
reconstruction and development, whether it be Rule of Law.  I didn’t 
weigh one any more than the other one.  We didn’t really have a 
priority there, other than when I said this would make people want to 
follow this guy, I was more supportive of it than just simply putting up 
a school in the middle of nowhere or this kind of thing.  So 
development itself wasn’t it. (Interviewee 5, August 22, 2018) 
 
The statement that it was not just about development but also about the governor’s 
priorities is important.  A State Department official also asserted that while the 
governor’s priorities were imperfect, they did demand at least some PRT attention: 
At one point the governor had said, “we’re going to green this up.  
We’re going to get water here.  We’re going to green it up.”  So I 
would always joke with [the commander], “Green this up.  Green this 
up.”  It was a lot of responding also to what the governor wanted, what 
the provincial council wanted. (Interviewee 11, October 9, 2018.) 
  
 Governors in both provinces also tried to pull priorities toward large, urban 
projects.  In 2011, the governor in Ghazni began advocating for major modernization 
work in Ghazni City to prepare for a festival in which Ghazni City would be named 
the “Islamic Capital of Culture.”  According to The Guardian,  
[The governor’s] 2013 wishlist involves 57 miles of surfaced road 
within the city, a fully functioning electricity grid, bus stations, a 
sports stadium, a proper sewage system, hotels, airport, a cold storage 
facility and public parks running along both sides of the river that will 
‘give a very beautiful scene.’  He also wants a pounds 19.5m ‘expo 
centre’ complete with theatre, library and an exhibition hall. (June 9, 
2011.) 
 
About the governor’s prioritization of the festival, one Ghazni PRT commander said, 
 
That was high on [the governor’s] priority.  He wanted infrastructure 
to support that.  He wanted buildings A, B, and C.  I think the Polish 
PRT kind of caved to some of that.  The way we addressed a lot of it 
was we are going to make it easier for people to come to the city with 
a lot of road and street development.  He was pretty ok with what.  He 
wanted more to support that event, but it wasn’t necessarily in line 





improve infrastructure for a big ceremony.  Kind of like all of the 
money that goes into the Olympics and then what.  We built the 
Olympic village, ok great.  We tried to keep that conversation at arms-
length.  (Interviewee 2, October 1, 2018.) 
 
A similar push for “New Qalat City” in Zabul was smaller in scale than the festival in 
Ghazni, but the governor’s passion and the challenge for the PRT sound quite similar.  
An article in The Otttawa Citizen described, 
This is New Qalat City, a yet to be completed business park that 
includes a governor's office, hospital, courthouse, women's centre, 
bank and fire station. They are empty modern edifices, only some of 
which are barely functioning. They sit disconnected in sand, yet to be 
linked by modern infrastructure. USAID hopes some other 
international donor can be prodded into investing in the completion of 
the project, that someone will come along and build roads, install a 
sewer system and connect it to the electricity grid.  (March 29, 2008.) 
 
When asked about whether the Zabul governor had specific priorities, one PRT 
commander said,  
He did.  They were somewhat misguided I think.  There was a new 
area of town called New Qalat City.  He was like I want everything to 
look modern, and everything new.  They spent a lot of money, some 
previous PRTs, I guess.  It also was—it could be a target as well.  It 
wasn’t the city.  It was just a new building, and everything was 
supposed to look nice for Afghanistan.  That was a priority for him, 
but it didn’t really affect everyday people.  (Interviewee 5, August 22, 
2018) 
 
 Thus, PRT commanders had to maintain restraint with supporting the 
governor’s priorities because the governor’s priorities were overly concentrated.  
When asked if the governor’s interests were limited to Ghazni City, one PRT 
commander said, 
I would say that was the priority of effort that he was shooting for.  
But he understood the necessity for other ones.  In many cases, he 
gave his full support.  But you could tell, the farther from Ghazni City 
you got, the quality of district sub-governors also changed.  





About navigating that relationship with the governor, that same commander said, 
 
I was not giving everything.  It was alright governor, I will do 
something for you but you need to help me help you.  I can’t want this 
more than you want it.  (Interviewee 3, October 10, 2018.) 
 
And he later said,  
 
I also understood that [the governor] needed to retain power and 
maintain his ‘wasta.’  So when the point came that I was interacting 
with the village elders, the village chief, the sub-governors, and the 
governors, I was 100 percent on the governor’s side because I wanted 
to show a unified front.  So it was very, very, very much a balancing 
act, which was much more difficult than you would think.  
(Interviewee 3, October 10, 2018.) 
 
At the same time, projects could not be successful without the governor’s support.  
This same commander in Ghazni said,  
I would put it as projects were more successful where the governor 
wanted there to be security, which was his primary interest areas. 
(Interviewee 3, October 10, 2018.) 
 
Similarly, another commander in Ghazni shared:   
 
We had sort of been given the instruction, and I think I tried to 
coordinate everything with the governor—I don’t say through.  But we 
learned early on that it was not a good idea to have something 
happening that the governor did not know about. (Interviewee 9, 
August 28, 2018.) 
 
A similar theme emerged in Zabul:  maintaining a relationship with the 
governor and supporting the governor’s priorities without becoming an agent of the 
governor.  A State Department official in Zabul described, 
What we tried to do was listen to the governor, listen to the provincial 
council, find out what they needed and try to support them.  One of the 
things that the governor wanted to do was to go on a military 
expedition and retake all of the districts.  There were a couple of 
districts that nobody could set foot on except the Taliban.  He wanted 
to take off on his own with his own provincial army and go do that.  





governance, we did what we could without giving him money for it.  
(Interviewee 12, October 13, 2018.) 
 
 Thus, while relationships with governors were central to PRT success, the 
governor’s limited interests presented an unavoidable constraint.  PRT decisions must 
be seen as careful management of this relationship.  In this light, some PRT decisions 
that were center-focused may have been for the purpose of relationship management. 
Unifying U.S. Agency Priorities 
A final headwind for projection could be trying to unify—or mass—the focus 
of the different U.S. agencies.  This pressure only emerged in one interview with a 
PRT Zabul commander, and it did not impose severe restraint.  Still, this potential 
headwind is relevant for future inter-agency institutions.   
 One Zabul PRT was particularly deliberate about mission analysis and unity 
of effort across agencies.  That PRT developed a nine-month to year-long long-term 
strategy, and they concluded that the best way to use their resources was immediately 
around Qalat City.  The PRT commander described, 
We came up with a new toolbox.  We said ok, we aren’t going to build 
anymore goathouses.  When we said goathouses, we meant 
construction projects out in the hinterlands because there’s no 
sustainability for them, or there’s no force protection, to protect those 
schoolhouses and things, unless a local community wanted it and they 
would provide a teacher. That was one of the problems was that they 
didn’t have the human capital to sustain it.  So if a town asks for a 
school, they basically wanted employment for folks to build 
something, but they became goathouses because they didn’t have a 
teacher there to run the school.  So we only did projects that were 
sustainable.   
 
We kind of looked at—the interagency team—kind of looked at the 
environment we were in and said really the only secure location is 
Qalat City itself because you had the Afghan National Army, you had 





there were doctors and teachers.  So we focused on those things that 
already had a baseline foundation and started adding to the layers, 
started building that up. (Interviewee 6, August 27, 2018.) 
 
That same commander later described his thinking:   
 
Me and my DO [deputy] and each of the inter-agency reps, so State, 
USAID, and ag.  So we all coordinated and made sure it [the long-term 
plan] was good.  Then, we shared it.  The one thing we wanted to do 
was build unity of effort.  So you had, at the time I would brief, there 
were 13 different organizations there, and at the time I got there, it felt 
like everyone was doing their own thing.   
 
We would fratricide each other on reconstruction and development.  
The Afghans were very savvy, they would play one off the other, and 
say, hey, we didn’t get anything.  Meanwhile, someone had brought 
something for them or done something for them.  So it was really 
synchronizing our efforts. 
 
And, there’s reasons why.  One, we wanted to reduce that 
fraternization.  Two, we wanted to build that unity of effort and mass 
our resources to help the Afghans stabilize the area.  Another 
important reason for us to do that was preservation of the PRT.  
(Interviewee 6, August 27, 2018.) 
 
 This anecdote is important because it shows how a well-intentioned unity of 
effort across agencies could constrain focus.  At the extreme, if every PRT effort is to 
have something for every agency, there are only a limited number of places where all 
agencies have an interest.   
Ultimately, this constraint was not as significant as the commander initially 
described.  During the same time period, the Zabul PRT started sending inter-agency 
teams to different districts in what they called a Mobile District Reconstruction Team 
(MDRT).  ISAF Headquarters announced:  
The MDRT is focused on reconstruction and development in the 
districts which lie beyond Highway 1, and are taking advantage of 
counterinsurgency windows of opportunity to bring isolated 
communities basic services.  In the past, the PRT focused on the Zabul 





gravity. The operational purpose of the MDRT is to decentralise the 
efforts of the PRT and expand the influence of the legitimate 
government into outlying districts. (US Fed News, January 3, 2009.) 
 
About these efforts, the PRT commander said, 
       
Now it’s hard for us to do something sustainable out at these remote 
areas, so that’s why we came up with the DRT with the small projects 
that they could leverage or the human capacity expertise, like medical 
expertise, or agriculture, or engineering expertise.    
 
We tried to bounce them.  I didn’t have that many folks, so sometimes 
I would send the same personnel to several different locations.  But, 
we would mix it up.  One week they would go up to Shah Joy, another 
time they would go up to Day Chopan, wherever there were U.S. or 
Romanian forces. 
 
That was the concept, I would send out docs, engineers to these remote 
areas, also the inter-agency reps like the Ag or the USAID reps, and 
they would bring out their tool bags and say, ok, this is what we are 
going to do for you, and here is what the needs were, and network with 
the folks out there. (Interviewee 6, August 27, 2018.) 
 
Thus, unifying agency objectives was not all constraining, but at the extreme, the 
potential exists.  When thinking about projecting development, it is at least worth 
considering that principles such as unity of effort and massing effects that make sense 
in most contexts could impose limitations.   
Conditions that Support Projection 
Amidst the headwinds, there were four conditions that supported projection:  
valuing equitable geographic dispersion of goods and services, leveraging local 
leaders with large social endowments, tolerance of financial inefficiency, and 
separating U.S. agency objectives (Table 1).  All of these conditions were not 
necessary for projection to occur, but they tended to support it.  These conditions are 





centric development, efficiency, and robust policy-making. 
Valuing Geographic Equity for Afghans 
Whereas valuing development for the most people produces centralization, 
valuing geographic equity supports projection.  This point might seem self-evident, 
but it is significant in the sense that geographic equity is not heavily emphasized in 
counterinsurgency or stability doctrine.  Counterinsurgency and stabilization doctrine 
emphasize population-centric considerations—logically so because the ends are 
political control of the population—but PRT leaders also felt the need to pursue a 
geographic balance outside of doctrine.  One PRT commander put it simply, 
We did as much as we could to everyone for everyone.  Imagine if the 
government only responded to Alabama when there was a state of 
emergency and not Florida, there is a lot of dissent there.  We tried to 
be consistent across the board and prioritize those projects that have 
the major impacts in all of the districts that were there.  (Interviewee 3, 
October 10, 2018.) 
 
Still, applying geographic equity had some complexity.  The same commander 
described, 
I started with the economic centers to be honest with you.  If you look 
at Ghazni central, alright, let’s see what’s going on there.  Ok, we’ve 
got that, what’s the next step out.  You have the different district 
centers and the infrastructure around there.  Ok, well, we need to 
develop the streets to make sure that they can sell during the winter 
during inclement weather, and we need the sub-governor to have a 
place where he can live, a place that he can hear people talk, and a 
place that will improve economic development, so a road project, 
water projects, housing type stuff, hospitals.  You know, big on the 
medical side, we would do that.  Once we got the main ones out, then 
we want to make sure that all of the districts had an equitable amount 
of development.   
 
We looked at those that generated the most income and started 
building those, and then looked at those that we wanted to show the 





we put efforts into those.  And then the ones that were highly contested 
areas, we would go visit, and we would start dialog to do it, but it was 
all contingent on the government and the security forces being able to 
lock down those areas.  If they were unable to do it because of 
contention, because of X or because of Y, I knew that whatever we 
built would be destroyed.  I would politely decline and go to another 
spot where I knew would be more. (Interviewee 3, October 10, 2018.) 
 
 In Zabul, the PRT found that the provincial council had a broader focus than 
the governor, and this perspective helped with operationalizing geographic equity.  
Speaking about the role of the provincial council, a Zabul PRT commander said,  
The council, one of the things that they emphasized to me was that we 
were hitting the people not just in Qalat City or not just in Shah Joy.  
[The previous commander] was kind of the same way.  He was like, 
we need to get out in the country-side.  When I had the brakes put on 
me by the one brigade, then I found that all that we were doing was 
work either very closely to Qalat or very closely to where my outlying 
units were.  To me, you disconnect yourself from the population and 
they become resentful.  And they did, you could sense it. (Interviewee 
7, October 4, 2018.) 
 
That same commander also described that while it was more taxing to have his troops 
decentralized and working on development in more remote areas, he also felt it was 
appropriate:  
I didn’t like having the guys out there doing this stuff.  I was a little 
uncomfortable about it, but I knew it was necessary.  If the Afghans 
saw us coalescing around the governor, to me, that didn’t look good.  
Part of the thing that you deal with is perception.  So we had 300,000 
people in Zabul Province.  I was trying to reach out to as many of them 
as possible, in some way, even if it was only a small thing, to try to do 
something good that was long-lasting that they could support 
themselves.  It wasn’t just to go in there and just to drop a big bundle 
of money and leave because that just doesn’t do any good to anyone.  
(Interviewee 7, October 4, 2018.) 
     
 Hence, it took commanders actively pushing beyond centralized development 





equilibrium with more centralized development.  Considerations of geographic equity 
may need a greater place in counterinsurgency and stability doctrine. 
Leveraging Afghan Local Leadership 
The interviews made clear that projection from the center was ineffectual 
without local leader support.  One PRT commander in Ghazni told two meaningful 
stories.  In one, a district sub-governor who had known relationships with local 
Taliban was able to facilitate all of the schools in his district opening—a notable feat 
compared to an estimated 30 percent of schools that were open nation-wide.  In the 
story, the district sub-governor arranged for a district education official—who had 
known Taliban connections—to review new school textbooks with the PRT.  The 
education official reviewed the books, removed only two pages of text, and affirmed 
that the books were appropriate for the schools in the district.  The schools were able 
to open presumably because local Taliban were brought into the process and could 
accept the school texts (Interviewee 2, October 1, 2018).  The PRT commander also 
noted that the district sub-governor’s influence was not limited to education 
development.  Because of the relationships the sub-governor maintained, the PRT 
commander described, “He had a little bit of a dirty background, but man he was 
getting stuff done.  When projects were done in his district, I can’t think of a single 
one that failed or that happened to stop” (Interviewee 2, October 1, 2018).   
 In a second story, the same PRT commander described an instance in which 
they did not have support from local leaders in a village they were trying to assist.  He 





A lot of guys didn’t want resources because it would make the security 
situation worse for them.  I personally didn’t understand that really 
until I saw it for my own eyes.  How could you not want some free 
warm gloves, clothes, socks, and jackets for your kids as we roll into 
the winter and the snow starts to fall and your kids don’t have 
anything.  But it was like, we just don’t want it.   
 
Well, I’ll tell you what, we’re just going to leave this here because 
some of the ladies over here say that they do want it.  And this is a true 
story.  
 
Then, that night on ISR [an Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance video feed] we are watching a massive bonfire in that 
village.  We go back the next morning and sure enough everything we 
left there was burnt to a crisp.  And oh by the way, there were two 
freshly dug graves right there.  It turns out, I know one of them was a 
local female and the other one we didn’t get details about.  But it was 
like a punch in the face, it was like, when you do try to force the issue, 
look what happens.  Not cool. (Interviewee 2, October 1, 2018.) 
 
It is noteworthy that local leader support was necessary to make remote projects 
successful.  There is minimal evidence that leader support could come after 
successful projects. 
 A State Department official in Zabul had a broader reflection about the central 
role of Afghan leadership.  The official shared,  
The line of questioning again comes down to it’s not all about us, but 
it’s about the Afghans.  The Afghans had to have ownership.  This 
wasn’t our responsibility one way or the other.  Because when you say 
that, what I think to myself is that we needed more Afghans who took 
ownership of this over just trying to survive.  So if we had more 
Afghans involved, and could have had more engaged Afghans, but 
again, I don’t know if we ever understood the dynamics of local 
politics in Qalat or in the entire province.  What this comes down to is 
that it is never just up to us—what the U.S. was doing, or what the 
NATO troops were doing.  (Interviewee 11, October 9, 2018.) 
 
Here, the importance of Afghan leadership comes through as obvious, but the 





understated.  If time is not taken to identify willing and capable local leaders, 
projection from the center is either not possible or not worth repeating. 
Tolerating Financial Inefficiency 
PRT commanders in Ghazni also consistently noted that completing 
development projects away from the center required greater acceptance of financial 
inefficiency.  Funds for successful projects in remote districts required accepting that 
all of the funds in the contract did not go directly into the project.  One PRT 
commander explained, 
But the ones like in Andar, the Taliban essentially had an approval 
process too.  Sometimes our contractors would come by and they 
would factor into their bid basically a bribe to pay the Taliban to let 
them build it there.  Once the contractor said hey, I can build this.  The 
Taliban had essentially already approved it for the area.  So once they 
did that, ok, it was going to get built.  But, there were plenty of 
proposed projects where magically we can’t find any contractors who 
will bid on this because for whatever reason the Taliban didn’t want 
this to happen in this area. (Interviewee 1, August 10, 2018.) 
 
Another commander shared,  
 
I do feel pretty strongly though that we have taxes in America, and in 
Afghanistan they purposely overcharge you and they use it just like 
taxes.  They use it to fund security.  They use it to hire guys to kind of 
work the seams with some of the local Taliban guys.  They hire some 
guys to kind of lobby with GIRoA, with district leadership.  They do 
all this stuff, and the media would say, they spent a million dollars for 
this and they only spent 500 thousand on it.   
 
We did the analysis.  It’s like, ok, some of that might be true.  I am 
sure some of that money might be pocketed but I guarantee they also 
kind of hired an underground security force.  They also did some kind 
of sketchy contracting and lobbying to get stuff done. 
 
There was a lot of over-charging going on, but there was also a lot of 
stuff that they needed to get stuff done that wasn’t a part of the PRT 





but did they need to do that to get stuff done, absolutely. (Interviewee 
2, October 1, 2018.) 
 
What the commanders describe makes what is sometimes seen as corruption appear 
different.  Funds not used directly for the project were a part of coalition-building.  
That this system works provides some evidence that local Taliban were responsive to 
economic incentives.  One commander noted that “Local Taliban is a very easy way 
to describe thieves and thugs” (Interviewee 3, October 10, 2018).  He also said,  
There was a lot of, if I don’t get my cut of the money, the Taliban 
miraculously started attacking.  If they got their cut of the money, it 
was pretty convenient, the Taliban were not quite as active. 
(Interviewee 3, October 10, 2018.) 
 
 Still, tolerance for this system is not entirely intuitive or comfortable.  One 
Ghazni commander noted that it took time for him to accept this type of risk and 
inefficiency.  He said, 
So we had a road, karez cleaning, canal cleaning project.  I am sure 
that the Taliban were taxing it.  Some of the guys doing it, might have 
been economic Taliban.  One because we wouldn’t allow any 
mechanical devices.  I didn’t want the Taliban taxing any engineers 
that came in and extorting money from us.  So, you know, here are 
shovels, you are going to work all day, six dollars, because that’s the 
going rate for a day’s labor.  You’re going to be tired, but you can feed 
your family and look at it essentially as competing with the Taliban 
economically where probably at the beginning I wouldn’t have done 
that.   
 
But at the end, since there’s never a good answer in Afghanistan.  
There’s no perfect answer.  If there was a good answer, we would have 
done it, but you’re just choosing among your least-worst options.  You 
know, this one is the least-worst, ok.  This is good, I am going to pay 
these guys six dollars a day to clean out this karez, knowing that the 
Taliban are probably taxing them a dollar, dollar-fifty a day. 
(Interviewee 1, August 10, 2018.) 
 
This perspective is not typically embraced by inspectors general or anti-corruption 





inefficiency for projection.  Standards of zero tolerance for corruption among local 
residents would lead to zero projection. 
Separating U.S. Agency Objectives 
Finally, it was sometimes evident in Ghazni that separating the objectives of 
different U.S. agencies allowed greater projection.  This condition is the converse of 
the effect of unifying agency objectives that was sometimes evident in Zabul.  It was 
not true in every Ghazni PRT, but some PRTs allowed the different U.S. agencies to 
operate a bit more separately.  One PRT commander captured the condition:  
We always talk about the illusive ‘Whole of Government.’  It was 
definitely not a ‘Whole of Government’ integrated strategy where all 
of the objectives were aligned.  It was each agency is pursuing its own 
objectives.  And they were very different, so hey State cares about the 
library and Rule of Law, and trying to get some semi-legitimate judges 
there, and obviously public diplomacy—the Lincoln Center—and 
they’re going to build that in Ghazni City, which is great and hey it 
meets their objectives.  Whereas, USAID and the Department of 
Agriculture, they would never have come up with those projects, so 
they were like great.   
Same with the PRT, we were like wells, basic health clinics, schools.  I 
guess I would say multiple organizations working in parallel.  But, it 
was not that illusive or mythical ‘Whole of Government’ where there 
was a proconsul or viceroy looking at the entire dynamic of the 
situation saying, here’s what we do. (Interviewee 1, August 10, 2018.) 
 
A State Department official in Ghazni also described a free-flowing relationship 
between agencies where priorities depended more on when funding was available 
than a synchronized plan across agencies: 
We didn’t really develop a year-long plan.  Remember the guys were 
deployed for six-month rotations but between getting up to speed, and 
inventory, and out-processing, it is four-and-a-half to five months at 
best.   
 
We kind of were able to just keep working together and evolve based 





permission to go do.  All of that was with the sort of the overlying 
framework of trying to get out to more places along the way.  When 
you add geographic goals and everybody is allowed to bring a little bit 
of money to it, it wasn’t too hard to develop our plans and priorities. 
(Interviewee 9, August 28, 2018.) 
 
There is some irony in this condition.  A vigorous interagency process is valuable for 
thorough policy-making almost without exception.  But inter-agency synchronization 
is not costless.   
The Role of Project Type 
What was also common in both provinces was a trend toward smaller, more 
sustainable projects and greater investment in human capital as an alternative to a 
focus on infrastructure or economic activity.  This trend was driven both out of 
concern for sustainability and growth of cultural understanding.  In Ghazni, one PRT 
commander described, 
The one thing probably in retrospect, yea, we built needless things, 
things that weren’t really fitting.  But again, it makes the donors feel 
good.  At the time, the storyboards were big.  And, we can make all of 
these storyboards about all of the great things we are doing, and 
everyone loves the picture of us building a health clinic.  Well, look, 
we built this, but somehow Afghan society survived thousands of 
years before we decided to show up and build a well here, or build a 
school house here.  They were as much for our benefit, look at all the 
great things we are doing, as they were actually for the benefit of the 
people of Afghanistan. 
 
And, this would be tricky.  We kind of focus on physical infrastructure 
because there’s a way you can measure it, there’s a way you can build 
it.  If there is a way to focus more on human capital and building a 
cohesive society—which is a not a quick process.  But, if there is a 
way to shift the emphasis to the human capital development, I would 
try to do that. (Interviewee 1, August 10, 2018.) 
 
Another Ghazni PRT commander had a similar perspective on the movement away 





I think when we went there, we had a feeling that infrastructure 
development was really important.  I think as time went on during our 
deployment, we realized it was less about infrastructure and more 
about basic necessities.  I think our projects started shifting a little bit 
more toward basic necessity type stuff.   
 
For example, if you are in a little region and what is being used for a 
school is literally the backyard of a qalat with a little shade tent 
stretched between two walls.  At the beginning of the deployment, I 
would say our collective response would be, well, let’s help these guys 
get a school in place.  At the end of the deployment it was, no, they 
don’t need a school, what they need is some help getting somebody 
that is trained to teach them, maybe some books, or some clean water, 
an easier ability to travel from that village to a bazaar for just the basic 
necessities like food and water.  (Interviewee 2, October 1, 2018.) 
 
A Ghazni State Department official shared a similar perspective,  
 
If something shifted when I was there, and I tried to influence 
hopefully, was more of a focus on personnel development.  I don’t 
think there had been any exchanges of scholarships or training and 
development opportunities for Afghans.  I shouldn’t say they didn’t 
happen, but now, several years later, I don’t recall that any of those 
things happened prior to me coming.  It’s great to build roads, but it’s 
also important to invest in the people and get the bigger and broader 
exposure. (Interviewee 9, August 28, 2018.) 
 
 An emphasis on the human development side was paralleled in Zabul.  One 
PRT commander said,  
The way I approached all of this was like Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs.  What’s the first thing you are going to need, it’s food and 
shelter and security.  You know, give people that.  Then start building 
off of that.  This was a health issue, people were dying.  Children were 
dying.  We tried to help with that with a food supplement. (Interviewee 
5, August 22, 2018.)  
   
Another PRT commander described just wanting to help the community in Zabul: 
 
That’s also part of the thing about being a PRT.  To me that was all 
kind of sort of a project in a way.  It was helping them in any way that 
we could that didn’t take away from their ability to do something.  I 
wasn’t trying to make the U.S. look better or anything; I was just 
trying to be human.  That was also a small part of what you may need 





became part of the community as best as we could. (Interviewee 7, 
October 4, 2018.) 
       
 While not explicitly the intention, projects that became smaller, more 
sustainable, and more human capital focused have a connection to resource 
maximization:  less time and resources spent on each project means the PRT has more 
time to move throughout the province.  Yet at the same time, smaller, more 
sustainable projects mean smaller, more concentrated marginal benefits.  The 
movement towards smaller, more sustainable projects and an emphasis on human 
capital was positive for the effectiveness of development.  But, the implications of 
this trend on projection may be mixed.  While not the focus of this analysis, the 
relationship between project size and projection may be relevant in future work. 
Arguments Not Supported 
There are two factors in the bureaucratic and individual decision-making 
literatures that could have impacted project emplacement that my interview research 
did not support:  one is risk aversion and the other is the level of experience of PRT 
members.  Rooted in Warwick (1975), risk aversion would be a common bureaucratic 
explanation for behavior in an environment with weak rules and distance from higher 
headquarters.  Meanwhile, inexperience would be a common individual-level 
explanation for a lack of projection if the challenge of resolving complexity led to 
some form of paralysis. 
I looked for evidence of risk aversion by asking respondents about whether 
risk appetites varied across agencies.  This strategy was based on the expectation that 





no indication that risk aversion altered decision-making.  Military and civilian leaders 
managed risk but were far from risk averse.  Concerns about risk on the civilian 
side—where it might be more expected—may have been more prevalent in Kabul 
than at the PRT level.  Hence, this set of respondents did not find risk aversion to be 
significant for explaining the extent of PRT projection. 
Moreover, a lack of projection due to inexperience was not evident in the 
respondents in this study.  The interviewees were as experienced at the time of their 
service as one could expect of any PRT.  All thirteen respondents had past overseas 
deployments, and all thirteen had Master’s degrees.  Six of the respondents had 
previous experience in Iraq, two of whom served on PRTs in Iraq.  Four of the 
respondents had previous Afghanistan experience.  Eight of the respondents had 
substantive Dari or Pashto training (five Pashto and four Dari).   It seems infeasible to 
have had a more experienced group serving in key roles in PRTs in Afghanistan in 
the 2008 to 2012 time period.  I reject the notion that more experience would have 
increased projection.   
Conclusion 
This case study illuminates the way PRTs made important decisions to 
maximize their resources.  Maximizing the number of Afghans served, adhering to 
provincial leader preferences, and unifying agency objectives present efficiency-
enhancing but projection-reducing pressure.  Conditions that support projection are 
valuing geographic equity, leveraging local leader support, tolerating financial 
inefficiency, and separating agency objectives—each of which run somewhat counter 





result, incentives rarely align to allow sustained projection in any remote district or 
local area.  At equilibrium, concentration in the center is more common than 
concentration in remote areas.  To the Afghan public, a lack of sustained projection 
may look like unwillingness to take risk or make a commitment—something closer to 
“cheap talk” than a costly signal about the government’s intentions.  I examine these 
effects empirically in Chapter 2.    
 An implication of this study might appear to be that greater logistical 
capability would have reduced the resource pressure on PRTs, thereby enabling more 
sustained projection.  This suggestion is partly true but has limited worth—in part 
because there remains a limited political appetite for sustained engagement at the 
local level in places like Afghanistan and in part because current doctrinal constructs 
will still under supply projection of governance and development.  If doctrine weighs 
only population-centric focus without geographic focus, if time constraints allow only 
developing relationships with national or provincial and not district or local leaders, if 
financial requirements tolerate no inefficiency, or if inter-agency cooperation is not 
agile, the headwinds to projection will be great.   
 Policy solutions should not swing too far in one direction.  Clear errors from 
excessive emphasis on physical terrain over population, disregard for anti-corruption 
practices, or the absence of inter-agency planning can also victimize 
counterinsurgency and stability operations.  Indeed, these errors occurred and had 
adverse effects during operations in Afghanistan.  For instance, a key finding in the 
2018 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) report on 





enabled corruption, and bolstered support for insurgents” (180), and a key lesson in 
the SAR was that “different U.S. Departments and Agencies have different priorities, 
and regional and international actors often have other agendas that work at competing 
purposes” (9).  This study does not reduce the significance of these findings.  But, this 
study does show, for instance, that corruption and the inter-agency process look a bit 
different on the ground than at the policy level.  On the ground, good principles may 
constrain projection in unexpected ways.  With stabilization, there are likely areas 
where civilian and military leaders have to balance tension rather than hold absolute 
principles.     
Important questions come from this study for counterinsurgency and 
stabilization planning.  At the tactical level, who must counterinsurgency and 
stabilization reach?  This question must be answered in terms of both population and 
geography.  At the strategic level, is consistent projection to those areas possible, and 
how long must consistent projection be sustained?  Applying the factors associated 
with projection that this study identified, the answers to these tactical and strategic 
questions require acceptance of geographic equity versus popular benefit tradeoffs, 
local level versus provincial level tradeoffs, financial inefficiency versus anti-
corruption tradeoffs, and inter-agency agility versus unity tradeoffs.  Consideration of 








Chapter 2: The Effects of Project Risk and Commitment 
 
Analyses of the effects of development assistance during 
counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan have 
puzzling short-term findings that motivate taking a longer-term view of 
the potential for assistance to reduce violence.  I introduce risk and 
commitment as critical dimensions for understanding the longer-term 
relationship.  My theoretical suggestion is that development has the 
greatest potential to counter insurgents over time if counterinsurgents 
emplace development projects in areas that favor insurgents—that is, 
areas with sufficient risk—and maintain their commitment to those 
areas for an extended period.  This theory of risk and commitment 
comes from thinking about common spatial and temporal attributes of 
multiple counterinsurgency and stability mechanisms previously 
identified in the research literature—information-sharing, opportunity 
cost, and goods competition.  I examine risk and commitment’s 
interaction at the micro level in data from a longitudinal study of 
Ghazni and Zabul Provinces in Afghanistan.  I find that violence 
escalates in less risky highway areas even with high levels of 
commitment to development assistance.  In contrast, violence in 
moderately higher risk areas off the highway remains subdued, at least 
initially in response to development.  Development assistance projects 
without risk fail to constrain violence in the longer-term, but the data 
remain open-ended on the longer-term effects of the projects in riskier 
areas where fewer projects were implemented. 
 
Introduction 
Addressing the effects of development assistance on security in Afghanistan 
means engaging with several puzzles in existing research.  The first is the apparent 
difference between the effects of development assistance in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011a) provide the central theoretical and empirical 
foundation for understanding the violence-reducing effects of development projects in 
Iraq; development assistance fosters information-sharing by the local populace to 
counterinsurgents.  Yet, empirical analyses for Afghanistan have not found similar 





(Chou 2012, Child 2014, Adams 2015, Sexton 2016, Iyengar et. al. 2017), only 
Adams finds a significant violence-reducing effect consistent with the Berman, 
Shapiro, and Felter model.  While many sources of variation may explain the 
difference between studies of Iraq and Afghanistan, it remains an open question 
whether the fundamental information-based model applies to the Afghan context. 
A second puzzle is that improved perceptions of governance associated with 
development assistance have not correlated with reductions in violence in 
Afghanistan (Beath, Christia, and Enikopolov 2011, Iyengar et al 2017).  Iyengar et. 
al. find that among five datasets of development projects in Afghanistan, four show 
positive relationships between development assistance projects and perceptions of 
governance but none suggest corresponding reductions in violence.  The one program 
in the Iyengar et. al. analysis that might superficially appear to both increase support 
for governance and reduce violence, the National Solidarity Program (NSP), did not 
reduce violence when studied as a randomized controlled trial by Beath, Christia, and 
Enikopolov.  Thus, the connectivity between perceptions of governance and security 
comes into question.   
Yet a third puzzle relates to the potential inconsistency between the short- and 
long-term effects of development on insurgents.  Insurgents may choose to exhibit 
either patience or aggression in the short term that might confound analyses of the 
way development is affecting them in the longer-term.  Yet the impact of data 
limitations and the reality that short-term analyses offer the cleanest identification of 
empirical relationships together mean that the effects of multiple years of 





Given that development in the current Afghan conflict began as early as 2002 and 
continues at present, the need for a longer-term perspective seems particularly 
relevant.   
In reviewing the literature, Condra et. al. (2010) is unique in its connection to 
all three puzzles.  The authors find that violent responses to civilian casualties came 
more quickly in Iraq than in Afghanistan.  They argue that while insurgents faced 
information constraints in Iraq, insurgents face labor constraints in Afghanistan.  As a 
result, the information-sharing mechanism may be less significant and the pathway 
for development assistance to impact insurgents may be longer.  This conclusion 
offers meaningful insight into the three puzzles—hinting at the need to consider 
longer time periods—yet there remains the need for a more explicit study of the 
connection between the conclusions in Condra et. al (2010) and the mechanisms 
related to development in Afghanistan over multiple years.   
I use a longitudinal data case study to examine the mechanisms by which 
development assistance affects violence in Afghanistan, with the potential longer-
term impacts in mind.  By studying two adjacent provinces, Ghazni and Zabul, from 
2002 through 2011, I can analyze a long run that spans multiple years.  
Comparatively, the long run in Condra et. al. was two to three months.   
In considering the longer term, I introduce the concepts of risk and 
commitment as critical concepts through which to analyze the relationship between 
development assistance and violence.  My reading of the empirical and theoretical 
literature is that both the willingness to take risk and sustained, local commitment are 





longer-term.  When risk and commitment interact, there are several possible 
mechanisms that could allow micro-level improvements in security:  increasing 
information-sharing by the local populace, increasing the opportunity cost of 
participating in the insurgency, or decreasing loyalty to insurgents through 
competition with insurgent goods.   
This theory motivates my effort to quantitatively operationalize risk and 
commitment and then to empirically discern their independent and interactive effects 
as attributes of development assistance.  A case study framework where spatial 
precision and the integration of multiple data sources are possible is intended to 
support refinement of the theory.  My empirical results indicate that development 
with commitment but low risk allows violence to escalate, while development with 
risk and commitment at least initially, curbs violence.  As my analysis in Chapter 1 
showed, it was rare for projects to have both risk and commitment.  A result of the 
limited number of projects in relatively riskier districts is that some uncertainty 
remains about the interactive effects of risk and commitment in the longer term.   
Overall, this analysis highlights most clearly the weakness of development 
assistance undertaken without risk as commitment persists into the longer-term.  The 
headwinds to projection in Chapter 1 thus can be seen as adversely affecting 
stabilization.  This analysis contributes to the empirical literature on the relationship 
between development assistance and violent insurgent activity by developing a 
framework in which it is possible to distinguish risk and capture commitment over the 
longer-term.  Existing analyses treat all districts in Afghanistan as the same in terms 





short- and longer-terms.  While the empirical results from this analysis have 
limitations, the framework here can help guide future tests of the efficacy of 
development assistance. 
Distinguishing Between Short and Long-term Mechanisms 
Existing theoretical and empirical work on the relationship between 
development assistance and insurgent violence contains multiple conflicting 
mechanisms that may characterize the relationship.  Not only do these mechanisms 
operate in different directions, but they also have differing time horizons.  There are 
reasons for both promise and uncertainty regarding all of the mechanisms by which 
development might reduce violence for both the short-term and long-term time 
horizons.  From the existing literature, it is unclear which mechanism is actually at 
work in Afghanistan—or even if any are present. 
Starting with the potential for development to reduce violence in the short 
term, Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011a) suggest an information-sharing mechanism 
in which development leads the population to provide more information to 
counterinsurgents.  While empirical evidence in Iraq supports this mechanism, 
analyses such as Sexton (2016) do not find evidence of short-term information returns 
in Afghanistan.  My theory is that information-sharing has constraints in the short 
term—as Sexton identifies—and that more consequential information-sharing may 
require risk and commitment on the part of those undertaking development, the tenets 
of the longer-term model I suggest.  
 Yet, before moving to the longer term, the other side of the short-term 





the adverse short-term security effects from development are mechanisms in which 
insurgents seek to discredit counterinsurgents (Crost, Felter, and Johnston 2014), 
capture resources (Strandow, Findley, and Young 2016), or contest territorial control 
(Sexton 2016).  Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011a), Berman et. al. (2011b), and 
Berman et. al. (2013) also identify negative externalities associated with development 
in the short term that can increase violence.  They suggest that large projects might 
not be sufficiently attuned to local community needs and conditionality (2011a, 2013) 
or that improving the local economy can inflate the cost of information (2011b).   
However, Crost, Felter, and Johnston (2014) provide an empirical basis for the 
suggestion that the impacts of development might differ significantly between the 
short term and even a slightly longer-term horizon from their study in the Philippines.  
They find that violence during a six-month “social preparation phase” before a 
project’s start date had the most casualties and that violence after that six-month 
period was “substantially smaller and not statistically significant in any specification” 
(1846).  That is, the time horizon matters at a fairly granular level. 
 Among the mechanisms other than information-sharing by which 
development assistance might weaken insurgents over a relatively long time horizon 
are opportunity cost and goods competition mechanisms.  First, the opportunity cost 
mechanism suggests that economic development will increase the opportunity cost of 
participating in the insurgency because potential insurgents must relinquish better 
opportunities outside of the insurgency.  The opportunity cost theory has roots in the 
Becker (1968) theory of crime.  While Berman et. al. (2011b) rejects the opportunity 





support to its potential relevance in the long term.  Second, the goods competition 
mechanism comes from Berman and Laitin (2008).  Berman and Laitin suggest that 
development assistance could reduce the relative advantage insurgents maintain with 
local public goods provision, subsequently increasing the likelihood that insurgents 
face a defection problem. 
 Still, it is also possible to conceive of mechanisms whereby violence increases 
in the wake of development assistance even after a relatively long-term time horizon.  
Long-term investments in development can stunt state capacity improvements or 
adversely raise popular expectations.  Fukuyama (2006, 241), del Castillo (2008, 167) 
and Ghani (2009, 28) all describe the debilitating effects of development assistance 
on Afghan institutions.  Thus, the uncertainty associated with conflicting mechanisms 
that exists in the short term also extends to the longer horizon.   
Theory 
Amidst the conflicting mechanisms surrounding development in conflict 
environments, my theoretical approach seeks to unify some of the existing theory and 
empirics by suggesting that the effects of development during counterinsurgency will 
vary along the dimensions of risk and commitment.  Risk has a spatial character, 
while commitment has a temporal one.   
Risk refers to the risk tolerance by counterinsurgents in undertaking a 
development project, and it is equivalent in the Afghan context to the level of 
insurgent control, where insurgent control can come from advantageous terrain and/or 
popular support.  Insurgent control should be thought of along a spectrum like those 





Commitment refers to the persistence of efforts aimed at development 
assistance in a local area.  While commitment might be measurable in multiple ways, 
I consider the period of time over which counterinsurgents make investments in a 
local area to be most important.  I use the number of development projects 
counterinsurgents implement in a local area as my primary measure of commitment.  
For additional insight, I consider resource investments in dollars or the time planned 
for the completion of a development project as alternate ways to show commitment.  
My theoretical approach builds off the suggestions of Lindsay and Petersen 
(2011) that “hearts and minds” counterinsurgency programs tend to focus primarily 
on neutrals and weak supporters of either side.  On the Lindsay and Petersen scale, 
those neutrals and weak supporters are between -1 and +1 on a scale of insurgent or 
government support that ranges from -3 to +3 (a scale on which -3 are mobile 
insurgents and +3 are government security forces).  Within this construct, Lindsay 
and Petersen describe that the most important interactions for counterinsurgents may 
be with local insurgent or government supporters, those who are at -2 or +2 on their 
scale.  They write,  
[I]f the crucial action is occurring at the +/-2 level, then targeting is 
crucial.  Not only targeting of violence, but targeting of engagement 
and development is crucial.  Indiscriminate aid may be as 
counterproductive as indiscriminate violence.  (35.) 
 
Lindsay and Petersen are suggesting that projects in areas of greater risk have the 
potential to have greater effects.  My theory starts from this perspective on the 
importance of risk and adds commitment as an additional important dimension.   
The interactive effect of risk and commitment could come from the 





sharing mechanism.  The probability that these mechanisms become active and aid in 
reducing violence increases when risk and commitment increase together—at least up 
to a point.  Projects with high risk but low commitment are unlikely to have an effect, 
and on the flip side, projects with low risk but high commitment are also unlikely to 
have an effect.   
Increasing risk means that development assistance will be closer to the areas 
where insurgents reside and plan, seek future recruits, and offer goods that enhance 
their control.  In terms commonly used by tactical intelligence officers, those types of 
areas are insurgent support zones.  While areas that are deep in insurgent support 
zones are unlikely to be conducive to development assistance or yield stability returns 
from development investments because the terrain and popular advantages so greatly 
favor insurgents, development assistance with moderate levels of risk might have 
such effects.  Areas of moderate risk on the edge of insurgent support zones are likely 
to be near insurgent staging areas, where insurgents meet and pick up equipment 
before attacks.  Staging areas are near the intersection of the higher risk support zones 
that clearly favor insurgents and the lower risk disruption zones, or engagement areas, 
where insurgents conduct their attacks. 
Theoretically, somewhat increasing the risk associated with development 
assistance—that is, emplacing development assistance near staging areas rather than 
near engagement areas—increases the probability that any of the proposed 
mechanisms can weaken insurgents.  With moderate risk, development assistance 
should permit better information-sharing because those who benefit from the 





quality information.6  Similarly, relatively more risky development assistance should 
increase the chance of inflicting opportunity cost considerations on potential recruits 
because those recruits are more likely to come from areas of greater insurgent control.  
Finally, moderately risky development assistance may enable counterinsurgent goods 
and services to enter the markets where insurgent goods and services typically hold a 
competitive advantage.  At the same time, risk alone is insufficient because 
commitment over time to those riskier areas is necessary to corroborate information, 
to manifest sufficient economic growth for opportunity costs to be sizable, and to 
sustain competition with insurgents.  
Yet, commitment without risk is much more common among development 
assistance efforts during the course of recent counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.  In 
Chapter 1, I set out the multiple factors that present significant headwinds to 
sustained development projection away from the center—that is, into areas of risk.  
Unfortunately for counterinsurgents, development assistance without risk should be 
expected to have weak effects.  Because insurgents rarely reside in areas of lower 
risk, development with commitment but with little or no risk is missing the spatial 
dimension necessary to influence insurgents or future insurgents.  Development 
assistance projects in less risky areas are unlikely to transfer strong effects into 
neighboring areas of greater risk.  That is, carrying out development assistance in less 
risky areas, even if done well on a project-by-project basis, is not likely to do much to 
weaken the insurgents who reside in more risky areas.   
                                               
6 By “placement and access,” I am referring to characteristics that influence the quality of a Human 





Thus, whether development assistance has sufficient time (commitment) and 
proximity to areas of insurgent control (risk) seems likely to be pertinent for its 
effects on insurgent violence.  When analyses do not distinguish between varying 
levels of risk, the majority of projects that are carried out in areas with relatively less 
risk can dominate the effects that appear in empirical estimates.  The common finding 
that violence increases after development assistance projects in Afghanistan is not 
surprising when risk is omitted from empirical models and most projects are in the 
less effective low-risk areas because of the headwinds to projection.  At the same 
time, when analyses do not capture the degree of local commitment, they do not 
permit the consideration of evidence either in favor of or against counterinsurgency 
and stabilization mechanisms that require time to take root.  The empirical strategy in 
this study is thus aimed at allowing the regression model to discern the extent to 
which the effects of development assistance change when risk and commitment 
interact.   
Data 
This analysis starts from a NATO dataset providing information on 
development projects in Afghanistan from 2001 through 2012.  (Data courtesy of 
Shaver and Wright.)  The dataset includes projects from the Afghan Ministry of 
Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, and Development (MRRD), the Afghan Ministry of 
Finance, and the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) NATO 
database.  The dataset includes projects funded by international donors, international 
development banks, and multiple U.S. agencies including the U.S. Agency for 





Counterinsurgents and their supporters identify the projects and monitor project 
completion, but the work is most often done by local contractors.  This broad 
collection of projects over a considerable time period is useful for the longer-term 
analysis here because it allows analysis of the cumulative effect of the 
conglomeration of development assistance that converged into the villages and 
districts of Afghanistan.  
 The analysis focuses on individual projects as the unit of analysis in assessing 
the relationship between development assistance and changes in violence.  A 
challenge is that this dataset in principle includes a wealth of useful information 
including geographic precision for the location of each project, the cost of each 
project, and the time period over which each project was active and then completed.  
In practice, however, complete information is not available for all of the projects in 
the dataset.  To address some of the missing data, I am able to add locational 
information to many projects.  I use the “finder tool” within the Afghanistan Spatial 
Data Center (ASDC), a project with contributions from USAID, the Afghan 
Ministries, and the University of Maryland, to identify the geocoordinates for projects 
when the settlement or village but not the coordinates are in the dataset.  The “finder 
tool” handles phonetic spelling and returns a matching score for each village.  Using 
this tool, I could verify existing project coordinates and add additional project 
coordinates for all of the projects that include the settlement locations to which they 
pertain.   
 Guided by my theoretical premise about the role of micro-level risk for the 





which the geography aided in quantifying risk.  Based on my field experience in 
Wardak Province, Afghanistan, I operationalize risk as the difference between being 
on or off Highway 1 (Ring Road)—a development project away from the highway is 
one with greater risk than one on the highway.  Highway 1 is a major terrain feature 
that orients both civilian and insurgent behavior linearly.  Areas along the highway 
are frequently patrolled by counterinsurgents and are natural engagement areas where 
insurgents target counterinsurgents.  Control along the highway is contested.  Areas 
further from the highway are naturally areas of greater insurgent control due to 
advantageous terrain, such as mountains or valleys, and rural Pashtun popular 
support.  Insurgents tend to develop support zones in these types of areas.  To use an 
analogy, imagine if the police patrolled I-95 along the east coast of the United States 
but rarely ventured into non-highway areas.  Areas off the highway would quickly 
become a different place.  Given the terrain in Afghanistan, the environment can be 
vastly different only a few kilometers from the highway.  
To focus on implications relevant for U.S. policy-makers, I study provinces 
with the most U.S. primacy over reconstruction and development, which translates to 
U.S. leadership of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).  There were PRTs in 26 
of 34 Afghan provinces, and 14 of the PRTs had leadership from other countries.  
Among the 12 provinces with PRTs led by the United States, Ghazni and Zabul are 
the only provinces along Highway 1.  Thus, motivated by the goal of operationalizing 
risk and U.S. leadership in reconstruction and development, I study Ghazni and Zabul 
Provinces.  Although Ghazni also had a Polish-led PRT, the U.S. PRT continued to 

























Figure 1a.  Ghazni and Zabul Provinces within Afghanistan 






Notes:  All of these variables come from the xSub database, which pulls from multiple sources.  
(Zhukov, Yuri M., Christian Davenport, and Nadiya Kostyuk.  2017.  xSub:  Cross-National Data on 
Subnational Violence.  Produced and distributed by Ann Arbor, MI:  Center for Political Studies, 
University of Michigan.  http://cross-sub.org/data.) 
 
“Population in 2000” is from Gridded Population of the World (GPW) v3, National Aeronautical 
Science Administration (NASA), http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/collection/gpw-v3.   
 
“Mean Elevation” and “Max Elevation” are from ETOPO5 5-minute gridded elevation data, National 
Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI), 
https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/global/etopo5.HTML.   
 
“Open Terrain” and “Forest” are from Global Land Cover Characterization (GLCC), U.S. Geological 
Survey, https://lta.cr.usgs.gov/GLCC.  “Open Terrain” measures the proportion of land covered by 
open terrain (shrublands, savannah, grasslands, barren or sparsely vegetated).  “Forest” measures the 
proportion of land covered by evergreen, deciduous or mixed forest.   
 
“Road Density” is from Digital Chart of the World (DCW), http://statisk.umb.no/ikf/gis/dcw/ (link is 
dead).   
 
“Temperature in 2014” and “Rain in 2014” are from National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), https://data.noaa.gov/dataset/terrestrial-air-temperature-and-precipitation-
1900-2014-gridded-monthly-time-series (link is dead).   
 
“Ethnic Groups” are from Geo-referencing of Ethnic Groups (GREG), https://icr.ethz.ch/data/greg/.  
Weidmann, Nils B., Jan Ketil Rød, and Lars-Erik Cederman. 2010. "Representing Ethnic Groups in 
Space: A New Dataset." Journal of Peace Research 47(4): 491–99.  GREG includes the names of local 
ethnic groups.   
 
“Languages Spoken” is from World Language Mapping System, 
http://www.worldgeodatasets.com/language/.  
Table 1. Ghazni and Zabul Provincial Level Comparison
(1) (2)
Ghazni Zabul
Population Density in 2000 (persons/km2) 85.89 14.92
Area (km2) 27,431 20,498
Mean Elevation (meters) 2,688 1,944
Max Elevation (meters) 3,962 3,124
Open Terrain (fraction of total area) 0.9473 0.9642
Forest (fraction of total area) 0.0173 0.0053
Road Density (km/km2) 0.0930 0.0722
Temperature in 2014 (celsius) 10.94 15.74
Rainfall in 2014 (millimeters) 20.66 21.25
Ethnic Groups Afghans; Hazara-Berberi; Uzbeks Afghans; Hazara-Berberi





While Ghazni and Zabul are not identical, they are adjacent rural provinces 
along Highway 1 with primarily Pashtun populations.  The highway creates a similar 
economic structure in which bazaars along the highway are major economic centers.  
The predominantly rural environment aids in identifying mechanisms because the 
human terrain is simpler than in urban areas.  (Figures 1a and 1b depict the provinces 
geographically while Table 1 compares the human and physical environments.) 
Most differences related to the border that Zabul shares with Pakistan or the 
physical environment can be controlled for in a regression framework by including 
appropriate covariates.  However, one key difference between the provinces are four 
Hazara-dominated districts in western Ghazni that are more stable than neighboring  
Pashtu-dominated districts:  Ajristan, Malistan, Jaghuri, and Nawur districts (Izady).7  










                                               
7 The Hazara are a minority group comprising seven to 20 percent of the population in Afghanistan.  
They are of Mongolian descent, speak a dialect of Dari (Hazargi), and are almost entirely Shia Muslim, 
which contrasts with the Persian descent, Pashto language, and Sunni Muslim practices of the Pashtun 
population.    
Figure 1c.  Districts in Ghazni and Zabul with 
Hazara Districts Highlighted 






  Removing the Hazara districts makes the operationalization of risk more 
appropriate.  Qualitative interviews supported the validity of the decision to drop the 
Hazara districts.  Interviews with four different Ghazni PRT members mentioned that 
the Hazara districts were different.  One PRT commander in Ghazni described,  
Just because of Ghazni’s geography and the Hazara are basically the 
western third of the province, it was a totally different approach.  
Basically, when guys would fly out, once you’re there, they could take 
off their body armor, and that was a very secure area.  That was the 
only location. 
Then, there were some, there were three or four districts, there was 
nothing going on.  They were totally Taliban controlled.  No one went 
there.  Kind of a spectrum.  Three or four where nothing happened… 
all of the Hazara areas, you knew that whatever you contracted for was 
going to get built within tolerances… and then the messy middle, I 
would say. (August 10, 2018 Interview.)   
 
A State Department official in Ghazni offered a similar characterization: 
 
Ghazni was a really interesting place because it was almost like all of 
Afghanistan in a microcosm.  So you had this flat area to the east and 
south that Highway 1 went through, and that was largely Pashtu.  And 
then you had a mountainous region that was partly Hazara and partly 
Pashtu.  And the mountainous Pashtu regions, number one, were very 
far away and, number two, were very insecure.  So some of those we 
just didn’t go to.  (August 16, 2018 Interview.)   
 
Thus, after removing the Hazara Districts from the dataset and controlling for 
differences in the physical environment, risk is reasonably operationalizable by 
distinguishing between districts on and off the highway, and the environments in 









Active/Obligated 489 163 652
Committed 30 32 62
Completed 1,970 536 2,506
Nominated 26 65 91
Planned/Unfunded 20 13 33
Suspended 1 4 5
Terminated (Cancelled) 236 230 466
Unknown 591 262 853
Total 3,363 1,305 4,668
Projects with Latitude and Longitde
Total 1,748 761 2,509
Projects with Start Date
2002 9 2 11
2003 63 21 84
2004 336 56 392
2005 339 29 368
2006 246 40 286
2007 370 63 433
2008 270 25 295
2009 279 29 308
2010 99 21 120
2011 3 4 7
Total 2,013 290 2,303
Projects in Hazara Districts
Total 804 0 804
Table 2. Projects in Initial Dataset
(1) (2) (3)
Ghazni Zabul Total
Active/Obligated 75 3 78
Completed 330 63 393
Total 405 66 471
Table 3. Projects in Final Analysis
Note:  Projects in the final analysis are those with latitude 
and longitude coordinates, a start date, and a status of 
active or completed that are not located in the 
































Figure 2.  Graphs of Projects over 
Time 




















The dataset with all of the projects in Ghazni and Zabul starts with 4,668 
projects that span from 2002 through 2011 (Table 2 and Figure 2).  Examples of 
common projects include digging wells, building schools, cleaning karezes 
(underground irrigation tunnels), and creating roads. However, only a sample of 
projects with sufficient spatial and temporal precision, a status of “completed” or 
“active”, and a location in districts other than the Hazara districts are appropriate to 
Table 4.  t Test Comparing the Sample of Projects in the Final Analysis to the Unusable Projects
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Sample Mean Unusable Project Mean
p-value for Two-Tailed 
Difference in Means Test
Amount Spent (USD) 35,626 170,335 0.0007
Planned Start Year 2006.78 2006.94 0.1028
Province (Ghazni = 1) 0.86 0.70 0.0000
District Population Density (persons/km2) 1193.77 710.13 0.0000
District Mean Elevation (meters) 2,146 2,299 0.0000
District Open Terrain (fraction of total area) 0.91 0.94 0.0000
District Number of Ethnic Groups 1.27 1.41 0.0000
District Number of Languages Spoken 1.01 1.15 0.0000
District to Provincial Capital Distance (km) 30.16 50.12 0.0000
District Road Density (km/km2) 0.20 0.15 0.0000
District Temperature (celsius) -7.01 -8.08 0.0000
District Rainfall (millimeters) 3.27 3.12 0.0000





use for this analysis.  The other projects were missing information in one or more 
dimensions of their location, start date, or status, or they were in the predominantly 
Hazara districts and thus excluded from the empirical analysis.  The resulting sample 
of projects with sufficient information and a location in a predominantly Pashtun 
district has a sample size of 471, with 405 in Ghazni and 66 in Zabul.  Table 3 and 
Figure 3 depict the projects in the sample in tabular, spatial, and temporal form.   
  Table 4 shows that there are differences between the sample projects and the 
unusable projects.  The sample favors projects in Ghazni that are closer to the 
provincial capital and in areas of greater population density than the unusable 
projects.  The primary reason for this difference appears to be that only 22 percent of 
the projects in the dataset in Zabul have a start date listed compared to this 
information being present for 60 percent of the projects in Ghazni.  It is hard to 
discern if this difference biases the results in a particular direction.  In the analysis 
that follows, I include provincial fixed effects to reduce concerns about omitted 











Direct Fire 2,108 2,059 4,167
Indirect Fire 1,303 651 1,954
IED Explosion 801 1,031 1,832
IED Found and Cleared 831 1,337 2,168
Total 5,043 5,078 10,121
Table 5. SIGACTS in Ghazni and Zabul 2002 Through 2011
Figure 4a.  Graph of SIGACTS by 

























The primary dependent variable for the analysis comes from Significant 
Activities (SIGACTS) recorded by the DoD from 2001 through 2012.  (Data courtesy 
of Shaver and Wright).  SIGACTS are violent events reported by service members on 
the ground—when insurgents attack coalition forces or coalition forces interdict an 
attack such as by finding an Improvised Explosive Device (IED), that constitutes a 
SIGACT.  Table 5 and Figure 4 depict SIGACTS in tabular, spatial, and temporal 
form after limiting the dataset to the 2002 to 2011 time period.  The spatial and 
temporal precision of DoD SIGACTS make them the preferred data source on 
security conditions for this analysis, with the number of SIGACTS taken as 
corresponding to the level of violence in a location. 
Still, SIGACT data remain imperfect in two ways.  First, the number of 
SIGACTS reported varies with troop numbers and the number of patrols.  More 





patrols will make SIGACTS more likely.  I include controls for a project’s start year 
to reduce potential bias from year-to-year changes in troop numbers (since the extent 
to which counterinsurgents patrolled varied in response to broad strategic decisions 
that varied over time), but there is no perfect control for the number of patrols.  One 
could envision a violence indicator such as SIGACTS per patrol, or even SIGACTS 
per mile of distance patrolled, but that information not available.  Second, violence 
data in general is an imperfect proxy for insurgent strength.  As Kalyvas (2006) 
identifies, insurgents have little need for violence in areas of their exclusive control.  
In addition, insurgents also have options to transfer to other areas, remain patient, or 
employ non-violent means.  The longer-term perspective that exists with the use of a 
commitment variable that accounts for a project’s timing within a longer-term 
sequence helps distinguish longer-term trends from short-term reactions, but some of 
these dynamics may remain persistent.   
I use two additional data sources other than the project and SIGACT data to 
gain further insight into the role of risk and commitment.  First, I conducted personal 
interviews with members of the State Department, DoD, and USAID who served on 
PRTs from 2008 through 2012.  Those interviews both informed the empirical design 
and offered first-hand perceptions of the mechanisms at work surrounding 
development projects.  Second, Afghanistan National Quarterly Assessment Report 
(ANQAR) survey data provide an Afghan local perspective on security conditions, 
government performance, and development satisfaction.  (NATO Joint Force 
Command Brunssum shared the ANQAR survey data.)  Waves 1-10 of the survey 





study. 8  NATO advised against using the ANQAR results from 2011 and 2012 due to 
a discontinuity in survey methods during that time period.   
Using the three different data sources together offers as much variety and 
precision at the tactical level as is feasible to gather in an unclassified retrospective 
case study.  While measurement in a combat environment is imperfect, areas where 
these three very different data sources point to similar conclusions allows for some 
confidence regarding the conclusions even within a relatively small n case study.  A 
perspective not present is that of insurgents.  Such data at the tactical level is rarely 
unclassified and might only be possible only through site exploitation documents or 
sources such as detainee records.  Such analysis would be useful in the future.     
Method 
This analysis is unique for the spatial and temporal precision used to estimate 
the effects of development projects on security and for the way I operationalize and 
employ risk and commitment as key variables of interest.  Spatial precision comes 
from using the latitude and longitude of development project settlements and 
measuring the relationship between development assistance and violence within five 
kilometers of those projects.  Temporal precision comes from analyzing the effects of 
projects within six 30-day periods of a project’s start date.  The spatial and temporal 
precision I employ is most similar to Karell and Shutte (2018) compared to earlier 
                                               
8 The project sample for the ANQAR portion of the analysis has slightly different requirements than 
the SIGACT portion.  Projects with a start date, an “active” or “complete” status, and a location in a 
non-Hazara district are still required, but projects do not need to have geocoordinates.  Projects only 
need to have information on their districts.  However, an assumption must be made that the projects 
within a survey wave are those that impact survey responses.  Thus, I include only projects within 90 
days of the first survey wave up to the last date of the last survey wave.  The resulting sample size is 





estimates effects of development spending at the district level with bands in weeks, 
months, or half years (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011a, Chou 2012, Child 2014, 
Adams 2015, Sexton 2016).  For robustness, I also test several spatial and temporal 
adjustments to the basic regression specifications.  First, I adjust the time period 
bands, shortening them to 15 days or increasing them to 45 days.  Then, I vary the 
spatial distance around a project in which SIGACTS are measured, ranging from 1km 
to 9km.   
 
I operationalize risk with a binary variable indicating whether projects are in 
highway or non-highway districts, with Highway 1 being the main highway running 
north and south through Ghazni and Zabul.  I operationalize commitment as the 
number of projects within a district.  An area where there are a larger number of 
projects is one in which there is a greater demonstration of commitment by 
counterinsurgent forces.  Thus, each project has a project number based on its 
sequence within a district that reflects the number of projects that were previously 
started in the district since 2002.  Table 6a shows the project numbers used in the 
primary definition of commitment for projects in highway and non-highway districts.   
The definitions of risk and commitment are both imperfect.  For risk, factors 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Project Number Within District HWY nonHWY HWY nonHWY
1-10 124 98 18 98
11-20 48 15 4 15
21-30 63 4 7 4
31-40 55 0 7 0
41-50 13 0 3 0
51-60 17 0 4 0
61-70 12 0 3 0
71-80 11 0 3 0
81-89 11 0 5 0
Total 354 117 54 117
Before Matching After Matching





other than insurgent control may impact decisions to emplace projects on or off the 
highway.  Risk is also more continuous than the highway and non-highway district 
cutoff implies.  I try to address these concerns with a large number of environmental 
controls throughout the analysis and with an alternate definition for risk that 
distinguishes risk as the difference between the provincial capital and other districts.  
Most importantly, I am suggesting that areas off the highway—or away from the 
capital—are more likely to have higher risk than areas on the highway, and not that 
areas off the highway are always higher risk.  On average, I expect the probabilistic 
difference to be large enough for there to be a significant effect.  That there is a 
significant difference in terms of the degree of insurgent control between areas on and 
off the highway comes from my experience on the ground in Afghanistan. 
For commitment, using the project number in sequence impedes upon the 
independence of error terms and biases the results toward areas with high 
commitment, which are primarily on the highway and in Ghazni.  The challenge here 
is related to both methods and data.  A challenge specific to longer-term analysis on 
which I focus is that the number of projects in risky areas were limited despite the 
long duration of investments in Afghanistan.  Prior analyses do not treat the limited 
number of projects away from the center as a significant factor to be analyzed.  
Taking this central geographic feature of Afghanistan into account is an advance of 
the work here over the existing research literature.  My theoretical argument and 
personal experience both suggest that the two environments might be different, and 
the empirical goal is to discern if this is the case.  However, if I were to only estimate 





alone would easily be dismissed as demonstrating only fleeting gains in reducing 
violence—hardly an outcome on which to base policy.   
  I use the number of projects as the primary definition of commitment 
because I think it is the way local Afghans are most likely to judge commitment.  I 
later include the amount spent on a project and the planned project duration as 
alternate definitions of commitment to address this definition’s weakness in terms of 
error independence and project number balance.  I discuss the estimates obtained 
using the alternate definitions of the critical variables after reporting the main results. 
After defining the critical variables, I use nearest neighbor matching to match 
non-highway projects with highway projects of similar size and at a similar time.  I 
match on the amount allocated to a project, the month in which a project starts, and 
the year in which a project starts.  Matching on the amount allocated to a project is 
important because projects of different size should have different effects as shown in 
Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2011a), Berman et. al. (2013), Adams (2015), and 
Sexton (2016).  Matching on the project start month is necessary to account for 
seasonal variation in levels of violence, which exist due to the presence of “fighting 
seasons” in Afghanistan.  Cold temperatures and snow in the winter, a wet season in 
the spring, and harvest times create strong seasonal effects in the intensity of fighting.  
Matching on project start year is necessary to account for changes in insurgent 





variables improves the accuracy of estimated effects.9  Tables 6b and 6c show 
improvements in covariate balance and reductions in differences in project type as a 
result of matching.  For robustness, I use nearest neighbor matching with the average 
level of pre-project violence in place of the start year and start month, nearest 
neighbor matching with a full set of environmental covariates, and employ an 
alternate matching process, coarsened exact matching.   
 
 After matching, I first estimate the separate effects of risk and commitment on 
violence (SIGACTS) from the time a project starts.  The basic form of the equations I 
                                               
9 I use the “teffects” command in Stata and follow the recommendations of the Social Science 
Computing Cooperative (SSCC) at the University of Wisconsin for “Regression on the ‘Matched 
Sample.’”  The “teffects” command in Stata is not perfectly designed for panel data and difference-in-
difference estimation, requiring a minor manual adjustment to select the nearest neighbor match that 
also corresponds to the correct time period.   
Table 6b.  Covariate Balance Before and After Matching















Start Year 2007.21 2005.71 2006.09 -0.53 0.16
Start Month 6.69 6.66 6.92 0.08 0.10
ln Amount Spent (USD) 9.64 9.35 9.61 -0.02 0.20
Population Density (persons/km2) 1538.67 728.82 76.49 -1.27 -0.69
ln Distance from Pakistan (km) 5.20 5.14 5.10 -0.28 -0.12
District Open Terrain (fraction of total area) 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.44 0.05
District Number of Ethnic Groups 1.38 1.60 1.03 -0.95 -1.53
District Number of Languages Spoken 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.21 0.21
District Road Density (km/km2) 0.21 0.14 0.14 -0.68 -0.01
District Temperature (celsius) -7.21 -6.91 -6.49 0.28 0.13
District Rainfall (millimeters) 3.32 3.36 3.20 -0.30 -0.34
District to Provincial Capital Distance (km) 29.80 44.75 37.08 0.29 -0.33
District Mean Elevation (meters) 2136.38 2114.29 2196.68 0.31 0.35
Table 6c.  Project Type Balance Before and After Matching


















Agriculture 7.3 7.4 3.4 -3.9 -4.0
Commerce and Industry 4.2 3.7 2.6 -1.7 -1.1
Education and Community Devlopment 19.2 11.1 14.5 -4.7 3.4
Governance and Capacity Building 1.1 1.9 0.9 -0.3 -1.0
Infrastructure 48.0 42.6 47.0 -1.0 4.4
Other 0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.6 0.0
Public Health 16.7 31.5 29.9 13.2 -1.6





estimate follows a difference-in-difference specification.  The comparison between 
started projects, the use of a difference-in-difference estimation with matching and 
narrow spatial and temporal windows for distinguishing the effects of development 
projects on SIGACTS as the dependent variable parallels the technique used in Karell 
and Shutte (2018), making this estimation strategy consistent with the most current 
methods in this sub-field.10  Karell and Shutte use this method to estimate the effects 
of different types of projects in similar environments, while I estimate the effects of 
similar projects in different types of environments.   
  
 
This estimation strategy is based on the idea that there are parallel trends in 
terms of violence before project start and random assignment of projects on and off of 
the highway.  Figure 5a and Figure 5b depict the quality of the parallel trends before 
and after a project’s start date for projects in highway and non-highway districts once 
                                               
10 A difference in my analysis versus Karell and Shutte is that it I do not include matching on average 
pre-project violence in my primary results, while Karell and Shutte emphasize matching on pre-project 
violence in both of their primary results figures.  I find that matching on start year and start month 
rather than average pre-project violence allows better parallel trends.  This occurs because areas with 
low violence on the highway are those with inconsistent trends.  My preferred matching combination is 
in the main results in Tables 7-9, but I include the results with matching on pre-project average 
violence among the robustness checks in Table 10.  
Figure 5a.  SIGACTs Before and After 
Project Start 






matching is complete.  The trends in terms of average SIGACTS and IED events (a 
sub-set of the SIGACTS) are flat in the 150 days (time period 2 to time period 6) 
before both highway and non-highway projects (areas where there is variation are 
small based on the y-axis scale).  Meanwhile, qualitative interviews in Chapter 1 
showed that the PRTs, who were the principal units responsible for projects in Ghazni 
and Zabul, made project emplacement decisions similarly for projects in highway and 
non-highway districts as they tried to overcome resource constraints and headwinds 
to projection.  As PRTs implemented projects in this way, commitment to any one 
district was nearly random.  Particularly emblematic of the way decisions about 
projects were made was this statement by a State Department official in Ghazni: 
On a given day, we would have these mission planning exercises 
where it was like, alright, no one has been to Deh Yak in three weeks, 
we’re going, what do we want to accomplish there.  Then, everyone 
was throwing up their hands.  The Polish water guy wanted to go out 
there because his predecessor left a note about a program that they 
could have done.  AID said they wanted to go out because they never 
did anything to go outside the wire and that was the closest they could 
get.  I had my goals and agendas for who to meet with.  (August 28, 
2018 Interview.) 
 
This process led to a broadly similar mix of projects in highway and non-highway 
districts.  Differences that did exist in terms of project type were reduced by 
matching, as shown in Table 6c.  Matching also reduced environmental differences as 
shown in Table 6b.  I seek to reduce other concerns about differences in the 
environment by reporting multiple results for robustness, including without 
covariates, with a partial set of covariates, and with a complete set of covariates. 
The coefficient of interest, ß1, in the risk equation, equation (1), estimates the 





highway district.  The coefficient of interest, ß1, in the commitment equation, 
equation (2), estimates the effect of a project’s sequence among the projects in a 
district.  In all cases throughout this analysis, the effects estimated are differences 
between projects that started, as indicated by a project status of “active” or 
“completed” in the dataset.  Areas without projects or where projects were never 
started are not a part of the analysis.  Thus, I am estimating the Average Treatment 
Effect on the Treated (ATT) between villages in which projects were started in 
highway and non-highway districts.  This differs from an Average Treatment Effect 
in which the estimate would be the difference between projects started and not started 
in highway and non-highway districts respectively.    
After estimating the effects of risk and commitment on violence 
independently, I then estimate the effects when risk and commitment interact.  The 
coefficient of interest, ß1, in the interaction equation, equation (3), indicates the effect 
on SIGACTS as the number of projects in a non-highway district increases.  Based on 
my theory, I expect that only the coefficient of interest in the interaction equation will 
predict a decrease in the number of SIGACTS—that is, that taking both risk and 
showing commitment result in a reduction of violence. 
SIGACTS  = ß0 + ß1nonHWY*start + ß2nonHWY + ß3start + ßX + e 
 
(1) 
SIGACTS  = ß0 + ß1projectNumber*start + ß2projectNumber + ß3start + ßX + e 
 
(2) 
SIGACTS  = ß0 + ß1projectNumber*nonHWY*start + ß2 nonHWY*start + 
ß3 projectNumber*start + ß3 projectNumber*nonHWY + ß5projectNumber + 
ß6nonHWY + ß6start + ßX + e 
(3) 
 
The SIGACTS measures used as the dependent variable include only those 





I also include the results for four different types of SIGACTS:  IEDs found and 
cleared, IED explosions, direct fire events, and indirect fire events.  The matrix X in 
all equations includes controls for various aspects of the environment that could also 
account for variation in the level of violence.  These include the project’s start year, 
the average of the number of SIGACTS in the six 30-day periods before project start, 
a province dummy, the amount spent on the project, the population density of the 
district, the distance to Pakistan, the percentage of open terrain in the district, the 
number of languages spoken in the district, the density of roads in the district, the 
average temperature in the district, and the average rainfall in the district.  
Finally, for additional insight, I use the ANQAR quarterly survey data for 
several alternate dependent variable measures of security.  These include how survey 
respondents feel each level of government is performing at security, the perceived 
level of overall security in respondents’ districts, and how security has changed in 
their district over the past six months.  The quarterly survey data allow me to test the 
interactive effect between risk and commitment using a multinomial logit regression.  
While less spatial and temporal precision is possible since the survey is at quarterly 
frequency at the district level compared to the more timely and more geographically 
granular SIGACT data, I can examine the effect as the number of projects in a district 
up to the survey date interacts with the district being a highway or non-highway 








Estimating the risk equation indicates that fewer total SIGACTS and fewer 
total IEDs follow the start of projects in non-highway districts compared to highway 
districts on average when commitment is not considered (Table 7).  The graphs in 
Figures 5a and 5b (previously on page 78) further illuminate the findings in Table 7.  
Together the table and figures reveal that the estimated effect comes from a relatively 
large increase in the number of SIGACTS or IEDs following the start of projects on 
Table 7. Risk: Effects within 5km of Projects in Highway and Non-Highway Districts - Matching














Interaction Non-Highway x Project Start -0.4217** -0.4214*** -0.4214*** -0.2165** -0.2024*** -0.2024***
(0.1762) (0.1372) (0.1355) (0.0863) (0.0722) (0.0710)
Non-Highway Dummy -0.4929*** 0.0811 -1.3951* -0.3205*** 0.0358 0.3854
(0.1246) (0.1021) (0.7386) (0.0610) (0.0537) (0.3874)
Project Start Dummy 0.4943*** 0.5270*** 0.5270*** 0.2023*** 0.2079*** 0.2079***
(0.1246) (0.0932) (0.0920) (0.0610) (0.0490) (0.0483)
Start Year 1.0888*** 1.0656*** 0.3873*** 0.3794***
(0.0343) (0.0356) (0.0181) (0.0187)
Average Pre-Project SIGACTS -0.1152 1.4412*** -0.1493** -0.8929***
(0.1242) (0.4598) (0.0653) (0.2411)
Province Dummy (Ghazni = 1) 0.1367*** 0.2133*** 0.0746*** 0.0970***
(0.0220) (0.0259) (0.0116) (0.0136)
ln Amount Spent (USD) -0.0871*** -0.0617** -0.0447*** -0.0508***
(0.0273) (0.0277) (0.0144) (0.0145)
Population Density (persons/km2) 0.0001 0.0006 0.0002*** -0.0005*
(0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0003)
ln Distance from Pakistan (km) 0.5448*** -0.6397 0.2346*** 0.2498
(0.1573) (0.4898) (0.0828) (0.2569)
District Open Terrain (fraction of total area) -8.7475* -10.0435***
(4.5281) (2.3748)
District Number of Ethnic Groups -8.3423*** -2.7965***
(1.1090) (0.5816)
District Number of Languages Spoken -0.5231 -0.3067
(0.4115) (0.2158)
District Road Density (km/km2) -45.4957*** -8.5802**
(8.3080) (4.3572)
District Temperature (celsius) -2.4615*** -1.6992***
(0.5506) (0.2888)
District Rainfall (millimeters) 9.9973*** 5.2970***
(1.8590) (0.9750)
District to Provincial Capital Distance (km) -0.0532*** -0.0302***
(0.0106) (0.0056)
District Mean Elevation (meters) -0.0117*** -0.0125***
(0.0043) (0.0023)
Constant 0.8504*** -276.1043*** -420.6077*** 0.4687*** -150.2916*** -180.6495***
(0.0881) (44.5466) (52.4204) (0.0431) (23.4409) (27.4925)
Observations 2,808 2,340 2,340 2,808 2,340 2,340
R-squared 0.0277 0.5218 0.5354 0.0377 0.4491 0.4683
Standard errors in parentheses





the highway compared to minimal change in SIGACTS or IEDs following the start of 
projects off the highway.  After they start, matched projects on the highway have 49 
percent more SIGACTS (0.42 more per 30 days compared to 0.85 per 30 days on 
average before project start) and 43 percent more IEDs (0.20 more per 30 days 
compared to 0.47 per 30 days on average before project start) within five kilometers 
compared to a non-highway district project.   
In the context of similar literature, this result seems to conflict with the Sexton 
(2016) finding that projects in less stable districts were less effective.  Yet, the results 
might fit within the broader theory in Kalyvas (2006).  As Kalyvas would expect, 
insurgents appear more likely to use violence in contested districts—those along the 
highway—than in districts that are more firmly in insurgent control—those off of the 
highway.  This initially is interesting, but the relationship between risk and 
commitment over the longer term has not yet been assessed.  Reactions to the finding 
that there is less violence on average near projects in non-highway districts should be 
tempered by the reality that the longer-term analysis offers a better view of the effects 






Results from estimating the commitment equation indicate that when risk is 
not considered, violence increases as a project’s sequence number within its district 
increases (Table 8).  On average, when risk is not specified, each additional project 
results in eight percent more SIGACTS (0.05 more per 30 days compared to 0.60 per 
30 days on average before project start) and six percent more IEDs (0.02 more per 30 
days compared to 0.31 per 30 days on average before project start) within five 
kilometers.  This result is consistent with what many have found when studying 
Table 8. Commitment: Effects within 5km of Subsequent Projects - Matching














Interaction Project Number x Start 0.0423*** 0.0519*** 0.0519*** 0.0134*** 0.0169*** 0.0169***
(0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Project Number 0.0480*** 0.0123** 0.0139** 0.0290*** 0.0067** 0.0053*
(0.0028) (0.0048) (0.0059) (0.0013) (0.0026) (0.0032)
Project Start Dummy -0.2264*** -0.2592*** -0.2592*** -0.0680 -0.0783* -0.0783*
(0.0871) (0.0763) (0.0756) (0.0424) (0.0415) (0.0410)
Start Year 1.0022*** 0.9509*** 0.3533*** 0.3362***
(0.0341) (0.0379) (0.0185) (0.0205)
Average Pre-Project SIGACTS -0.1043 0.8808** -0.1468** -0.9419***
(0.1171) (0.4217) (0.0637) (0.2285)
Province Dummy (Ghazni = 1) 0.0380* 0.0396 0.0346*** 0.0399**
(0.0229) (0.0342) (0.0124) (0.0185)
ln Amount Spent (USD) -0.0129 0.0131 -0.0153 -0.0210
(0.0273) (0.0286) (0.0148) (0.0155)
Population Density (persons/km2) -0.0003*** 0.0011*** 0.0001* -0.0007***
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0002)
ln Distance from Pakistan (km) 0.0661 0.2226 0.0423 0.1939
(0.1575) (0.3609) (0.0857) (0.1955)
District Open Terrain (fraction of total area) -8.5337** -11.3581***
(4.1575) (2.2522)
District Number of Ethnic Groups -6.0833*** -1.9724***
(1.1041) (0.5981)
District Number of Languages Spoken -0.6124 -0.3004
(0.3896) (0.2111)
District Road Density (km/km2) -47.3515*** -5.4334
(7.2745) (3.9408)
District Temperature (celsius) -2.0507*** -1.2036***
(0.4590) (0.2487)
District Rainfall (millimeters) 7.9096*** 3.6611***
(1.6840) (0.9122)
District to Provincial Capital Distance (km) -0.0496*** -0.0296***
(0.0101) (0.0054)
District Mean Elevation (meters) -0.0116*** -0.0089***
(0.0030) (0.0016)
Constant 0.0248 -76.3622* -71.4247 -0.0418 -69.3578*** -65.2479*
(0.0616) (46.2666) (69.0902) (0.0300) (25.1750) (37.4277)
Observations 2,808 2,340 2,340 2,808 2,340 2,340
R-squared 0.3298 0.5719 0.5808 0.3426 0.4727 0.4881
Standard errors in parentheses





Afghanistan without operationalizing risk (Chou 2012, Child 2014, Sexton 2016):  
development projects appear unable to reduce violence.  But, my theory is that when 
we consider risk and commitment together, the results will be different. 
 














Interaction Project Number x Non-Highway x Start -0.0533*** -0.0588*** -0.0588*** -0.0107 -0.0127 -0.0127
(0.0199) (0.0194) (0.0192) (0.0098) (0.0106) (0.0105)
Interaction Non-Highway x Start 0.4527** 0.4741** 0.4741*** 0.0112 0.0427 0.0427
(0.2001) (0.1842) (0.1822) (0.0979) (0.1008) (0.0993)
Interaction Project Number x Start 0.0456*** 0.0547*** 0.0547*** 0.0134*** 0.0171*** 0.0171***
(0.0042) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Interaction Project Number x Non-Highway -0.0538*** -0.0261* -0.0329** -0.0288*** -0.0095 -0.0174**
(0.0141) (0.0147) (0.0148) (0.0069) (0.0080) (0.0081)
Project Number 0.0513*** 0.0169*** 0.0169*** 0.0306*** 0.0081*** 0.0069**
(0.0030) (0.0050) (0.0059) (0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0032)
Non-Highway Dummy 0.4552*** 0.0536 -1.7853** 0.2257*** 0.0424 0.2867
(0.1415) (0.1343) (0.6987) (0.0693) (0.0735) (0.3808)
Project Start Dummy -0.3342*** -0.3431*** -0.3431*** -0.0412 -0.0638 -0.0638
(0.1273) (0.1057) (0.1046) (0.0623) (0.0579) (0.0570)
Start Year 0.9722*** 0.9209*** 0.3449*** 0.3288***
(0.0344) (0.0379) (0.0188) (0.0206)
Average Pre-Project SIGACTS -0.2152* 1.1935*** -0.1760*** -0.9770***
(0.1190) (0.4346) (0.0651) (0.2369)
Province Dummy (Ghazni = 1) 0.0607** 0.0853** 0.0428*** 0.0546***
(0.0239) (0.0348) (0.0131) (0.0190)
ln Amount Spent (USD) -0.0229 0.0026 -0.0185 -0.0293*
(0.0272) (0.0287) (0.0149) (0.0156)
Population Density (persons/km2) -0.0004*** -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0007***
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0003)
ln Distance from Pakistan (km) 0.3525** -0.5005 0.1298 0.2967
(0.1670) (0.4617) (0.0914) (0.2516)
District Open Terrain (fraction of total area) -11.0700*** -10.8343***
(4.2779) (2.3316)
District Number of Ethnic Groups -6.4562*** -2.1657***
(1.0982) (0.5986)
District Number of Languages Spoken -0.5524 -0.3173
(0.3874) (0.2111)
District Road Density (km/km2) -38.3159*** -6.0507
(7.8663) (4.2874)
District Temperature (celsius) -1.5153*** -1.3801***
(0.5421) (0.2955)
District Rainfall (millimeters) 6.5986*** 4.1474***
(1.8361) (1.0007)
District to Provincial Capital Distance (km) -0.0536*** -0.0304***
(0.0100) (0.0054)
District Mean Elevation (meters) -0.0056 -0.0104***
(0.0042) (0.0023)
Constant -0.0829 -123.0979** -161.5015** -0.0887** -86.1040*** -94.6630**
(0.0900) (48.3192) (70.1376) (0.0441) (26.4385) (38.2273)
Observations 2,808 2,340 2,340 2,808 2,340 2,340
R-squared 0.3478 0.5784 0.5889 0.3544 0.4748 0.4919
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1









(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
IEDs Found and 
Cleared
IED Explosions Direct Fire Events Indirect Fire Events
Interaction Project Number x Non-Highway x Start -0.0057 -0.0071 -0.0198** -0.0262**
(0.0078) (0.0054) (0.0079) (0.0110)
Interaction Non-Highway x Start 0.0077 0.0350 0.2100*** 0.2214**
(0.0735) (0.0516) (0.0753) (0.1041)
Interaction Project Number x Start 0.0093*** 0.0077*** 0.0142*** 0.0234***
(0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0021)
Interaction Project Number x Non-Highway -0.0046 -0.0048 -0.0095 -0.0072
(0.0059) (0.0041) (0.0060) (0.0083)
Project Number 0.0101*** -0.0019 0.0024 0.0064**
(0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0028)
Non-Highway Dummy 0.0351 0.0073 -0.0487 0.0600
(0.0536) (0.0376) (0.0549) (0.0759)
Project Start Dummy -0.0265 -0.0373 -0.1049** -0.1744***
(0.0422) (0.0296) (0.0432) (0.0597)
Start Year -0.0049 0.0477*** 0.0506*** -0.0327**
(0.0095) (0.0067) (0.0098) (0.0135)
Average Pre-Project SIGACTS 0.2402*** 0.1046*** 0.2550*** 0.3724***
(0.0137) (0.0096) (0.0141) (0.0194)
Province Dummy (Ghazni = 1) -0.0608 -0.1152*** -0.1350*** 0.0958
(0.0475) (0.0334) (0.0486) (0.0672)
ln Amount Spent (USD) 0.0064 -0.0249*** -0.0223** 0.0179
(0.0108) (0.0076) (0.0111) (0.0154)
Population Density (persons/km2) 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ln Distance from Pakistan (km) -0.0473 0.1771*** 0.3295*** -0.1068
(0.0666) (0.0468) (0.0682) (0.0944)
Constant 9.9972 -96.1012*** -102.7713*** 65.7774**
(19.2760) (13.5463) (19.7463) (27.3021)
Observations 2,340 2,340 2,340 2,340
R-squared 0.4429 0.2682 0.3170 0.3321
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9b. Interaction Effect by Type of SIGACTS within 5km of Projects in Highway and Non-Highway Districts - Matching
Figure 6a.  Change in Average SIGACTS 
with Increasing Project Number for Non-
Highway Districts 
Figure 6b.  Change in Average SIGACTS 








Table 10. Robustness Checks:  Fixed Effects, Bandwidth Variation, and Matching Variation - Matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
District Fixed 
Effects
15 Day Bands 45 Day Bands








VARIABLES Total SIGACTS Total SIGACTS Total SIGACTS Total SIGACTS Total SIGACTS Total SIGACTS
Interaction Project Number x Non-Highway x Start -0.0533*** -0.0588*** -0.0764*** -0.0228 -0.0914*** -0.0380
(0.0163) (0.0194) (0.0261) (0.0153) (0.0235) (0.0294)
Interaction Non-Highway x Start 0.4527*** 0.4741** 0.6457*** 0.3545** 2.4716*** 0.5266**
(0.1637) (0.1842) (0.2475) (0.1638) (0.2743) (0.2378)
Interaction Project Number x Start 0.0456*** 0.0547*** 0.0687*** 0.0187*** 0.0873*** 0.0421***
(0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0050) (0.0040) (0.0056) (0.0036)
Interaction Project Number x Non-Highway -0.0029 -0.0261* -0.0258 -0.0076 -0.0355** -0.0167
(0.0141) (0.0147) (0.0198) (0.0113) (0.0176) (0.0217)
Project Number 0.0326*** 0.0169*** 0.0145** -0.0114*** 0.0078 0.0076
(0.0065) (0.0050) (0.0070) (0.0036) (0.0048) (0.0049)
Non-Highway Dummy 0.3615 0.0536 -0.0068 0.0691 0.1894 0.1063
(0.2872) (0.1343) (0.1808) (0.1177) (0.2172) (0.1746)
Project Start Dummy -0.3342*** -0.3431*** -0.3928*** -0.2235* -2.3407*** -0.4265***
(0.1042) (0.1057) (0.1421) (0.1147) (0.2068) (0.1150)
Start Year -0.0923* 0.0607** 0.0732** 0.1102*** 0.2083*** 0.0189
(0.0490) (0.0239) (0.0320) (0.0193) (0.0379) (0.0284)
Average Pre-Project SIGACTS 0.8795*** 0.9722*** 1.0829*** 0.8766*** 0.8632*** 0.9834***
(0.0341) (0.0344) (0.0345) (0.0360) (0.0291) (0.0355)
Province Dummy (Ghazni = 1) 0.4875 -0.2152* -0.2061 -0.1437 -0.2415 -0.0669
(0.3055) (0.1190) (0.1598) (0.1207) (0.2341) (0.1614)
ln Amount Spent (USD) -0.0229 -0.0123 -0.0765*** -0.0421 -0.1137***
(0.0272) (0.0363) (0.0188) (0.0412) (0.0359)
Population Density (persons/km2) -0.0004*** -0.0006*** 0.0001** -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ln Distance from Pakistan (km) 0.3525** 0.4604** 0.5025*** 0.8535*** 0.0629
(0.1670) (0.2240) (0.1368) (0.2362) (0.2004)
District Fixed Effects Yes No No No No No
Constant 184.9986* -123.0979** -148.7875** -222.5932*** -421.6432*** -37.2390
(98.1020) (48.3192) (64.7608) (39.1692) (76.6458) (57.4905)
Observations 2,808 2,340 2,340 1,992 2,148 2,418
R-squared 0.5656 0.5784 0.6132 0.3620 0.5663 0.5204
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 km 3 km 5 km 7 km 9 km
VARIABLES Total SIGACTS Total SIGACTS Total SIGACTS Total SIGACTS Total SIGACTS
Interaction Project Number x Non-Highway x Start -0.0057 -0.0177 -0.0588*** -0.0806*** -0.0889***
(0.0074) (0.0125) (0.0194) (0.0258) (0.0315)
Interaction Non-Highway x Start 0.0710 0.1738 0.4741** 0.7279*** 0.9071***
(0.0700) (0.1184) (0.1842) (0.2446) (0.2982)
Interaction Project Number x Start 0.0099*** 0.0245*** 0.0547*** 0.0684*** 0.0809***
(0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0049) (0.0060)
Interaction Project Number x Non-Highway -0.0070 -0.0164* -0.0261* -0.0371* -0.0459*
(0.0055) (0.0094) (0.0147) (0.0194) (0.0237)
Project Number 0.0057*** 0.0141*** 0.0169*** 0.0263*** 0.0313***
(0.0019) (0.0032) (0.0050) (0.0065) (0.0078)
Non-Highway Dummy 0.0175 0.0456 0.0536 0.1326 0.1416
(0.0510) (0.0861) (0.1343) (0.1777) (0.2164)
Project Start Dummy -0.0579 -0.1399** -0.3431*** -0.5377*** -0.6783***
(0.0402) (0.0680) (0.1057) (0.1404) (0.1712)
Start Year 0.0136 0.0162 0.0607** 0.0725** 0.1139***
(0.0089) (0.0152) (0.0239) (0.0329) (0.0416)
Average Pre-Project SIGACTS 0.9492*** 1.0070*** 0.9722*** 0.8985*** 0.8951***
(0.0495) (0.0411) (0.0344) (0.0282) (0.0276)
Province Dummy (Ghazni = 1) -0.0841* -0.1398* -0.2152* -0.3576** -0.5689***
(0.0445) (0.0756) (0.1190) (0.1572) (0.1928)
ln Amount Spent (USD) 0.0024 -0.0065 -0.0229 -0.0571 -0.0680
(0.0103) (0.0178) (0.0272) (0.0359) (0.0438)
Population Density (persons/km2) -0.0001*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0006***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ln Distance from Pakistan (km) 0.0716 0.1324 0.3525** 0.4387* 0.6747**
(0.0630) (0.1067) (0.1670) (0.2257) (0.2803)
Constant -27.6387 -32.9095 -123.0979** -146.8241** -230.7467***
(18.0950) (30.7310) (48.3192) (66.6143) (84.3085)
Observations 2,340 2,340 2,340 2,340 2,340
R-squared 0.2770 0.4618 0.5784 0.6050 0.6108
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1





Estimation of the interaction between risk and commitment from equation (3) 
suggests that as the number of projects in non-highway districts (riskier areas) 
increases, the effect on total SIGACTS is small but negative and statistically 
significant (Table 9a).  Similar to Table 7, a figure helps with interpretation.  Figures 
6a and 6b show the average change in SIGACTS from before to after the start of 
projects in highway and non-highway districts.  Within the first 24 projects—the 
maximum number of projects in a non-highway district—the difference in the change 
in SIGACTS between the two areas appears minimal.  However, after 24 projects, the 
change in SIGACTS increases at a greater rate for projects in highway districts 
(Figure 6b).  These graphs illuminate that it is the lack of violence reduction despite 
increasing commitment in highway areas that produces the negative coefficient on the 
interaction of project number, non-highway, and project start in Table 9a.  It is 
important to keep in mind as well that these are projects at relatively close to the same 
time period after matching, but with different levels of commitment across projects.  
In this light, the analysis reveals more about the weakness in projects of low risk but 
high commitment—sustained development assistance on the highway—than it does 
about the effects of projects with both risk and commitment.  
Thus, the appropriate interpretation of the magnitude of the effect in Table 9a 
is that when we account for the longer term by including the project sequence 
number, each additional project in a highway district results in an average increase of 
approximately six percent more SIGACTS (an increase of 0.05 SIGACTS per 30 
days from the before project average of 0.85 per 30 days) compared to a non-highway 





increases, not by an increase in IEDs (Table 9b).  The results when I substitute district 
fixed effects for the environmental covariates, adjust the time band width, or alter the 
matching algorithm as robustness checks are broadly similar in magnitude and 
direction (Table 10).  The same is true when the spatial bounds are adjusted (Table 
11). 
The specification in Table 9a also estimates that total SIGACTS increase 
when risk or commitment independently increase.  That is, the coefficients on the 
interaction of non-highway and start (just risk) as well as the interaction of project 
number and start (just commitment) are both positive and significant.  This result is 
consistent with my theory that risk and commitment together have a different effect 
than risk or commitment independently.   
In addition, the interaction of the project number and non-highway variables 
in Table 9a also controls for the selection bias that exists when deciding upon a 
project’s location.  The negative coefficient on the interaction of project number and 
non-highway indicates that each subsequent project in a non-highway district was 
started in an area with less violence on average.  However, the estimated effect from 
the interaction of project number, non-highway, and start is still significant even 
though the non-highway projects are being emplaced in areas of decreasing violence.  
This separation of the selection bias from the treatment effect is helpful for 








Table 12. Alternate Parameters and Definitions of Commitment - Matching
(1) (2) (3)
Limit to First 









VARIABLES Total SIGACTS Total SIGACTS Total SIGACTS
Interaction Project Number x Non-Highway x Start -0.0068
(0.0142)
Interaction Non-Highway x Start 0.1483 -1.9089* -0.1239
(0.1472) (0.9984) (0.1595)
Interaction Project Number x Start 0.0026
(0.0046)




Interaction ln(Amount Spent) x Non-Highway x Start 0.1584
(0.1042)
Interaction ln(Amount Spent) x Start -0.1349*
(0.0699)
Interaction ln(Amount Spent) x Non-Highway 0.0259
(0.0745)
ln Amount Spent (USD) -0.0603** -0.0684 -0.0546*
(0.0246) (0.0507) (0.0299)
Interaction Planned Duration x Non-Highway x Start -0.0143***
(0.0018)
Interaction Planned Duration x Start 0.0146***
(0.0014)
Interaction Planned Duration x Non-Highway 0.0001
(0.0014)
Planned Duration (days) -0.0033***
(0.0011)
Non-Highway Dummy -0.1667 -0.1727 -0.2265*
(0.1137) (0.7145) (0.1220)
Project Start Dummy -0.0174 1.7891*** 0.2503**
(0.1022) (0.6603) (0.1079)
Start Year 0.1946*** 0.1359*** 0.2785***
(0.0243) (0.0220) (0.0331)
Average Pre-Project SIGACTS 0.7339*** 1.1003*** 0.9895***
(0.0361) (0.0348) (0.0380)
Province Dummy (Ghazni = 1) -0.3882** -0.1352 0.0338
(0.1583) (0.1245) (0.1634)
Population Density (persons/km2) -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
ln Distance from Pakistan (km) 0.9126*** 0.5540*** 0.7210***
(0.1492) (0.1573) (0.2365)
Constant -393.6230*** -274.8076*** -561.4974***
(49.0844) (44.5136) (66.8494)
Observations 2,028 2,340 2,016
R-squared 0.3474 0.5234 0.5655
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1





To examine whether the effects in terms of the change in violence from the 
first 24 projects are different in highway and non-highway areas, I limit the analysis 
to the first 24 projects before matching and then complete the same process as in 
Table 9a.  The lack of significance on the interaction of project number, non-
highway, and project start in column (1) of Table 12 reflects that there is not a 
statistically significant difference between highway and non-highway projects within 
the first 24 projects.  This result is what we would expect from the visual appearance 
of Figures 6a and 6b.   
We are left wondering whether projects in non-highway districts (that is, 
projects with risk) would continue to subdue violence after 24 projects, whether 
SIGACTS would begin to increase as they do with additional projects in highway 
districts, or whether SIGACTS might decrease with additional commitment to non-
highway districts.  Unfortunately, this uncertainty is a direct reflection of the great 
headwinds to the projection of development assistance off the highway as identified 
in Chapter 1 and the short period of the surge in Afghanistan when it became 
somewhat easier for counterinsurgents to implement development assistance in 
outlying districts away from the highway.  The result is that we know more about the 







Alternate Definitions of Risk and Commitment 
 
 
    
Because of the limitation in the number of projects in non-highway districts, it 
is worth considering whether other potential measures of commitment can increase 
our confidence that the effects of commitment on violence vary across areas with 
different levels of risk.  Two alternative measures of commitment are the amount 
spent on a project and the planned duration of a project.  Fortunately, both of these 
measures are more balanced between highway and non-highway areas compared to 
the project numbers in highway and non-highway areas (Tables 13a and 13b).   
The interaction of the natural log of the amount spent, non-highway, and 
project start in column (2) of Table 12 is positive but not statistically significant.  This 
result is consistent with Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011a, 2013) in which higher 
cost projects do not reduce violence.  In this context, the result reflects that the 
quantity of financial resources invested is not a strong sign of commitment.  Multiple 
projects do more to show that counterinsurgents will remain in a place than having 
one really costly project. 
The interaction of planned project duration, non-highway, and project start in 
column (3) of Table 12 is negative and statistically significant, indicating that projects 
planned for longer in more risky non-highway districts result in less violence than 





0-50K USD 104 102
>50K USD 13 15






0-100 days 90 93
101-500 days 11 9
>500 days 11 9






likely a weaker signal of commitment compared to the project number because the 
information about planned duration is much less public; it may even be unspoken.  
While local residents might have a sense that a project will take longer, the signal of 
commitment is less explicit.  Still, project duration has a time component, unlike the 
amount of resources spent, and that time component may contribute to its 
significance.  The results reflect that the effects of commitment embodied in planned 
project duration differs in a meaningful way across higher and lower risk areas.  
Because the estimated effect is in days, a project planned for an additional 30 days in 
a non-highway district results in 0.43 fewer SIGACTS per 30 days compared to a 
project in a highway district—51 percent less than the pre-project average number of 
0.85 SIGACTS per 30 days for matched projects in highway districts.  The 
significance of this definition of commitment supports the idea that commitment in 
Afghanistan requires time.   
In terms of risk, an alternative definition aids robustness and also helps for 
transferability to areas without a linear feature like Highway 1.  Alternative ways to 
operationalize a measure of risk might be to use the radial distance of a project from 
coalition force bases or simply the distance of a project from a provincial capital or 
urban center.  Attempting the latter method, I compare the effects of projects away 
from the provincial capitals in Ghazni and Zabul to the effects of projects in the 








VARIABLES Total SIGACTS Total SIGACTS Total SIGACTS
Interaction Project Number x Away Capital x Start -0.0341*** -0.0437*** -0.0437***
(0.0068) (0.0075) (0.0075)
Interaction Away Capital x Start 0.0523 0.2264 0.2264
(0.1870) (0.1878) (0.1872)
Interaction Project Number x Start 0.0307*** 0.0350*** 0.0350***
(0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0039)
Interaction Project Number x Away Capital -0.0505*** -0.0143** 0.0004
(0.0048) (0.0057) (0.0069)
Project Number 0.0625*** 0.0106*** 0.0194***
(0.0028) (0.0037) (0.0043)
Away from Capital Dummy 0.2819** -2.1945*** -4.7225***
(0.1322) (0.4035) (0.7028)
Project Start Dummy -0.0376 -0.1181 -0.1181
(0.1610) (0.1534) (0.1529)
Start Year 0.0839*** -0.0133
(0.0252) (0.0352)
Average Pre-Project SIGACTS 0.7730*** 0.7413***
(0.0286) (0.0297)
Province Dummy (Ghazni = 1) -0.1024 0.8857**
(0.1406) (0.4224)
ln Amount Spent (USD) 0.0023 0.0191
(0.0261) (0.0269)
Population Density (persons/km2) -0.0007*** 0.0006
(0.0001) (0.0004)
ln Distance from Pakistan (km) 0.3955** 0.8929**
(0.1851) (0.3510)
District Open Terrain (fraction of total area) 12.0906***
(4.0570)
District Number of Ethnic Groups 2.2233***
(0.7763)
District Number of Languages Spoken -0.0887
(0.4253)
District Road Density (km/km2) -8.7407*
(4.6336)
District Temperature (celsius) 1.9550***
(0.4236)
District Rainfall (millimeters) -5.7617***
(1.3112)
District to Provincial Capital Distance (km) 0.0278***
(0.0083)
District Mean Elevation (meters) 0.0157***
(0.0033)
Constant -0.0022 -167.8289*** 9.3158
(0.1138) (51.1261) (70.8145)
Observations 5,112 3,852 3,852
R-squared 0.3429 0.4865 0.4906
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1






The effects from the alternate definition of risk are quite similar in magnitude 
and significance to those earlier when I defined risk as projects in non-highway 
districts (Table 14).  Still, neither method perfectly approximates the actual 
disposition of insurgent control.  It would be useful for researchers to consider 
additional ways in which to operationalize measures of risk.  The aim of this analysis 
is to introduce risk and commitment as critical variables. 
Integrating Additional Data Sources 
Popular Perceptions 
 
Table 15a. Interaction Effect on Perception of GIRoA at Securing the Country, Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Very Poorly A Little Poorly
Neither Poor or 
Well
A Little Well Very Well
Interaction Project Number x Non-Highway -0.0085*** 0.0051* 0.0020 0.0041* -0.0026
(0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Project Number -0.0014** -0.0002 0.0017*** -0.0006 0.0004
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0003)
Non-Highway Dummy 0.2315 -0.1071* -0.0550 -0.0895** 0.0203
(0.7374) (0.0623) (0.0458) (0.0402) (0.0478)
Start Year 0.0938*** 0.0238 -0.0675*** -0.0314 -0.0186
(0.0213) (0.0217) (0.0157) (0.0191) (0.0116)
Province Dummy (Ghazni = 1) 0.0780** 0.0453 0.1227*** -0.0413 -0.2047***
(0.0359) (0.0406) (0.0314) (0.0330) (0.0412)
ln Amount Spent (USD) 0.0036 -0.0192* 0.0263*** -0.0052 -0.0056
(0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0091) (0.0095) (0.0040)
Population Density (persons/km2) -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 1,857 1,857 1,857 1,857 1,857
Standard errors in parentheses







Table 15b. Interaction Effect on Perception of Provincial Governor at Securing the Province, Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Very Poorly A Little Poorly
Neither Poor or 
Well
A Little Well Very Well
Interaction Project Number x Non-Highway -0.0027 -0.0057* 0.0037* 0.0045 0.0001
(0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0014)
Project Number -0.0024*** 0.0001 0.0018*** 0.0000 0.0005*
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0003)
Non-Highway Dummy 0.0763 0.1177 -0.0738 -0.1402*** 0.0200
(0.0740) (0.0810) (0.0490) (0.0324) (0.0348)
Start Year 0.1282*** 0.0127 -0.0436** -0.0709*** -0.0264***
(0.0248) (0.0218) (0.0177) (0.0197) (0.0094)
Province Dummy (Ghazni = 1) 0.0787** 0.0935** 0.0986*** -0.1189*** -0.1519***
(0.0359) (0.0392) (0.0357) (0.0383) (0.0346)
ln Amount Spent -0.0035 0.0071 0.0004 -0.0054 0.0013
(0.0113) (0.0117) (0.0095) (0.0093) (0.0036)
Population Density (persons/km2) 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000 -0.0000*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,849
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 15c. Effect on Perception of District Governor at Securing the District, Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Very Poorly A Little Poorly
Neither Poor 
or Well
A Little Well Very Well
Interaction Project Number x Non-Highway 0.0057** -0.0066* 0.0021 0.0039 -0.0051*
(0.0029) (0.0039) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0029)
Project Number -0.0003 -0.0009 0.0020*** -0.0016*** 0.0008***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0003)
Non-Highway Dummy -0.0832 0.0057 0.0744 -0.0774* 0.0805
(0.0615) (0.0887) (0.0818) (0.0463) (0.0863)
Start Year 0.0241 0.0816*** -0.0650*** -0.0051 -0.0356***
(0.0257) (0.0282) (0.0216) (0.0235) (0.0124)
Province Dummy (Ghazni = 1) 0.0418 0.1018** 0.1205*** -0.0651* -0.1990***
 (0.0374) (0.0420) (0.0359) (0.0358) (0.0460)
ln Amount Spent 0.0159 -0.0096 0.0086 -0.0160 0.0011
(0.0124) (0.0132) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0051)
Population Density (persons/km2) -0.0000** 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001*** -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 1,494 1,494 1,494 1,494 1,494
Standard errors in parentheses







ANQAR data on popular perceptions offer alternate dependent variable 
measures by which to gauge the impact of development assistance.  The ANQAR 
data include perceptions of performance of different levels of government at securing 
the areas of their responsibility, perceptions of overall security conditions, and 
perceptions of recent changes in security.  Here, commitment is the number of 
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Bad Fair Good
Interaction Project Number x Non-Highway 0.0124*** -0.0005 -0.0119***
(0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0041)
Project Number -0.0017** 0.0007 0.0009
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Non-Highway Dummy -0.2116*** -0.0049 0.2165**
(0.0531) (0.0776) (0.0888)
Start Year 0.0318 -0.0191 -0.0127
(0.0245) (0.0215) (0.0218)
Province Dummy (Ghazni = 1) -0.2329*** 0.2826*** -0.0497
(0.0386) (0.0372) (0.0393)
ln Amount Spent -0.0048 -0.0005 0.0053
(0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0116)
Population Density (persons/km2) -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 1,856 1,856 1,856
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 15d. Interaction Effect on Perception of Overall Security in Mantaqa (District), 
Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Worse The Same Better
Interaction Project Number x Non-Highway 0.0060** 0.0022 -0.0082**
(0.0027) (0.0034) (0.0036)
Project Number -0.0003 -0.0012* 0.0015**
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Non-Highway Dummy -0.0402 -0.1536** 0.1938**
(0.0639) (0.0703) (0.0865)
Start Year 0.0492** 0.0103 -0.0595***
(0.0219) (0.0232) (0.0206)
Province Dummy (Ghazni = 1) -0.0961*** 0.1892*** -0.0931**
(0.0367) (0.0406) (0.0375)
ln Amount Spent -0.0084 0.0011 0.0073
(0.0110) (0.0123) (0.0105)
Population Density (persons/km2) -0.0000** 0.0001*** -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 1,857 1,857 1,857
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 15e. Interaction Effect on Perception of Change in Security in Mantaqa (District) Over 





projects within a district up to an ANQAR survey date, and risk remains as before a 
project’s emplacement in a non-highway district.  The survey results are coded as 
discrete numbers, so I examine the marginal effects of additional projects on and off 
the highway with a multinomial logit model.  The coefficient on the interaction of 
project number and non-highway indicates the marginal effect on the survey result of 
increasing commitment with an additional project in a non-highway district, while the 
coefficient on project number indicates the marginal effect on the survey result of 
increasing commitment with an additional project in a highway district.   
In Tables 15a, 15b, and 15c, impressions of the government overall (GIRoA), 
the provincial governor, and the district governor at securing their areas of 
responsibility as projects increase in non-highway districts offer mixed evidence 
relative to the theory.  Evidence in favor of the theory of risk and commitment exists 
in the reduction in the perception that GIRoA is performing “very poorly” at securing 
the country (Table 15a) and the reduction in the perceptions that provincial (Table 
15b) and district (Table 15c) governors are performing “a little poorly” at securing 
their areas of responsibility as project numbers increase in non-highway districts 
compared to highway districts.  The marginal decreases in the “a little poorly” and 
“very poorly” survey results in non-highway districts are statistically significant and 
at least five times larger in magnitude than the corresponding estimated coefficients 
in highway districts.  Further, a difference of similar magnitude between additional 
projects in non-highway and highway districts is evident in the increase in the “a little 
well” perception of GIRoA at securing the country (Table 15a).  However, some of 





performing “a little poorly” at securing the country (Table 15a) and the increase in the 
perception that district governors are performing “very poorly” at securing their 
districts (Table 15c) as the number of projects in non-highway districts increase.   
Moreover, the perceptions of the overall level of security in one’s district or 
the changes in security in one’s district in Tables 15d and 15e are not consistent with 
the theory.  There is no evidence of security improvements with additional 
commitment to non-highway districts in Tables 15d and 15e.  In sum, the effects of 
risk and commitment on security in the ANQAR data remain inconclusive. 
PRT Interviews 
Interviews with PRT members provide a final additional data source for 
discerning whether the effects of commitment are different in areas involving varied 
levels of risk.  To start, PRT officials were clear that development was not possible in 
the areas of greatest risk.  One State Department official in Ghazni suggested that 
certain districts were “lost”:          
Almost the three tiers.  Ghazni City, we’re going to have stuff in there, 
government is going to execute that.  Then the lost districts; nothing is 
going to happen.  And, there were the ones in the middle, and we 
actually tried to make a difference. (August 16, 2018 Interview.) 
 
With this lens kept in mind, projects started in non-highway districts were not in the 
riskiest areas.  They were in areas of moderate risk—riskier than on the highway but 
not in the riskiest areas with high degrees of insurgent control.  The riskiest areas with 
high degrees of insurgent control—areas deep into insurgent support zones—did not 






However, some PRT members perceived that stability was possible if both 
moderate risk and commitment could be sustained.  For instance, a State Department 
official in Zabul described what he called an “experiment” in which heavy security, 
development, and governance investments were committed to a local area away from 
the highway:   
We started to explore this idea that what we would do was have this 
massive security presence and just lock this down.  The people in the 
villages were absolutely not going to see the Taliban for weeks on end.    
It was not like hey how you doing, and then tonight the enemy is there.  
It is going to be like the enemy is not going to be here for a long time.  
Let’s just get people used to that… It was the most remarkable and 
efficient operation, I ever saw. 
 
But then we realized, no, this is an experiment.  Then, part of the 
experiment was, let’s see, let’s see how long it takes for the enemy to 
come back in.  How much resistance can you build back in?  And, of 
course, inevitably, their resistance to their infiltration broke down.  But 
it was interesting to see how the village broke down gradually… 
 
See what happened there was that it became obvious to everyone 
concerned, and see for that time in Zabul, it took a whole Battalion of 
Airborne IN [approximately 650 to 700 Soldiers] to make a district 
secure.  And we showed that it was possible.  We showed that if 
everything was secure, we could absolutely make a lot of progress.  
(July 24, 2018 Interview.) 
 
He later continued, 
 
We thought that the length of time that we would have to be there 
was—and this kind of goes without saying—it was kind of contingent 
on what the Afghans could bring to the table. 
   
What we did with that intervention in Suri, for example, and then what 
we jointly tried to do with the Canadians later in Kandahar.  We tried 
to get the central government in Kabul to send a whole bunch of civil 
servants down to where we were intervening to, you know, develop a 
“government in a box” for a while.  But, I tell you all these folks from 
Kabul didn’t have the staying power. 
   
If they had actually stayed for a year, the Afghans, maybe it would 





because it’s not like the Afghan people in the villages didn’t know 
what was going on.  They saw that all these Tajik, and all these various 
effeminate guys from Kabul would come down and after a while they 
couldn’t take it, you know, it was too dusty and icky down here.  That 
almost alienated them from their government even worse.  (July 24, 
2018 Interview.) 
 
As this official described it, risk could contribute to stabilization in the short term, but 
the absence of commitment meant that stabilizing effects would not be enduring.  
Commitment required both high concentrations of security forces and high numbers 
of government officials who could sustain development.  Thus, the fundamental 
challenge from the PRT perspective was similar to the challenge of sustaining 
counterinsurgent operations in “red” (insurgent controlled) areas presented in Galula 
(1964, 72-3).11 
 The best any PRT could achieve in the riskier areas was sporadic 
commitment.  One PRT commander in Ghazni described,  
We had one big unit and one big focus.  We were just kind of making 
incremental efforts.  I am reaching my finger across my desk, right, 
and I am poking, and each one of those times was a big logistical 
movement, a big convoy, a big mission planning. (October 1, 2018 
Interview.) 
 
Even still, the projects in riskier areas sometimes worked differently than other 
projects.  Another Ghazni PRT commander said,  
But the ones like in Andar, the Taliban essentially had an approval 
process too.  Sometimes our contractors would come by and they 
would factor into their bid basically a bribe to pay the Taliban to let 
them build it there.  Once the contractor said hey, I can build this.  The 
Taliban had essentially already approved it for the area.  So once they 
did that, ok, it was going to get built.  But, there were plenty of 
proposed projects where magically we can’t find any contractors who 
will bid on this because for whatever reason the Taliban didn’t want 
                                               
11 Galula writes, “If the counterinsurgent operations are sustained over a period of months, the guerrilla 






this to happen in this area.  (August 10, 2018 Interview.) 
 
A third Ghazni PRT commander said,   
 
There was a lot of, if I don’t get my cut of the money, the Taliban 
miraculously started attacking.  If they got their cut of the money, it 
was pretty convenient, the Taliban were not quite as active.  (October 
10, 2018 Interview.) 
 
This dynamic with the Taliban participating in the development project process and 
allowing projects to occur in areas of moderate risk reflects a different stabilization 
mechanism than those previously discussed:  co-option.   
The co-option mechanism suggests that insurgents allow development 
assistance to take place because it benefits them directly.  Co-option seemed to have 
some stabilizing characteristics in risky areas despite uneven commitment.  Yet, 
while co-option might start to have a beneficial impact in reducing violence with less 
commitment than other mechanisms, it still requires persistent commitment into the 
longer-term to continue to stem violence.  The stabilizing effects of co-option cease 
with the end of development assistance.   
Failing to maintain commitment in riskier areas raised expectations and led to 
disappointment.  As a consequence of the challenge of maintaining commitment to 
riskier areas, a State Department official in Ghazni concluded that commitment to 
areas of less risk would be better than sporadic risk: 
I think it probably would have been better to leave some places 
completely untouched.  And I’m a Peace Corps guy; I want to get as 
far away from the capital and have the best local relationships and intel 
as anybody.  But, given that we have space and knowledge constraints 
and difficulty in processing and retaining information, sharing 
knowledge, I think it would probably be better to leave entire districts 
completely untouched and have more consistent, regular engagements 






As much as I love getting out of a car and handing out toothbrushes 
and erasers to little kids somewhere—and maybe somehow that is 
planting little seeds of positivity, things like that—ultimately, we only 
do that when we are meeting with someone else talking about 
something else bigger and broader.  And I think we probably didn’t 
have the ability and the bandwidth, and the resources, to follow 
through.  It’s impossible to say, but I think we disappointed as many 
people as we could placate them based on our inability to follow 
through.   
 
I would have just been absolutely militant about limiting our focus to a 
couple of things and doing them really well and owning them.  And 
that means relationships, and follow through, and access, and 
consistency, and that sort of whole of government approach.  I would 
have rather focused on a few things like that.  I think it would have left 
a greater impact and a greater legacy.  (August 28, 2018 Interview.) 
 
This perspective emphasizes that the demands of achieving risk and commitment 
were almost too great and that risk without commitment was not sufficient.  The 
remaining option was commitment without risk—an option that this analysis shows 
should not be expected to reduce violence. 
Discussion 
While this empirical analysis aims to discern the relevance of risk and 
commitment within a micro-level case study, the results are suggestive but not 
conclusive.  It is not clear what the results of higher levels of commitment to risky 
areas would be.  In addition to the limitations of the data, several dynamics contribute 
to making the effects of risk and commitment difficult to distinguish.   
First, insurgents have the advantage of an opportunity to remain patient, 
neither attacking nor exposing themselves to counterinsurgents.  By including a 
project’s sequence number, this analysis reaches toward the longer-term horizon to 





sufficient projects in non-highway districts (risky areas) does not permit a sufficiently 
long-term view, and the absence of violence in non-highway areas may still reflect at 
least some insurgent patience.   
Second, insurgents typically have a great deal of mobility.  Thus, the lack of 
insurgent activity in non-highway areas following projects may be because insurgents 
transfer their efforts to other nearby areas.  In principle, I expect that insurgent 
support zones are less mobile than their engagement areas, which would translate to 
less mobility in non-highway areas.  However, the extent to which this is true is 
difficult to discern. 
Third, insurgents may be substituting non-violent means for violent means in 
response to development assistance in non-highway areas.  Such a change was not 
detectable with the data sources used in this analysis.  Data capturing the insurgent 
perspective might be necessary to investigate this claim. 
Finally, the fight in Afghanistan is intensely local, making the identification of 
unified policy trends difficult.  One State Department official in Ghazni offered that 
“Every single project was its own case study” (August 28, 2018 interview).  Despite 
maximum efforts to appropriately match projects and control for environmental 










Despite the data constraints and some of the competing dynamics discussed, 
this study allows refinement of my initial theory and creates an opportunity for 
further study along the lines of risk and commitment.  The stylized graphs in Figure 
7a and 7b aid in illustrating remaining uncertainties rather than offering accuracy or 
precision.  Figures 7a and 7b follow the same form as Figures 6a and 6b, indicating 
the change in violence against increasing commitment over time.  However, in 
Figures 7a and 7b, the solid lines in both figures show what was empirically 
supported by this study, and the dashed lines offer theoretical possibilities where gaps 
remain.   
Figure 7b shows that in a low-risk area—such as near an engagement area on 
the highway—the change in violence following a project’s start is initially flat 
followed by a later increase after an inflection point at “B”.  This figure is essentially 
a stylized remake of Figure 6b.  Figure 7a shows several ways in which in a 
moderate-risk area—such as near insurgent staging areas off the highway—the 
change in violence after a project’s start might evolve differently with increasing 
commitment.  Those possible differences are highlighted with the multiple dashed 
Figure 7a.  Refined Theory of Moderate 
Risk Area 






lines.  (A high-risk area—such as near insurgent bed-down locations—is not included 
as the qualitative interviews indicated such areas were impractical for development.)  
The differences between Figure 7a and 7b are theoretical and are intended to frame 
future research. 
 One difference between moderate risk and low risk areas is that co-option may 
contribute to the lack of an increase in violence with increasing commitment in 
moderate risk areas.  While moderate risk and low risk areas look the same 
quantitatively at lower levels of commitment—as they do between the y-axis and 
point “B” on Figure 7a—there might be qualitative differences—such as with co-
option starting after point “A” in the moderate risk area.  The qualitative interviews 
suggesting that insurgents sometimes chose to allow or even directly labored in 
development projects despite low levels of commitment to riskier areas offers some 
evidence of this possibility.  At the extreme, people working to build the development 
assistance project might during the previous week have been wielding a weapon 
aimed at counterinsurgents.  Alternatively, insurgent patience, transference, and non-
violence could also explain persistent flat levels of violence with increasing 
commitment in moderate risk areas.  Differentiating between these arguments could 
be on an agenda for future research.  
 A second difference in moderate risk areas is that the longer-term 
development mechanisms begin to have an effect as commitment further increases 
beyond point “B.”  This level of commitment to moderate risk areas did not appear in 
this study.  Thus, I retain the theory that information-sharing, opportunity cost, and 





moderate risk areas—possibly in that order of increasing commitment with each 
additional mechanism becoming active at “C”, “D” or “E” levels of commitment.  
This study offers limited evidence that such differences may exist based on the results 
with the alternate definition of commitment relating to the planned project duration 
and some positive changes in perceptions of the government’s ability to secure 
different areas in the ANQAR data.  Additional data collection on an environment 
where higher levels of commitment—time commitment in particular—to areas of 
moderate risk would be necessary to achieve greater clarity on this theory.  
Conclusion 
Returning to the three puzzles surrounding development in Afghanistan, I 
theorized that weak information-sharing, incongruity between improvements in 
development and security, and inconsistent long-term effects could be understood by 
examining development assistance along the lines of risk and commitment.  
Development assistance in Afghanistan appears to be predominantly in areas of lower 
risk, as Chapter 1 revealed.  An answer to the puzzles could be that the lack of risk 
taken in development assistance contributes to the lack of information returns and 
weak impacts in terms of stabilization in the longer-term, even in instances in which 
development improved governance or welfare and commitment was persistent.  I 
propose that the fewer number of projects with both risk and commitment might have 
a different effect because they have a greater chance of activating multiple 
mechanisms—co-option, information-sharing, opportunity cost, or goods 
competition. 





majority of projects that do not involve risk.  Insurgent violence increases following 
projects without risk even when commitment is present with development assistance 
that persists over time.  However, a limitation is that this analysis cannot prove that 
development assistance with risk and commitment is effectual.   
 For projects with risk, it appears that violent insurgent responses to projects in 
areas of greater risk were rare in the short term or at low levels of commitment.  Yet, 
there is insufficient data to discern the path insurgent responses would follow in areas 
of moderate risk if commitment were sustained over the longer-term.  There are 
simply not enough projects in non-highway districts to draw a clear conclusion.  I 
have included alternate definitions of risk and commitment as well as additional data 
from popular perceptions and PRT interviews, which add some evidence that projects 
in riskier areas may follow a different trajectory over time, but not all of the evidence 
works in corroboration. 
This study introduces a longer-term, quantitative perspective on development 
in Afghanistan at the micro level.  I have not encountered another analysis with a 
similar aim.  The empirics indicate that the absence of risk in the majority of 
development assistance in Afghanistan may contribute to weakness in countering 
insurgents.  This study also offers a framework and research agenda for the longer-





Chapter 3: The Relative Effects of Rural and Urban 
Development 
 
Increasing urbanization combined with the prevalence of urban 
terrorism frequently motivates urban development programs in 
conflict zones.  Yet in Afghanistan, the high tempo of deadly urban 
attacks despite continuing urban development prompts questions about 
whether urban development in fact contributes to urban stabilization.  
My theory of risk and commitment suggests that nearby rural 
development may be more consequential than urban development for 
reducing urban violence.  The annual Asia Foundation Survey, which 
stratifies respondents by province and rural or urban areas, presents 
an opportunity to test the relationship between rural and urban 
development and urban violence.  Using development indicators and 
development observations reported by rural and urban respondents 
from 2007 through 2017 with multiple measures of urban violence, I 
find that rural development has a consistent association with less 
urban violence, while urban development has a consistent association 
with more urban violence.  Practical implications emerge, first, for 
thinking about the role of development in counterinsurgency and 
stabilization, and, second, for planning the disposition of security 
forces and development during such operations.  While rural 
development assistance might be helpful in reducing urban violence, 
there remains a separate and vital decision over whether the resulting 
benefits in terms of the added stabilization are worth the resources 
involved.  Undertaking development projects in rural areas is difficult 
and costly.      
 
Introduction 
Since the end of 2014, U.S. military forces in Afghanistan have withdrawn to 
a footprint limited to major cities and security force assistance (McInnis and Feikert 
2017).  In concert, U.S. development assistance has shifted away from stabilization 
programs intended to improve security and extend the reach of the governance in 
favor of developing institutions that support private-sector economic growth (USAID 





civilian investments in Afghanistan determined by conditions-based rather than time-
based end states.  From an Afghan perspective, this strategy would demonstrate 
commitment but not necessarily willingness to take risks to bring about improved 
security or economic conditions for the Afghan people.  President Obama’s strategy 
from 2014 to 2016 was much the same in this regard.  As of this writing, the US 
strategy in Afghanistan appears to be in flux, making it relevant to understand the 
conditions necessary for U.S. efforts to translate into improvements in security. 
At present, the limited degree of risk being taken by counterinsurgents means 
that insurgents and government forces exist in almost separate spheres.  Government 
forces control major population centers, while insurgents dominate most of the rural 
areas.  Afghanistan as a whole remains insecure, with insurgents attacking from their 
rural strongholds into urban areas.  I argue that when counterinsurgents focus 
governance and development investment only in population centers, insurgents face 
minimal constraints in conducting attacks within those urban areas.   
 The empirical results of this chapter suggest that economic development with 
the attributes of risk and commitment—which translates to development in nearby 
rural areas that persists over several years—may support stabilization and a reduction 
of violence downstream within urban areas.  By development with risk, I mean 
development assistance emplaced in areas of greater likelihood of insurgent control, 
where insurgent control can come from either terrain or a population that favors 
insurgents.  In this context, rural areas are areas of greater risk.  Development with 
commitment implies that counterinsurgents communicate to the population (and 





assistance that shows commitment has repeated or long-lasting projects in local areas.  
Development with risk and commitment together is proposed as a more potent tool 
for countering insurgents than development with either risk or commitment in 
isolation, and the effects may extend downstream beyond the isolated more risky, 
rural areas.  That is, efforts outside of the government’s urban zone of control have an 
association with improvements in those cities when the efforts are of a sufficient 
duration to demonstrate commitment.   
 This conclusion is consistent with earlier U.S. experiences in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  U.S. military commanders found that most attacks in Baghdad from 
2004 to 2006 were staged in the suburbs 30 to 50 kilometers away (Institute for the 
Study of War 2018).  Thus, a key part of the surge in Iraq was projecting into those 
suburbs.  Meanwhile in Afghanistan, a limited footprint outside major population 
centers from 2002 to 2008 was accompanied by the Taliban’s resurgence.    
In previous chapters, I examined a case study of Ghazni and Zabul Provinces 
in Afghanistan and found that the development assistance emplaced in locations with 
relatively less risk on the main highway or in the provincial capitals—which 
comprised the majority of development projects—was followed by increases in 
violence despite increasing commitment over time.  I examined different indicators 
that the minority of development assistance in areas away from the highway or the 
capital might have different effects in the longer-term, but the local effects remained 
somewhat uncertain.  In this chapter, I consider whether the risk and commitment 
model applies to Afghan cities more broadly and over a longer period of time, and I 





adjoining urban locations.  This downstream impact may be clearer or more sizable 
than the upstream one.  The focus here is on the relationship between urban 
development, nearby rural development, and urban violence.  Using survey data from 
the Asia Foundation that captures whether the population perceives that development 
is progressing or regressing in urban and rural areas in Afghanistan, I estimate the 
relationship between development in each area on violent attacks in urban areas.   
Over the period from 2007 through 2017, I find a consistent association 
between increases in rural development and reductions in urban violence.  
Meanwhile, urban development has a consistent association with increases in urban 
violence.  This finding suggests the shortcomings of an urban-only development 
strategy and implies the potential value of extending beyond the boundaries of 
population centers as a means by which to secure those urban populations.  Practical 
implications emerge, first, for thinking about the role of development in 
counterinsurgency and stabilization, and, second, for planning the disposition of 
security forces and development during such operations.  Consequently, this study 
motivates the future undertaking of a cost-benefit analysis of rural and urban 
development.  While risk and commitment may contribute to whether development 
can reduce urban violence, a welfare calculation to assess whether the benefits of risk 
and commitment are worth the attendant costs is a topic for future research. 
The Tradeoffs Between Rural and Urban Development 
A focus on urban development in an environment like Afghanistan is 
reasonable.  Concentrating development efforts in urban areas seems efficient in 





density of urban populations mean that the government’s legitimacy message needs to 
travel less far.  Thus, logistical costs for both security forces and development 
implementers are fewer, and the popular benefits in terms of ensuring political and 
social support for the regime for a given amount of development effort are greater.  
Meanwhile, rural development appears both less efficient logistically and less 
beneficial popularly.  There are fewer people in the countryside, and it is more costly 
and risky to reach them.      
Another layer in the tradeoffs between urban and rural development relates to 
insurgent capabilities and incentives to conduct attacks.  Beall and Fox (2009) 
describe that rapid urban population growth, unemployment, and a youth bulge in 
urban areas often create urban security problems in developing countries (184).  
Specific to Afghanistan, Beall and Fox attribute overemphasis on rural development 
to rising insecurity in Kabul.  Beall and Fox found that many international donors 
focused on rural development either to repair rural combat damage, address 
humanitarian concerns, or avoid the coordination challenge associated with urban 
development (190, 196).  Still, arguments that economic opportunities must improve 
in urban areas to reduce terrorism might lack an appreciation for the tactical dynamics 
of conducting attacks.    
An important tactical question is whether insurgents who conduct attacks in 
urban areas recruit, reside, meet, and stage in the city or in the countryside, and then 
in turn how development policy should be spatially arrayed in response to the 
distribution of those insurgent activities.  Does development in urban areas reduce the 





does development in rural areas disrupt or distract rural insurgent principals, thereby 
reducing the number of urban attacks?  If both of these possibilities hold true, what is 
the balance between the two in terms of taking action? 
An answer to these questions for Afghanistan is not immediately clear 
because previous studies with similar foci have conflicting results.  Mousseau (2011) 
contends that “Islamic terrorists obtain support and recruits from the urban poor” (35) 
rather than rural poor (45).  He uses survey data in 14 Muslim countries in which 
respondents who approve of Islamic terrorism tend to be those who suffer from urban 
poverty.  On the other side, Blair et. al. (2012) find that in Pakistan the poor are less 
likely to support militant groups than the middle class, and the urban poor are less 
likely to support militant groups than the rural poor.   
Given the conflict between these two sets of findings, several important 
questions exist.  First, how does the rural-urban dynamic work in Afghanistan?  
Second, does the rural-urban development and security dynamic differ in a country 
with an on-going civil war—such as Afghanistan—as compared to an environment in 
which terrorist attacks are not part of an ongoing civil war?     
Theory 
 My case study of Ghazni and Zabul Provinces theorized about the important 
interaction of risk and commitment for understanding the effects of development in 
Afghanistan over a multi-year period and examined the theory with a micro-level case 
study.  Using NATO project data and Department of Defense SIGACTs, I found that 
even as the number of development projects in areas closer to the highway or the 





project.  I thus concluded that commitment without risk did not reduce violence.  I 
suggested that projects in non-highway districts—those with greater risk involved—
might have different effects when the districts in which they were emplaced received 
similar levels of commitment.  While the limited number of projects in non-highway 
areas impacted the conclusions that could be clearly drawn, violence did not rise 
following early projects in non-highway areas—which might be surprising to some—
and there were some indicators that the longer-term impacts of development 
assistance in the more risky non-highway areas might be different than projects 
undertaken in less risky areas.   
I argue that differences may exist because risk and commitment increase the 
likelihood that the mechanisms by which development could reduce violence become 
active.  These mechanisms include inducing information-sharing from the populace, 
raising the opportunity cost of violence, and providing goods competition with 
insurgents.12  These mechanisms are more likely to have an effect if development is 
in closer proximity to the areas in which insurgents stage before conducting attacks—
staging areas—than to where they conduct attacks—engagement areas or disruption 
zones.   (Staging areas are areas of moderate risk compared to the lower risk 
engagement areas where insurgents have less control.)  Commitment is necessary 
because the mechanisms are unlikely to take root immediately.  It takes time to 
                                               
12 The opportunity cost mechanism suggests that development assistance can increase the opportunity 
cost of participating in the insurgency and thereby reduce insurgent recruitment because potential 
insurgents must relinquish better opportunities outside of the insurgency.  The goods competition 
mechanism suggests that development assistance can reduce the relative advantage insurgents maintain 
with local public goods provision, subsequently increasing the likelihood that insurgents face a 
defection problem.  The information-sharing mechanism suggests that development assistance can lead 





corroborate information in relatively more risky areas, for development assistance to 
positively impact the economy enough in those areas for the opportunity costs to be 
significant, or to provide sufficient goods and services in those areas to be 
competitive with insurgents.  There may also be a co-option mechanism that takes 
less time to take root in riskier areas but that still requires commitment.13  With co-
option, insurgents might themselves want to allow the development to proceed 
because it provides benefits for them.  Co-option may be able to subdue violence in 
riskier areas as long as development assistance flows continue, even though 
insurgents retain their strength.  
 Applied to a rural-urban dynamic, the risk and commitment theory predicts 
that progress in rural development will have a greater effect in reducing urban attacks 
than development in the urban area itself.  That is, development with risk and 
commitment also has consequences downstream.  This implication comes from a 
notion that insurgents who conduct urban attacks project from nearby rural areas.  
The notion originates from my experience in Afghanistan analyzing insurgents, 
working with Afghan National Security Forces, and conversing with local Afghans.  
In rural areas, insurgents can stage and bed-down where the terrain and popular 
support enhance their security.   
When development reaches those rural areas, there are several possible 
insurgent responses.  First, insurgents can maintain their staging locations and bed-
down locations and focus their attacks on the rural development projects or the 
                                               
13 The co-option mechanism suggests that insurgents allow development assistance to take place 
because it benefits them directly, reducing attacks in proximity to development projects.  For instance, 
insurgents may become part of the labor force for development projects or gain legitimacy by allowing 





counterinsurgent presence that accompanies development, possibly reducing urban 
violence as they divert resources.  Second, insurgents can shift their staging locations 
and bed-down locations further from cities, making them less efficient in conducting 
urban attacks.  Third, insurgents can co-opt with rural development and participate in 
or permit the development projects.  With rural co-option, insurgents could still 
conduct urban attacks, or they could cease urban attacks.  From the perspective of the 
analysis here, the focus is less on pinpointing the specific mechanism but instead 
assessing whether urban attacks decrease when there is rural development in 
adjoining areas.  If so, then rural development may have a role in the urban 
stabilization that counterinsurgents must achieve.  Future work could then analyze the 
mechanisms by which the reduction in violence occurs.  
Data 
Independent Variable 
Longitudinal data on measures of urban and rural development are available 
through The Asia Foundation Afghanistan survey, the longest-running nationwide 
survey in Afghanistan that is typically used to capture changes in national attitudes.  
The survey has annual, provincial-level survey data from 2006 to 2017 and is 
representative of the population across all provinces.  The survey design is useful for 
this study because the sample is stratified by province and rural-urban status 
according to the population estimates of the Afghan Central Statistics Office (CSO).  
In the survey, there are two types of questions related to development.  One 





local area are better in a variety of dimensions than in the past, and the second type 
asks whether respondents observe the presence of different development projects.  In 
this study, I refer to the first type of questions as development indicators questions 
and the second type of questions as development observation questions.  The 
development indicators questions were not asked in the 2006, 2013, or 2014 surveys.  
The development observation questions were not all asked every year, but at least 






















South East 6,928 94.6
South West 7,795 80.7
West 6,350 78.5
North East 13,066 80.0
North West 10,299 78.5
Table 1a.  Asia Foundation Survey Respondent 
Summary Statistics
Notes:  18 provinces with at least one urban and one 
rural respondent every year from 2007-2017.  
Regions are Asia Foundation Survey regions, not 


























Kabul 96 169 159 480 908 707
Parwan 126 352 145 10 30 16
Ghazni 201 390 270 10 24 16
Paktia 119 204 128 5 24 10
Khost 104 210 131 5 12 8
Nangarhar 175 445 304 24 84 48
Badakhshan 192 456 210 6 84 10
Takhar 170 761 192 17 99 30
Baghlan 159 701 176 35 176 40
Kunduz 155 329 180 48 710 56
Balkh 132 742 200 72 287 105
Jawzjan 85 165 105 17 48 25
Sar-i-Pul 120 196 128 8 24 12
Faryab 172 286 198 18 43 24
Herat 142 379 316 59 168 110
Farah 104 203 112 6 18 10
Helmand 200 978 362 10 60 22
Kandahar 179 276 191 83 168 98


























Source:  Afghanistan Central Statistics Office






Because I am interested in both types of development questions (indicators 
and observations), in both urban and rural respondents, and in analyzing changes over 
time, I use data from 2007 through 2017 in 18 provinces for which there is at least 
one urban and one rural respondent in each province throughout the time period.  
Table 1a summarizes the number of respondents by year and region, while Table 1b 
describes the number of respondents in the rural and urban areas of each province.  
The provinces included spread across all seven of the regions of Afghanistan 
identified by the Asian Foundation (Table 1a) and represent 75 percent of the total 
Afghan population (Table 1c). 
One of the challenges of using a nationally representative Afghanistan survey 
for a study with a provincial level unit of analysis and an interest in separating rural 
and urban respondents is that the number of urban respondents per year in some 
provinces is quite small, reflecting the reality that most of the provinces are 
predominantly rural.  Seven of the 18 provinces have a median number of urban 
respondents less than 20 per year.14  To adjust for this sample size concern, results 
throughout the analysis are shown with and without population weights.  With the 
population weights, the weight of an observation in the analysis depends on the 
population of the province; the respondents for each province are effectively “scaled 
up” to match the population of the province. 
Another potential concern associated with the survey data is the effect of the 
time of year when the survey was conducted.  The survey aimed for completion 
                                               
14 Despite the small urban sub-samples, The Asia Foundation Survey is notable for the consistency of 






within a single month during each year it was conducted.  In seven of the eleven years 
in this study, the survey began in June, and in three of the eleven years, the survey 
began in July.  The most extreme case was in 2016 when the survey began on August 
31 and ended on October 16.  To examine whether the timing of the survey had an 
effect, I also show results with yearly fixed effects and with adjusted years that begin 






Compared to two years ago, would you say that situation for your household has gotten 











Financial well-being of your household / Financial situation of your household 24.0 28.6 -4.6
Employment opportunities 9.0 11.8 -2.8
Availability of products in the market 15.5 19.9 -4.4
Quality of your food diet 19.0 23.5 -4.5
Physical conditions of your house/dwelling 17.2 22.2 -5.0
Health well-being of your family members 23.1 29.8 -6.6
Electric supply 12.3 24.3 -12.0
Access to schools 28.7 37.8 -9.1
Any indicator 53.8 60.8 -7.0
Table 2.  Summary Statistics for Development Indicator Question (Weighted)
Note:  Shown are the mean of the provincial rural and urban percentages for the 18 provinces in the analysis weighted by the 
average provincial population.
Table 3.  Summary Statistics for Development Observation Question (Weighted)
Speaking of the past 12 months, do you know of, heard of any project or 









Reconstruction/ building of roads, bridges 42.4 48.7 -6.4
Water supply/ Water supply for drinking 34.9 35.5 -0.6
Water supply for irrigation 19.7 19.5 0.3
Electricity supply 12.8 24.3 -11.5
Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.) 29.1 33.3 -4.2
Education (reconstruction/opening of school, more teachers etc.) 33.6 34.1 -0.5
De-mining 21.5 18.7 2.8
Demilitarization / disarmament 17.9 16.7 1.3
Reconstruction/programs in agriculture 21.3 17.1 4.2
Reconstruction/programs in industry 7.9 11.3 -3.4
Building new mosques 24.7 29.8 -5.1
Humanitarian programs – food, medicines, shelter, production materials, etc. 13.6 14.8 -1.2
Observed Any Development 75.5 77.4 -1.9
Note:  Shown are the mean of the provincial rural and urban percentages for the 18 provinces in the analysis weighted by 





The development indicator questions ask whether conditions in different areas 
of development have improved.  Respondents can answer that conditions are “better,” 
“the same,” or “worse.”  I focus on both the share of urban and rural respondents in a 
province who said that any of the development indicators were better as well as on 
the specific development indicators that urban and rural respondents reported as being 
better.  From 2007 through 2014, the survey asked respondents about changes 
“compared to two years ago.”  From 2015 through 2017, the survey asked 
respondents about changes “compared to one year ago.”  The exact effects of this 
change in wording are uncertain, but I expect the effects to be minimal as events in 
the more recent year are likely to dominate respondents’ perspectives even when 
asked about the two-year horizon.  Using yearly fixed effects also helps address 
potential concerns with the year-to-year changes in survey wording.  Table 2 
summarizes the development indicator questions and the “any indicator” measure 
after weighting by provincial population.  
The development observation questions ask whether different types of 
development projects were observed, allowing responses of “yes” or “no.”  The 
question had a minor change in wording in 2013 from “speaking of the last 12 
months” to “in the past 12 months.”  This minor change seems unlikely to have any 
effect.  In this study, I focus on the percent of urban and rural respondents in a 
province who said yes to observing any type of development project as well as to the 
specific types of development projects they reported observing.  Table 3 summarizes 
the development observation questions as well as the measure of observing any 








I use two different data sources for the dependent variable of urban violence, 
and I examine the results for these two data sources separately for robustness.  I use 
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Global Events Database (GED) for a 
measure of the number of non-insurgent deaths, and I use the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Database (GTD) for a measure of 
the number of insurgent attacks.  These datasets are useful for longitudinal analysis 
because they maintain the same basic data collection method throughout the time 
period.  Both sources identify events from media reporting and documents.  SIGACT 



















Table 4.  Events Data Summary Statistics
Note:  Events in the 18 provinces with urban 
and rural survey data from 2007-2017 with 
event precision at the district level for GED 
(precision code <= 3) and attack specificity in 
a city, town, or village but with the nearest 






longitudinal analysis, particularly for events since 2014 due to U.S. troop level 
reductions to less than 10,000 across the country.  The reduced troop footprint means 
that the reported attacks will not provide a comprehensive picture of violence across 
the country.  While both datasets tend to be biased against reporting rural violence 
because of their reliance on media reports, the urban bias works in favor of the urban 
violence focus of this study.  This is the case because the goal is to gauge the 
relationship between development (whether rural or urban) and urban violence.  The 
expected absence of reporting on violence in rural areas is thus relatively less critical.   
 Still, the levels of geographic precision that are available for events within the 
GED and GTD data are important.  The most precision across the survey data is the 
district of the respondents.  (GPS coordinates for respondents are only in the survey 
data for 2016 and 2017.)  Thus, before aggregating either GED or GTD data to the 
province level, I restrict the events and attacks counted to those in the districts of 
urban respondents.  In the GED data, I further limit the data to all events with a 
precision code indicating it is accurate to the district level (precision code <= 3).  In 
the GED data for Afghanistan, 88 percent of the events have a precision code of three 
or better.  In the GTD data, I keep all events with a specificity indicating that the 
“event occurred in city/village/town and no lat/long [latitude/longitude] could be 
found, so coordinates are for [the] centroid of smallest subnational administrative 
region identified” (specificity code <= 2).  In the GTD data for Afghanistan, 55 
percent of the events have a specificity code of two or better.  Table 4 summarizes the 





As is evident, there are tradeoffs between the two datasets and the geographic 
precision that each allow.  The usable GED data have a more substantial percentage 
of the data with a precision level that aligns with the district level precision of the 
respondents, but it remains uncertain whether the events in those districts are rural or 
urban, since most districts include both types of areas.  The GTD specificity code that 
uses city, village, or town coordinates provides more confidence that the events are 
urban, but less of the whole dataset has this specificity.  Given the presence of these 
tradeoffs, using both datasets as dependent variables in separate analyses adds 
confidence to the findings that are consistent between the two. 
Covariates 
 The overall approach is to examine the relationship between the measures of 
progress in development in rural and urban areas on measures of urban violence.  In 
the preferred model, the primary controls come from provincial fixed effects.  In 
additional specifications, I include controls at the provincial level for population, 
demographics, and the environment with random effects and in OLS regressions.  For 
yearly population estimates, I use the estimates from the Afghan CSO.  For the 
demographic and environmental controls, I use xSub’s cross-national data on 
subnational violence (Zhukov, Davenport, and Kostyuk).  The controls from xSub for 
each province are the percentage of open terrain, the maximum elevation, the number 
of ethnic groups, the number of languages, the number of built-up areas, the number 
of petroleum fields, the density of roads, the temperature based on 2014, and the 







The empirical work assesses the relationship between rural and urban 
development and the two measures of urban violence.  Comparing the relative effects 
of rural and urban development on urban violence requires using a province-year unit 
of analysis and including measures of rural and urban development in the same 
equation.  Within each province, I sum the number of urban and rural respondents, 
the number of rural and urban respondents who said a development indicator was 
“better” for each development indicator, and the number of rural and urban 
respondents who answered “yes” to each development observation as I collapse the 
data into a province-year unit of analysis.  I then calculate the percentage of rural and 
urban respondents for each province-year who answered “better” to development 
indicators or “yes” to development observations.  When I collapse the data into the 
province-year, I weight the survey responses using sampling weights.15  The sampling 
weights I use are those given by the Asia Foundation that were stratified by province 
and rural-urban status (MergeWeight1).  I also create variables for whether individual 
respondents answered that any development indicator question was “better” or that 
any development observation was “yes.”     
 Equation (1) is the basic estimation equation, with X denoting the various sets 
of control variables:   
urbanViolence = ß0 + ß1ruralDev + ß2urbanDev + ßX + e     (1) 
In the initial set of models, the dependent variable, urbanViolence, denotes the 
number of non-insurgent deaths from an event in the GED.  I later use the number of 
                                               





attacks from the GTD as an alternative dependent variable for robustness.  The 
variable ruralDev is the percentage of rural respondents who indicate that 
development was “better” or that “yes” development was observed, while urbanDev 
provides the corresponding information for urban respondents.   
I first estimate equation (1) using the measure of development on the right-
hand side for whether any development indicator was better or any development was 
observed.  This baseline (and streamlined) specification is estimated using provincial 
level fixed effects and clustered standard errors.  I examine results with and without a 
one-year lag of the dependent variable (non-insurgent deaths) as well as with and 
without weighting by the average provincial population.  To examine the robustness 
of the approach, I also show regression results that include random effects with and 
without the provincial environmental controls, and with OLS weighted by the yearly 
provincial population.  After estimating regressions involving the right-hand side 
variables for whether any indicator was better or any development was observed, I 
estimate corresponding regression equations for each different type of development 
indicator and development observation.  That is, my initial specification has the 
broadest measure of development, after which subsequent regressions examine more 
finely-grained survey results regarding different types of development. 
I further estimate models with independent variable lags and models limited to 
the time periods of 2007 to 2014 and 2015 to 2017.  (The end of 2014 marked the end 
of major combat operations by the United States and International Security 
Assistance Forces in the Afghan conflict.)  For additional robustness, I estimate 





a model in which the dependent variable violent event counts are on an adjusted July-
June definition of a year rather than a Gregorian calendar year to account for when 
respondents were surveyed.  Lastly, I estimate the results without Kabul to discern the 
extent to which the results are driven by the county’s most populous and important 
city.  In all cases, I show the results with and without population weighting using 
analytic weights (aweight in Stata).  The analytic weights have the effect of widening 
the standard errors as a consequence of the small number of urban respondents in 
some areas.   
 
 Two concerns with this regression model are the possibilities of serial and 
spatial correlation.  There are multiple possible approaches for correcting the standard 
errors in short, wide panel datasets with serial correlation.  As a general approach, I 
cluster errors at the provincial level, which typically results in errors that are robust to 
serial correlation.  For additional robustness, I also show both Prais-Winsten 
estimates and Driscoll and Kraay standard errors.   





With respect to spatial correlation, concerns are small because it is only the 
districts with urban areas that comprise the dependent variable, and the distance 
between urban areas is great for most of the country—there is a sense in which each 
of the urban areas are akin to islands surrounded by rural territory.  (Figure 1 
highlights the districts with urban populations to allow visualization.)  In addition, the 
Afghan landscape is vastly different from one in the United States in which 
municipalities abut each other in a continuous urban area.  In Afghanistan, adjoining 
districts with urban populations have rural areas between their towns.  Still, even 
though the environment reduces concerns about spatial correlation, I further address 
the issue by limiting the analysis to the areas in the eastern, central, and southern 
regions to show that the adjoining districts with urban areas in the north and west are 
not dominating the estimates.  Focusing only on the eastern, central, and south 
regions limits the analysis to regions in which none of the urban areas are adjacent or 
even close to adjacent to each other.  Usefully, this robustness check has a dual effect 
of also confirming that the estimates are not driven by the relatively less kinetic (that 








Table 5a. Any Indicator of Better Development and Non-Insurgent Deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV lag
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial RE and 
clustered standard 
errors






OLS weighted by 
yearly provincial 
population
Rural Percent Any Better -0.1202 -0.1804 -0.4113 -0.2636 -0.1682 -0.3392
(0.0961) (0.1777) (0.3442) (0.2356) (0.1895) (0.2706)
Urban Percent Any Better 0.1194 0.1617 0.1585 0.1793 0.1425 0.1301
(0.0990) (0.1511) (0.1943) (0.1900) (0.1558) (0.2331)
Lag 1 Non-Insurgent Deaths 0.4003*** 0.5980*** 0.7830*** 0.4713*** 0.5895***
(0.1106) (0.1898) (0.0640) (0.0781) (0.0969)
Total Population, CSO (thousands) 0.0179*** 0.0185***
(0.0017) (0.0043)
Province Area (square km) 0.0007** 0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Percent Open Terrain -72.9137*** -84.7485*
(20.3019) (46.5432)
ln (Max Elevation) (meters) -38.0892*** -40.8960
(12.1351) (26.6467)
Number Ethnic Groups -2.6362 -0.2440
(2.1216) (3.3548)
Number Languages -1.1410 -1.7550
(1.7421) (3.1119)
Number Built-up Areas -1.2928 -1.9066
(1.9627) (3.6248)
Number Petroleum Fields -11.1110** -12.2881
(5.0209) (10.3979)
Road Density (km/square km) 41.7236 -10.8234
(41.2304) (113.4824)
Temperature, 2014 (Celsius) -0.7987** -0.9192
(0.4056) (1.1450)
Rain, 2014 (mm) 4.5535*** 4.7712
(1.4272) (7.3222)
Constant 36.5080*** 25.0065*** 35.0764*** 13.5719** 342.5335*** 387.5098*
(4.6641) (3.8558) (5.6465) (5.5070) (93.5896) (223.6209)
Observations 171 146 146 146 146 146
R-squared 0.0043 0.1331 0.2194 0.6276
Number of Province Clusters 18 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:  All of the data were weighted with sampling weights when aggregated to the province-year level.  Columns 3 and 6 were wegithed with analytic 
weights according to CSO population estimate.  Column 3 weights are by average provincial population estimates to allow provincial fixed effects.  Column 6 







The results are not significant at traditional levels of significance in all 
specifications, but they are widely consistent, and the differences between the rural 
and urban development relationships are distinct.  When any development indicator 
(Table 5a) or any development observation (Table 5b) are the independent variables 
of interest, the point estimates for rural development are consistently negative while 
the point estimates for urban development are consistently positive.  In addition, the 
point estimates for rural development are always larger in magnitude than those for 
urban development.  For the development indicators in Table 5a, the estimated 
Table 5b. Any Observation of Development and Non-Insurgent Deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV lag
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial RE and 
clustered standard 
errors






OLS weighted by 
yearly provincial 
population
Rural Percent Any Yes -0.3410 -0.4112 -0.8803* -0.2815 -0.3809* -0.7645***
(0.2158) (0.2737) (0.4993) (0.2508) (0.2281) (0.2160)
Urban Percent Any Yes 0.1782** 0.2003** 0.2815* 0.1809 0.3069** 0.4248**
(0.0824) (0.0892) (0.1522) (0.1362) (0.1228) (0.2140)
Lag 1 Non-Insurgent Deaths 0.4125*** 0.5618*** 0.7971*** 0.4608*** 0.5612***
(0.1031) (0.1218) (0.0717) (0.0724) (0.0931)
Total Population, CSO (thousands) 0.0190*** 0.0194***
(0.0014) (0.0044)
Province Area (square km) 0.0007*** 0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Percent Open Terrain -81.8451*** -89.2743*
(18.3569) (45.6994)
ln (Max Elevation) (meters) -40.6728*** -43.3233*
(10.7822) (25.8540)
Number Ethnic Groups -3.2278* -1.3809
(1.8269) (3.1809)
Number Languages -0.9377 -1.6308
(1.3254) (2.9375)
Number Built-up Areas -2.9676 -4.1825
(1.9225) (3.5983)
Number Petroleum Fields -9.0862* -9.0591
(4.7748) (10.1274)
Road Density (km/square km) 69.6987* 41.2333
(39.9757) (111.0994)
Temperature, 2014 (Celsius) -0.9802*** -1.0020
(0.3535) (1.1139)
Rain, 2014 (mm) 5.7730*** 5.0753
(1.0694) (7.2355)
Constant 48.8223** 39.3897** 68.4371** 16.6965 367.5022*** 419.7330*
(18.9056) (17.6379) (29.2582) (15.9638) (89.5938) (216.5361)
Observations 171 146 146 146 146 146
R-squared 0.0267 0.1590 0.2821 0.6505
Number of Province Clusters 18 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:  All of the data were weighted with sampling weights when aggregated to the province-year level.  Columns 3 and 6 were wegithed with analytic 
weights according to CSO population estimate.  Column 3 weights are by average provincial population estimates to allow provincial fixed effects.  Column 6 





coefficients for any improvement in a rural development indicator range from -0.1202 
to -0.4113 while the comparable urban development coefficients range from 0.1194 
to 0.1793.   Similarly, for the development observations in Table 5b, the estimated 
coefficients for observing any type of rural development range from -0.2815 to  
-0.8803, and the comparable urban development coefficients range from 0.1782 to 
0.4248.  That is, the results suggest—though at only moderate levels of statistical 
significance—that rural development is associated with a reduction in urban violence 
while urban development is associated with increased violence in urban areas.  
Further, the relationship is consistent with both the indicators of “better” development 
in Table 5a and the observations of development in Table 5b.  Confidence levels for 
the negative rural development relationship range from 63 to 79 percent in Table 5a 
and 74 to 99 percent in Table 5b depending on the specification. 
Column (3) in each table with provincial fixed effects, clustered standard 
errors, one dependent variable lag, and weighting by the average provincial 
population provides the preferred specification because of its parsimony, the 
robustness of the standard errors, and accurate reflection of the importance of 
different population centers.  The magnitude of the rural development indicator 
coefficient of about -0.4 (Table 5a, Column (3)) indicates that an increase in those 
who said development was better in rural areas by 10 percentage points would 
correspond to an average decrease of four non-insurgent deaths per province-year.  
With the mean number of deaths per province-year in those districts with urban 
respondents being 37, a 10 percentage point increase in better rural development 





from Table 5a is a lower end estimate compared to the estimates in Table 5b for 
respondents who said they observed development.  With a rural development 
observation coefficient of about -0.9 (Table 5b, Column (3)), a 10 percentage point 
increase in observing rural development corresponds to a 24 percent decrease in 





Better Financial Conditions -0.7175 0.1394
(0.5652) (0.1658)
Better Employment -1.1561 -0.0127
(0.8197) (0.1841)
Better Market Conditions -0.7367 -0.0113
(0.7575) (0.1571)
Better Food Quality -0.5535 -0.0031
(0.4745) (0.1232)
Better House Quality -1.0060 0.0881
(0.7350) (0.1344)
Better Family Health -0.3149 -0.1995
(0.3713) (0.2170)
Better Electricity 1.2774** -0.9221*
(0.5119) (0.4694)
Better Schools -0.4452 -0.1311
(0.5276) (0.0952)
Any Better -0.4113 0.1585
(0.3442) (0.1943)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:  Each row in the table is a separate regression.  The coefficients for each indicator 
come from separate regressions with provincial fixed effects, clustered standard errors, a one-
year dependent variable lag, and weights by average provincial population as in Table 5a 
column (3).  All of the data were weighted with sampling weights when aggregated to the 
province-year level and weighted with analytic weights according to the average provincial 
population in the fixed effects regression.






These results hold true for most of the individual types of development 
indicators and observations (Tables 6a and 6b).  For development indicators, the 
largest negative relationships for rural development are for employment and house 
quality (Table 6a).  The estimated coefficient on better rural employment is -1.1561, 
and the estimated coefficient on better rural house quality is -1.0060.  The only 




Observed Bridge or Road Development -0.6850 0.0975
(0.5488) (0.2156)
Observed Water Development -1.0170 0.1209
(0.6023) (0.1571)
Observed Irrigation Development -0.5774 -0.0284
(0.5218) (0.2588)
Observed Electricity Development -0.2705 -0.2910
(0.6385) (0.2607)
Observed Health Care Development -0.6571 -0.1187
(0.5354) (0.1907)
Observed Education Development -0.4635 0.1402
(0.2950) (0.2059)
Observed Demining -0.8942 0.3570
(0.5561) (0.3174)
Observed Demilitarization or Disarmament -0.7564 0.0292
(0.8275) (0.3467)
Observed Agricultural Development -0.6362** -0.4445
(0.2399) (0.2981)
Observed Industry Development 0.1330 -0.6385
(0.2827) (0.3744)
Observed Mosque Development 0.4255 -0.5260
(0.5750) (0.4019)
Observed Humanitarian Programs -0.5422 -0.0971
(0.6733) (0.1526)
Observed Any Development -0.8803* 0.2815*
(0.4993) (0.1522)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6b. Observed Development by Type and Non-Insurgent Deaths
Notes:  Each row in the table is a separate regression.  The coefficients for each indicator 
come from separate regressions with provincial fixed effects, clustered standard errors, a one-
year dependent variable lag, and weights by average provincial population as in Table 5b 
column (3).  All of the data were weighted with sampling weights when aggregated to the 
province-year level and weighted with analytic weights according to the average provincial 





areas.  The relationship for survey measures regarding electricity is also different 
from the general trend in Table 6b when progress with electricity was observed.  
Although the sign on the estimate for observing rural electricity development is 
negative in Table 6b, the magnitude diminishes to become very weakly negative, and 
the sign on observing urban electricity remains negative.  It appears that electricity 
development functions differently than other forms of development in Afghanistan. 
Most observations of rural development continue to follow the same overall 
trend with a negative rural coefficient that at least exceeds the magnitude of the urban 
development coefficient (Table 6b).  Rural bridge or road development, water 
development, irrigation development, health care development, education 
development, de-mining, and agricultural development all have associations with less 
urban violence at confidence levels beyond 68 percent.  For instance, the estimated 
coefficient for rural bridge or road development is -0.6850 compared to 0.0975 for 
urban bridge or road development, and the estimated coefficient for rural water 
development is -1.0170 compared to 0.1209 for urban water development.   
Deviating from the overall relationships between rural development 
observations and urban violence are measures regarding industry development and 
mosque development, for which rural observations have weak positive associations 
with urban violence and urban observations have negative associations with urban 
violence.  Still, the breadth of development observations that follow the trend and 
exhibit relationships with reductions in urban violence add strength to the argument 
that the act of rural development in general has an association with reduced urban 





suggest that it would be wise to focus rural development on areas other than 
electricity, industry, or mosque development. 
 
Table 7a. Any Indicator of Better Development with Lags and Non-Insurgent Deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Rural Percent Any Better -0.3772 -0.2109 -0.0266 -0.1421 -0.1766 -0.0388
(0.3819) (0.3403) (0.3709) (0.1881) (0.2233) (0.2180)
Lag 1 Rural Percent Any Better 0.0084 0.3294 0.3041 -0.1073 0.0158 -0.0409
(0.2625) (0.5125) (0.5128) (0.1166) (0.1803) (0.2464)
Lag 2 Rural Percent Any Better -0.6906* -0.5995 -0.3838* -0.3284*
(0.3897) (0.3752) (0.2123) (0.1704)
Lag 3 Rural Percent Any Better 0.1682 -0.0055
(0.2416) (0.1238)
Urban Percent Any Better 0.1582 -0.0511 -0.2636 0.1558 0.1571 0.0316
(0.1990) (0.3154) (0.3833) (0.1511) (0.2032) (0.2152)
Lag 1 Urban Percent Any Better -0.0722 -0.1554 -0.1582 0.0276 0.0135 0.0529
(0.2187) (0.3099) (0.3530) (0.1104) (0.1449) (0.2108)
Lag 2 Urban Percent Any Better 0.3749 0.3234 0.2305 0.1716
(0.2226) (0.2462) (0.1417) (0.1092)
Lag 3 Urban Percent Any Better -0.2909 0.0030
(0.3432) (0.1534)
Lag 1 Non-Insurgent Deaths 0.5899*** 0.6091** 0.6547** 0.3992*** 0.3723** 0.4002**
(0.1868) (0.2343) (0.2283) (0.1100) (0.1515) (0.1863)
Constant 37.6683*** 44.2062*** 50.7543*** 27.4963*** 31.7128*** 30.5623***
(6.3292) (7.4208) (15.4978) (5.0723) (6.6990) (10.2373)
Observations 146 135 123 146 135 123
R-squared 0.2219 0.3001 0.3397 0.1380 0.1636 0.1702
Number of Province Clusters 18 18 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:  All of the  data were weighted with sampling weights when aggregated to the province-year level.  Each regression has provincial fixed effects, 
clustered standard errors, and a one-year dependent variable lag.  Columns 1-3 were weighted with analytic weights by average provincial population.  








Examining models with lags of the independent variables, there is some 
evidence that the relationship between rural development and violence spans multiple 
years (Tables 7a and 7b).  Rural development two years prior has the relationship of 
the largest magnitude with reductions of violence.  The estimated coefficient of a 
two-year lag for any better rural indicator is -0.5995 in column (3) of Table 7a, and 
the estimated coefficient of a two-year lag for any rural development observation is  
-0.4048 in column (3) of Table 7b.  Meanwhile, urban development two years prior 
has a positive relationship with violence, with estimated coefficients of 0.3234 in 
column (3) of Table 7a and 0.1962 in column (3) Table 7b.  The lagged models offer 
a piece of evidence against the argument that the negative association between rural 
development and violence is due to a selection bias.  The selection bias would be that 
Table 7b. Any Observation of Development with Lags and Non-Insurgent Deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Rural Percent Any Yes -0.7593 -0.6220 -0.6597 -0.2913 -0.2560 -0.1880
(0.4944) (0.3662) (0.5179) (0.2356) (0.2380) (0.2687)
Lag 1 Rural Percent Any Yes -0.1506 0.0708 0.1331 -0.1737 -0.0897 -0.0348
(0.1984) (0.3409) (0.3458) (0.2289) (0.2659) (0.2445)
Lag 2 Rural Percent Any Yes -0.6266 -0.4058 -0.3970 -0.3604
(0.3696) (0.3367) (0.2462) (0.3144)
Lag 3 Rural Percent Any Yes -0.2523 0.0124
(0.5786) (0.2908)
Urban Percent Any Yes 0.3114* 0.3374* 0.2173 0.2195** 0.2949* 0.2465
(0.1591) (0.1924) (0.2090) (0.0979) (0.1455) (0.1521)
Lag 1 Urban Percent Any Yes -0.0627 -0.0561 -0.0539 -0.0228 -0.0005 -0.0379
(0.1716) (0.2058) (0.2056) (0.1081) (0.1380) (0.1347)
Lag 2 Urban Percent Any Yes 0.2697 0.1962 0.2661* 0.1967*
(0.1946) (0.1462) (0.1450) (0.0975)
Lag 3 Urban Percent Any Yes 0.0193 0.0495
(0.1871) (0.1498)
Lag 1 Non-Insurgent Deaths 0.5397*** 0.5453*** 0.5857*** 0.3933*** 0.3564** 0.3760*
(0.1255) (0.1691) (0.1732) (0.1045) (0.1408) (0.1790)
Constant 74.7413* 73.5580* 83.9069 44.8670* 39.5248 32.5045
(35.6594) (38.3864) (60.4966) (23.0530) (25.5748) (33.1623)
Observations 146 135 123 146 135 123
R-squared 0.2855 0.3285 0.3345 0.1647 0.1871 0.1781
Number of Province Clusters 18 18 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:  All of the  data were weighted with sampling weights when aggregated to the province-year level.  Each regression has provincial fixed effects, 
clustered standard errors, and a one-year dependent variable lag.  Columns 1-3 were weighted with analytic weights by average provincial population.  





rural development occurs only in areas where urban violence is already decreasing.  
The results in Tables 7a and 7b run against this argument, however.  Instead, they 
suggest that rural development precedes reductions in violence.   
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Rural Percent Any Better -0.2002 -0.0982
(0.3005) (0.2155)
Urban Percent Any Better 0.1232 0.1464
(0.2879) (0.2166)
Rural Percent Any Yes -0.7444* -0.3756
(0.3828) (0.2537)
Urban Percent Any Yes 0.4489* 0.2546
(0.2483) (0.1607)
Lag 1 Non-Insurgent Deaths 0.1105 0.2043* 0.1530 0.2347*
(0.1277) (0.1024) (0.1270) (0.1181)
Constant 45.3136*** 28.8400*** 63.2797* 39.4880**
(13.0309) (6.5406) (31.5897) (17.8585)
Observations 98 98 98 98
R-squared 0.0141 0.0548 0.0906 0.0765
Number of Province Clusters 17 17 17 17
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8a. Relationship Between Development and Non-Insurgent Deaths from 2007-2014 Only
Notes:  All of the data were weighted with sampling weights when aggregated to the province-year level.  Each 
regression has provincial fixed effects, clustered standard errors, and a one-year dependent variable lag.  Columns 1 







An important question is whether rural development only reduces violence 
when security forces are also active.  A way to examine changes related to the 
number of security forces in rural areas is to compare the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients that measure the relationship between indicators of development and 
violence during the separate periods when coalition forces were deployed to rural 
areas and when coalition forces were limited to urban areas.  By the end of 2014, 
International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan were reduced to just over 
13,000, which limited their presence to major cities (ISAF, December 1, 2014). 
The results in Table 8b weakly suggest that the relationship between 
development and violence persists even with a reduced presence of security forces in 
rural areas.  Columns (1) and (2) indicate that the same relationship between better 
rural development and less urban violence persists and may be even larger.  In 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Rural Percent Any Better -1.2054 -0.4095
(0.9881) (0.7817)
Urban Percent Any Better -0.8737 -0.5732*
(0.5242) (0.3188)
Rural Percent Any Yes 0.3595 0.2872
(0.6685) (0.5612)
Urban Percent Any Yes -0.1970 -0.1870
(0.5058) (0.3198)
Lag 1 Non-Insurgent Deaths 0.8077 0.3031 0.7676 0.0851
(0.4669) (0.4086) (0.7376) (0.3905)
Constant 138.0463*** 89.5136** 20.0892 35.1612
(47.0477) (36.6702) (42.0193) (22.6320)
Observations 32 32 32 32
R-squared 0.5695 0.2100 0.3005 0.0205
Number of Province Clusters 17 17 17 17
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8b. Relationship Between Development and Non-Insurgent Deaths from 2015-2017 Only
Notes:  All of the  data were weighted with sampling weights when aggregated to the province-year level.  Each 
regression has provincial fixed effects, clustered standard errors, and a one-year dependent variable lag.  Columns 1 






column (1), for instance, the estimated coefficient for any better rural development 
indicator is -1.2054.  However, columns (1) and (2) also show that the relationship 
between urban development and urban violence might change with less rural security 
forces.  For instance, the estimated coefficient in column (1) for any better urban 
development is -0.8737.  Columns (3) and (4) for observations of rural and urban 
development have point estimates that also seem to diverge from the trend, but wide 
standard errors give them very weak significance.  Overall, Table 8b provides some 
evidence that the overall relationship between rural development and urban violence 
remains even after the pullback of coalition forces away from rural areas, but the 
limited number of observations from the 2015-2017 time period makes for wide 
errors and low levels of statistical confidence.  We can say more confidently that rural 
development did have an association with less urban violence when security forces 
were present as a complement to development efforts from 2007 to 2014—the period 
when coalition forces had a greater presence in rural areas.  This relationship is 
consistent with that in Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011a) in which the wider 
presence of security forces during the troop surge in Iraq was found to enhance the 







(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Rural Percent Any Better -0.3103 -0.1786*
(0.1983) (0.1004)
Urban Percent Any Better 0.0214 0.0413
(0.1229) (0.0761)
Rural Percent Any Yes -0.7045*** -0.4506**
(0.2195) (0.1856)
Urban Percent Any Yes -0.0398 0.0063
(0.0857) (0.0752)
Lag 1 Non-Insurgent Deaths 0.2385* 0.0978 0.1926** 0.1003
(0.1318) (0.1038) (0.0780) (0.0934)
Constant 40.8765*** 33.7680*** 83.1060*** 59.4062***
(4.0173) (2.9957) (13.5224) (9.4234)
Observations 153 153 153 153
R-squared 0.2164 0.0627 0.3902 0.1689
Number of Province Clusters 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9. Relationship Between Development and Attacks in GTD
Notes:  All of the  data were weighted with sampling weights when aggregated to the province-year level.  Each 
regression has provincial fixed effects, clustered standard errors, and a one-year dependent variable lag.  Columns 1 
and 3 were weighted with analytic weights by average provincial population.  Columns 2 and 4 were not weighted by 
population.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Rural Percent Any Better -0.9985** -0.7371
(0.4454) (0.4894)
Urban Percent Any Better -0.2767 -0.0556
(0.2777) (0.1341)
Rural Percent Any Yes -1.3230** -0.8341**
(0.5155) (0.3433)
Urban Percent Any Yes 0.0472 0.1367
(0.2054) (0.1049)
Lag 1 Non-Insurgent Deaths 0.5057*** 0.3578*** 0.5493*** 0.3776***
(0.1302) (0.1123) (0.1382) (0.1146)
Yearly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 90.8621*** 64.6421** 117.3912*** 73.0707**
(28.1271) (28.8042) (40.4571) (25.5506)
Observations 146 146 146 146
R-squared 0.3768 0.2360 0.3971 0.2500
Number of Province Clusters 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10. Relationship Between Development and and Non-Insurgent Deaths with Yearly Fixed Effects
Notes:  All of the data were weighted with sampling weights when aggregated to the province-year level.  Each 
regression has provincial fixed effects, clustered standard errors, and a one-year dependent variable lag.  Columns 1 








(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Rural Percent Any Better 0.0601 -0.0138
(0.1588) (0.0958)
Urban Percent Any Better -0.0701 0.0889
(0.2119) (0.0978)
Rural Percent Any Yes -0.5931 -0.1975
(0.3589) (0.2311)
Urban Percent Any Yes 0.1669 0.1040
(0.1419) (0.0901)
Lag 1 Non-Insurgent Deaths 0.5124* 0.2823 0.5205** 0.2907
(0.2554) (0.1644) (0.2443) (0.1685)
Constant 27.8816*** 25.1328*** 56.8469** 35.5381*
(9.1665) (7.4959) (20.3900) (16.9053)
Observations 142 142 142 142
R-squared 0.2062 0.0841 0.2615 0.0832
Number of Province Clusters 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11. Relationship Between Development and Non-Insurgent Deaths for Adjusted Years
Notes:  All of the data were weighted with sampling weights when aggregated to the province-year level.  Columns 1 
and 3 were regressed with analytic weights by average provincial populatin.  Columns 2 and 4 were not weighted by 
population.  Adjusted years for the dependent variable run from July 1 of the year prior to the survey to June 30 of the 
year of the survey.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Rural Percent Any Better -0.1427 -0.1158
(0.1789) (0.1541)
Urban Percent Any Better 0.2142 0.1872
(0.1747) (0.1449)
Rural Percent Any Yes -0.1665 -0.1749
(0.1993) (0.1885)
Urban Percent Any Yes 0.2787** 0.2064**
(0.1309) (0.0880)
Lag 1 Non-Insurgent Deaths 0.3033*** 0.2919*** 0.3148*** 0.3079***
(0.0766) (0.0739) (0.0693) (0.0744)
Constant 22.0059*** 21.1222*** 17.4440 22.3005
(6.1177) (4.8421) (16.0120) (13.8236)
Observations 136 136 136 136
R-squared 0.1230 0.1150 0.1256 0.1124
Number of Province Clusters 17 17 17 17
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 12. Without Kabul, Relationship Between Development and Non-Insurgent Deaths
Notes:  All of the data were weighted with sampling weights when aggregated to the province-year level.  Columns 1 






Several additional robustness checks include using attacks in the GTD as a 
secondary dependent variable to measure violence, estimating the relationship with 
yearly fixed effects, estimating the relationship with an adjusted July-June year for 
the dependent variable, and estimating the relationship without Kabul.  Using the 
GTD data offers a secondary dependent variable that emphasizes counting the 
number of attacks rather than the number of deaths.  The relationships in these 
alternative regression specifications are broadly comparable in substance to when the 
GED data was used (Table 9).  In column (1) of Table 9, rural development has a 
relatively large negative relationship with the number of urban attacks with an 
estimated coefficient of -0.3103, and urban development has an estimated relationship 
very close to zero with an estimate of 0.0214 and a standard error that exceeds the 
magnitude of the coefficient.  In addition, the rural relationships to GTD attacks in 
Table 9 have slightly higher levels of statistical significance, with the weakest in 
column (1) at 87 percent, compared to the rural relationship with GED non-insurgent 
deaths as the dependent variable in Table 5a and Table 5b in which the lowest 
confidence level was 63 percent.  
Additionally, the results are robust to adding yearly fixed effects (Table 10), 
which effectively control for changes in the environment by year as well as for the 
few changes to survey questions.  Including yearly fixed effects actually increases 
both the magnitude of the estimated coefficients and the level of statistical 
significance of the estimates for both rural development indicators and development 
observations compared to Table 5a and 5b.  The estimated coefficient of -0.9985 for 





-1.3230 for any rural development observation in column (3) are both significant at 
the 95 percent confidence level. 
Such strong effects are not as evident when adjusting to a June-July year to 
account for the potential difference in the period that survey respondents may have 
been recalling when they were interviewed (Table 11).  For the development 
indicators (Columns (1) and (2)), the relationship goes down to near zero for both 
rural and urban development.  The estimated coefficients in columns (1) and (2) for 
rural and urban development indicators are less than the standard errors.  For 
development observations (Columns (3) and (4)), however, the results are consistent 
in magnitude and direction with those in the rest of the analysis.  The estimated 
coefficient for a rural development observation of -0.5931 and the estimated 
coefficient for an urban development observation of 0.1669 in column (3) are 
consistent in magnitude and direction with the overall results.  It could be that 
assessing whether development improved over a period was less concrete than 
whether development was observed at all, making the timing associated with the 
recollections more consequential.  Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, the results 
may be more messy with a July-June year because the time period spans two fighting 
seasons, and there may be variation in the times of fighting seasons due to differences 
such as the timing of the rainy season.   
A final attribute of the results that becomes apparent from the robustness 
checks is that the results are significantly influenced by Kabul.  Without Kabul, the 
magnutidue of the rural estimates maintain the same signs, but the levels of 





makes sense to report the primary results with Kabul because of its importance in 
Afghanistan, Table 12 reveals that the trends are less clear in some of the smaller 
urban areas.  The importance of Kabul in the results is consistent with (indeed, 
explains) the differences in some of the preceding tables with and without population 
weights.  Including population weights, which gives Kabul greater importance as the 
largest city, increases the magnitude of the estimates. 
Uncertainties and Limitations 
One potential question with the results relates to the precision of both the 
GED and GTD data.  Neither dataset includes every attack nor does the data precision 
allow complete confidence that only urban violence is measured.  Still, these data are 
the best available for a longitudinal study, and the consistency between the results 
using the two different sources of information on violence provides some confidence 






 Another potential question relates to serial correlation.  The Wooldridge test 
for autocorrelation finds that there is first-order autocorrelation at the one percent 
confidence level, which is not surprising based on the significance of the independent 
variable lags in Tables 7a and 7b.  While the method throughout the analysis of 
clustering standard errors is typically seen as robust to serial correlation, several other 
procedures are also suggested in the literature for adjusting the standard errors in 



















Errors with Max 
Ten
Lags
Rural Percent Any Better -0.3447 -0.4340* -0.1495 -0.1495
(0.2533) (0.2410) (0.2659) (0.1436)
Urban Percent Any Better 0.1335 0.2205 0.0746 0.0746
(0.2275) (0.2111) (0.2059) (0.1056)
Lag 1 Non-Insurgent Deaths 0.5665*** 0.5675***
(0.1875) (0.1860)
Total Population, CSO (thousands) 0.0192** 0.0196** 0.0338*** 0.0338***
(0.0076) (0.0079) (0.0098) (0.0069)
Province Area (square km) 0.0004 0.0004 0.0012*** 0.0012***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Percent Open Terrain -87.6813** -99.2768** -152.1736*** -152.1736***
(35.4531) (40.2534) (36.9794) (19.8341)
ln (Max Elevation) (meters) -42.1920** -44.2151** -70.9859*** -70.9859***
(19.1860) (18.8596) (13.3599) (9.0159)
Number Ethnic Groups -0.3126 -0.2335 -3.6243 -3.6243
(2.1792) (2.2089) (2.8822) (2.3931)
Number Languages -1.8791 -1.2590 -3.3367 -3.3367*
(2.1828) (2.3120) (2.4666) (1.6709)
Number Built-up Areas -1.9949 -1.4293 -4.0969 -4.0969**
(2.8803) (2.1996) (2.4333) (1.7752)
Number Petroleum Fields -12.6857* -14.4405** -21.1437*** -21.1437***
(7.3869) (6.4284) (6.1327) (3.6940)
Road Density (km/square km) -8.9428 -10.9367 71.0766* 71.0766***
(70.6297) (65.2037) (40.3251) (19.0960)
Temperature, 2014 (Celsius) -0.9278 -0.9275* -1.1909** -1.1909***
(0.5683) (0.5620) (0.4148) (0.1778)
Rain, 2014 (mm) 4.9876* 6.4210* 9.8868*** 9.8868***
(2.5959) (3.4816) (1.7772) (1.1455)
Constant 399.6529** 415.0140*** 653.1505*** 653.1505***
(161.1256) (158.4130) (120.7006) (79.7287)
Observations 146 146 171 171
R-squared 0.6046 0.5650 0.6355 0.6355
Number of Province Clusters/Groups 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:  All of the data were weighed with sampling weights when aggregated to the province-year level and were 
regressed with analytic weights by the provincial population in a given year.






short, wide panel data with autocorrelation.  In Table 13, I show multiple methods for 
robustness.  Each has tradeoffs.  First, I show Prais-Winsten estimates using the Stata 
command xtpsce.  A limitation of the Prais-Winsten estimates is that they only 
account for an AR1 lag structure.  From Table 7a, AR2 and AR3 lags may also be 
significant.  To try to get at a longer lag structure, I use Stata command xtscc, which 
estimates Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors for panel regressions with cross-
sectional dependence.  With xtscc, I can set the maximum number of lags up to 10.  I 
find that with either two or 10 lags, the strength of the statistical significance 
decreases, but the relative relationships between rural and urban development remain 
consistent.   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, weighted by 
average provincial 
population
Provincial FE and 
clustered standard 
errors with DV 
lag, unweighted
Rural Percent Any Better -0.9146 -0.4914
(0.6864) (0.3967)
Urban Percent Any Better 0.3877 0.3602
(0.4140) (0.3140)
Rural Percent Any Yes -1.5013* -0.9443
(0.6455) (0.5514)
Urban Percent Any Yes 0.5312 0.3765
(0.4196) (0.2762)
Lag 1 Non-Insurgent Deaths 0.7613*** 0.5291** 0.6590*** 0.5510***
(0.2026) (0.1659) (0.0851) (0.1175)
Constant 44.2752*** 32.1356*** 99.3766** 70.0506
(9.8194) (6.9480) (36.9018) (38.2683)
Observations 69 69 69 69
R-squared 0.3202 0.2015 0.4073 0.2628
Number of Province Clusters 8 8 8 8
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 14. Without Northeast, Northwest, and West, Relationship Between Development and Non-Insurgent 
Deaths
Notes:  All of the data were weighted with sampling weights when aggregated to the province-year level.  Columns 1 






In addition to serial correlation, there remains potential (even if minor) 
concern with spatial effects.  Adding a robustness check that removes the northeast, 
northwest, and west provinces from the analysis creates a sub-set of the data in which 
none of the urban areas are adjacent, or close to adjacent, to each other, removing the 
potential for spatial correlation.  The results from this sub-set of the data are highly 
consistent with the overall results (Table 14).  These results also indicate that the 
findings about the role of rural development are not driven by the less kinetic, less 
Pashtun provinces in the north.  Rural development correlates to reductions in urban 
violence, even in the provinces that have been the most difficult for coalition forces to 
secure. 
A final set of questions pertain to causality.  For one, these models only allow 
estimation of an association and do not identify causation from rural and urban 
development to urban violence.  In principle, it is possible that development efforts 
respond to violence.  Secondarily, the exact mechanism by which rural development 
might have a greater effect on insurgents than urban development remains uncertain.  
Opportunity cost, goods competition, and information-sharing, or co-option are all 
possible mechanisms.  The design of this study does not allow a causal claim.  Rather, 
it suggests that a different way of thinking about the relationship between 
development and stabilization may be necessary. 
Implications for the Role of Development during Counterinsurgency and Stabilization 
Development in counterinsurgency and stabilization theory is most often 
expected to legitimize governance.  From there, theorists expect subsequent effects on 





in the same area in which the development is carried out.  However, the evidence here 
suggests another construct that may be useful for counterinsurgents.  The link from 
development through governance to security in a given area may be weak in countries 
like Afghanistan with harsh terrain and weak security institutions, as the positive 
correlation between urban development and urban violence suggests.  Instead, the 
impacts of development on violence may reflect the way insurgent networks function 
in practice.  Development in the rural areas may have stabilizing downstream effects 
on urban areas because it is in rural areas where insurgents have support zones in 
Afghanistan.   
 This finding is consistent with recent reporting that the Taliban has been 
increasingly co-opting with rather than resisting development in rural Afghanistan.  
Johnson (2018) writes, “As U.S. and Afghan forces pull back to protect major 
cities—as part of Washington’s new strategy—the Taliban are filling the vacuum.”  
She continues later, “the Taliban leadership realized that instead of attacking 
government schools and aid projects, it could gain much more by co-opting them.  In 
doing so, it could take credit for providing services and win over the local 
population.”  That the Taliban chooses to co-opt with development suggests that the 
ability to control flows of development can be an asymmetric advantage for 
counterinsurgents.  However, such development may have more of a coalition-
building than a legitimizing character, and such coalitions cannot be built when 
development does not reach out into the areas insurgents reside. 
This contention has roots in Lindsay and Petersen’s 2011 study of 





tends to emphasize resources spent on neutrals and weak, unorganized government or 
insurgent supporters but that more direct engagement with local insurgent 
supporters—what they call community mobilization—can have higher payoffs for 
stabilization (25).  In the case of Afghanistan, neutrals or weak supporters of either 
side are likely more prevalent in urban areas, while local insurgents are likely more 
prevalent in rural areas.  Hence, the Lindsay and Petersen framework connects with 
the empirically higher payoffs from rural development this analysis finds in 
Afghanistan. 
While it is true that insurgencies in places other than Afghanistan may not 
always have rural roots, there is potentially a broader implication of the analysis here.  
In Afghanistan, rural development may disrupt urban attacks because insurgents 
commonly reside and stage in rural areas when conducting urban attacks.  Thus to 
make the application more general, this analysis suggests, first, that it may be relevant 
to devise and analyze development relative to the way insurgent networks function, 
and, second, that development may be more potent for countering insurgents in areas 
where insurgents stage than in the areas they attack.     
Implications for Security Force and Development Calculations 
The suggestion that development outside cities may be significant for security 
inside cities has a direct connection to calculations of security force and development 
requirements.  Traditionally, calculations of security force requirements during 
counterinsurgency have been based only on population counts.  McGrath (2006) notes 
that geography can be significant for troop requirements, but he makes geographical 





on ratios of security forces to population counts has been prevalent based on the logic 
of securing the population.  Quinlivan (1995) described that strong insurgencies 
required force ratios around 20 security forces per 1,000 population.  Later, McGrath 
(2006) offered a smaller estimate of 13.21 per 1,000 population. 
Even more directly connected to the urban focus of this study has been a 
special emphasis on urban policing requirements since McGrath (2006).  McGrath 
found that 4.1 per 1,000 was the minimum ratio necessary for policing urban areas, 
even when there was not insurgency.  Later, Goode (2009) offered an estimate of 2.8 
per 1,000 as the minimum for urban policing (55).  Each of these estimates suggest 
what it takes to physically secure urban populations with security forces.   
These conceptions may be missing the potential security-enhancing effect of 
development outside cities.  If development outside cities is significant for the 
security of cities, it may be reasonable to connect security force requirements to what 
is necessary to enable development in those areas—both from a security and a 
logistical perspective.  Past counterinsurgent security force footprints in Afghanistan 
have been either limited to urban areas (2002 to 2008 and 2015 to 2017) or reached 
out to most districts (2010 to 2012).  There might be a reasonable middle ground that 
makes it hard for insurgents to conduct attacks in population centers.  Security forces 
and development could be concentrated in areas that immediately surround 
population centers, say 30 kilometers around each.  If this footprint were sustained, 
the characteristics of risk and commitment could be attained.   
This approach would aim to reduce the ability of insurgents to carry out urban 





minimal value to insurgents; they are hard to exploit in the information war.  Urban 
attacks garner media attention and create disproportionate perceptions of insurgent 
strength.  If insurgents cannot conduct urban attacks, they might be reduced to being 
seen as political parties or irrelevant militias.   
While this approach embraces a sovereignty gap, others including Ghani and 
Lockhart (2009) always expected a sovereignty gap in Afghanistan, and the 
sovereignty gap this approach accepts would be smaller than the existing urban-only 
footprint.  The empirics from my analysis suggest that the urban-only emphasis for 
security forces and development may not contribute to security improvements for 
urban populations.  Recent reporting gathers that insurgent capabilities to conduct 
urban attacks are robust and that the conflict is at a “stalemate” (Seligman 2018).  
Rural development around cities might allow enough coalition-building to reduce 
urban attacks and break the stalemate.    
Conclusion 
 The indication that rural support may be a relevant contributor to urban 
attacks in Afghanistan is more consistent with Blair et. al. (2013) than Mousseau 
(2011), and it implies that the urban-centric institutional development focus 
characterizing current U.S. development efforts may not well-suited to reducing 
violence and having stabilizing effects.  Institutional investments in urban areas could 
have great effects in the very long-term (say over a horizon of 10-20 years), but the 
absence of rural development in the interim is likely to mean that large urban attacks 
will continue with little impediment.  The implication is that development work could 









This analysis should not be taken to mean that urban development is not 
necessary, or that rural development is cheap or easy.  The extent of the difference 
between rural and urban development seems important.  To examine the difference, I 
create gap variables for the differences between the rural and urban percentages who 
said that development indicators were better or that development was observed.  
Figure 2a.  Gap between Rural and Urban Development for 
Any Better Indicator 
Figure 2b.  Gap between Rural and Urban Development for 





Figures 2a and 2b show a consistent relationship between the gap for either 
development indicators or development observations and non-insurgent deaths when 
using locally weighted scatterplot smoothing to capture non-linearity.  The figures 
show that if rural development trails urban development by more than 30 percentage 
points (a gap that is more negative than -30), there is an association with increasing 
non-insurgent deaths.  Meanwhile, when the gap is between about -30 and -10 
percentage points, there is almost no change in the level of non-insurgent deaths.  The 
relationship between increasing rural development and decreasing violence exists 
whenever the rural-urban gap is on the positive side of -10 percentage points.  Hence, 
urban development may have weak effects on urban security when it exceeds rural 
development by greater than 10 percentage points, or adverse effects on urban 
security when it exceeds rural development by greater than 30 percentage points.    
Several factors may contribute to the weak or adverse effects when urban 
development dominates.  First, insurgents always have an incentive to attack urban 
areas and urban-dominant development does not pose a constraint, so insurgents can 
escalate violence freely.  Second, more urban development might make urban areas a 
more attractive target for insurgents to discredit counterinsurgents by conducting and 
exploiting urban attacks.  Third, urban-dominant development might expand the gaps 
in goods and services between the rural areas where insurgents reside and the urban 
areas, creating larger grievances and increasing rural support for insurgents.  Each of 
these three factors may contribute in part. 
Most importantly, the prominence of rural development’s relationship with 





highlights an important cost-benefit calculation.  While the calculations here do not 
allow a complete cost-benefit analysis, they do illuminate such analysis conceptually.  
Urban development might increase welfare for more people and is more cost 
efficient, but in Afghanistan, it does appear to reduce violence.  Rural development 
might reduce violence, but it has smaller marginal benefits and greater logistical 
costs.  Rural development may also have greater physical costs in the form of 
coalition force casualties.   
That an advantageous outcome in a conflict environment cannot come without 
risk and commitment should not be surprising.  Schelling (1966) valued the “art of 
commitment” and “manipulation of risk” in a very different security context—that of 
state-to-state coercion and compellence.  Hence, risk and commitment have pervasive 
importance for achieving security goals across the security spectrum.  It appears 
relevant to think about development during counterinsurgency and stabilization with 
these sources of influence in mind as well.  Yet because risk and commitment are 
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